COUNTERTERRORISM: LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON DRUGS

The military campaign to capture Osama bin Laden and dismantle his
terrorist network runs the risk of repeating a critical mistake in the U.S.
government's long-standing anti-drug efforts in Latin America.

A decade of headhunting strategies in Colombia have not only failed to stem
the tide of illicit drugs to the United States, they have produced a more
sophisticated class of drug trafficker. The ongoing campaign in Afghanistan
threatens to do the same for Islamic terrorists.

Colombia has received substantial U.S. support since 1989, when the senior
President Bush dramatically escalated the war on drugs. Shortly thereafter,
the Drug Enforcement Administration implemented the Kingpin strategy, which
sought to dismantle the Colombian drug industry by targeting leaders of the
cocaine cartels. The program achieved impressive results: cocaine labs were
destroyed, transportation networks disrupted, drug proceeds seized and
capos captured. But for all its tactical achievements, the headhunting
approach ultimately failed.

The Kingpin strategy and other programs did not substantially change the
price and availability of cocaine in U.S. drug markets.

In Colombia, cocaine -- and heroin -- production increased dramatically
during the latter half of the 1990s.

One reason for the resilience of the Colombian drug industry is that
trafficking enterprises alter their practices in response to
law-enforcement efforts. They do so by acquiring and analyzing information
about government anti-drug activities. They store information in manuals,
correspondence and computers. They use information technology, including
encryption software, electronic mail and secure online chat rooms, to
protect their communications from penetration by law-enforcement authorities.

For all their ingenuity, many traffickers eventually fell prey to law
enforcers.

Replacements Emerge

But no sooner were these underworld luminaries gunned down or imprisoned
than replacements emerged, eager to pick up where their predecessors left
off. Much to the chagrin of government officials, these new groups have
proven even more difficult to identify and dismantle.

After removing the largest, most visible organizations from the Colombian
drug industry, law-enforcement agencies are left with hundreds of small,
obscure, yet sophisticated groups about which they know next to nothing.

Like their criminal counterparts, al Qaeda is organized into loose networks
of cells and core groups. Cells enjoy considerable autonomy in researching,
planning and conducting terrorist operations, allowing for the adjustment
of everyday practices as circumstances warrant.

Hierarchies define responsibilities and rules for cell members. They use
fax machines, cellphones, e-mail and online chat rooms to communicate, and
computers with encryption software to store sensitive information.

Operations are conducted in secrecy. When planning operations, cell leaders
draw upon instruction manuals. Though separated from other groups located
in "enemy" territory, cells are linked to core groups that supply training,
funding and ideological support to members.

Overall, the structure of al Qaeda is, as one expert notes, "decentralized,
diffuse and flexible."

Bin Laden himself is one among several leaders who provide a semblance of
stewardship to this amorphous enterprise.

As the Kingpin strategy failed to curb the drug trade, the headhunting
approach to terrorism is unlikely to deter Islamic extremists. Even if U.S.
Marines and special forces wipe out bin Laden and his top associates,
lower-ranking figures are likely to rise within the loose network hierarchy.

In focusing our military, law-enforcement and intelligence resources on a
handful of individuals and groups, we run the risk of merely weeding out
the most notorious enterprises and providing opportunities for lesser
known, more sophisticated operations to materialize.

Address 'Demand-Side'

Instead, the U.S. should devote greater diplomatic and political resources
to addressing the "demand-side" of Islamic terrorism.

This would require new strategic thinking by policy makers, including a
reconsideration of the large U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and a
more balanced approach to the Palestine question.

As in the war on drugs, there are no silver-bullet solutions to the
campaign against terrorism. However, the best that we can expect from a
headhunting approach are symbolic, temporary victories as one set of
extremists are replaced by another.