OUR WAR ON TERROR REQUIRES NEW STRATEGIES

THE MILITARY campaign to capture Osama bin Laden and dismantle his
terrorist network runs the risk of repeating a critical mistake in the U.S.
government's long-standing anti-drug efforts in Latin America. A decade of
headhunting strategies in Colombia have not only failed to stem the tide of
illicit drugs to the United States, they have produced a more sophisticated
class of drug trafficker. The ongoing campaign in Afghanistan threatens to
do the same for Islamic terrorists.

Colombia has received substantial U.S. support since 1989, when the senior
President George Bush dramatically escalated the war on drugs. Shortly
thereafter, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration implemented the
"Kingpin" strategy seeking to dismantle the Colombian drug industry by
targeting leaders of the cocaine cartels.

The program achieved impressive results: Cocaine labs were destroyed,
transportation networks disrupted, drug proceeds seized, and capos captured.

But for all its tactical achievements, the headhunting approach to drug
control ultimately failed.

The Kingpin strategy and other programs aimed at leaders of the major
drug-trafficking organizations did not substantially change the price and
availability of cocaine in U.S. drug markets.

In Colombia, the production of cocaine - and heroin - increased
dramatically during the latter half of the 1990s, despite the loss of
hundreds of public officials in the ongoing struggle against the cartels.

In addition to decentralization of the drug industry, in which hundreds of
small "mom and pop" groups emerged to pick up the slack left by the
cartels, guerillas also increased their participation in the cocaine and
heroin trades.

One reason for the resilience of the drug industry is that enterprises
alter their practices in response to law enforcement efforts.

They do so by acquiring information about government anti-drug activities
from a variety of sources, including other smuggling groups, corrupt
government officials, the news media and public documents.

They store information in manuals, correspondence and computers.

They use information technology to protect their communications.

Many traffickers eventually fall prey to law enforcers.

A critical lesson of the Kingpin strategy was that cartel leaders could be
apprehended and their smuggling operations disrupted, at least temporarily,
when U.S. agencies cooperated with their Andean counterparts. But no sooner
were these underworld luminaries gunned down or imprisoned than
replacements emerged, eager to pick up where their predecessors left off.

To the chagrin of government officials, these new groups have proven even
more difficult to identify and dismantle.

Indeed, intelligence agencies find themselves victimized by their successes.

After removing the largest, most visible organizations from the Colombian
drug industry, they are left with hundreds of small, obscure yet
sophisticated groups about which they know next to nothing.

Like their criminal counterparts, al-Qaida, bin Laden's terrorist network,
is organized into loose networks of cells and core groups. Cells enjoy
autonomy in researching, planning and conducting operations, allowing for
the adjustment of everyday practices as circumstances warrant.

Hierarchies define responsibilities and rules for members.

They use fax machines, cell phones, e-mail and online chat rooms to
communicate and computers with encryption software to store information.

Operations are conducted in secrecy.

When planning operations, cell leaders draw upon instruction manuals.

Though separated from other cells in "enemy" territory, they are linked to
core groups that supply training, funding and ideological support to members.

Bin Laden is one among several leaders who provide a semblance of stewardship.

As the Kingpin strategy failed to curb the drug trade, the headhunting
approach to terrorism is unlikely to deter Islamic extremists. Even if U.S.
Marines and special forces wipe out bin Laden and his top associates, lower
ranking figures are likely to rise. If the military campaign disables
entire networks, other groups with similar goals are likely to emerge from
the rubble, drawing upon bin Laden's martyrdom for inspiration.

In focusing our military, law enforcement and intelligence resources on
individuals and groups, we run the risk of merely weeding out the most
notorious enterprises and providing opportunities for lesser known, more
technologically sophisticated operations to materialize. Instead, the
United States should devote greater diplomatic and political resources to
addressing the "demand-side" of Islamic terrorism. This would require new
strategic thinking by policy makers, including a reconsideration of the
large U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, and a more balanced approach
to the Palestine question. As in the war on drugs, there are no silver
bullet solutions to the campaign against terrorism.

The best that we can expect from a headhunting approach are symbolic,
temporary victories as one set of extremists is replaced by another.