COLOMBIAN RIDDLE: WHAT DREW REBELS TO THE TABLE?

BOGOTA, Colombia

MANY Colombians were relieved when the country's largest rebel group --
which is also the largest and richest guerrilla army in Latin American
history -- unexpectedly conceded to government demands and agreed to
start cease-fire talks.

But they were also puzzled. Why now?

After all, President Andres Pastrana has spent three years trying to
lure the group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC,
into negotiations, taking the unprecedented and audacious step of
ceding a huge territory to its control in a gesture of good faith. But
the guerrillas used their new dominion to store arms, plan military
offensives and grow coca. They kidnapped foreign aid workers and
stalled at the peace table.

They were the acts, many Colombians agreed, of a group intent on
making war, not peace, and many supported Mr. Pastrana when he decided
to take back the ceded territory. It was on the eve of being forced
out that the FARC made its astonishing concession.

Many experts think the group is not just trying to keep its territory.
Some of its commanders, diplomats say, are clearly aware that the tide
may soon turn against the FARC, a 17,000-fighter force that operates
nationwide.

The rebels are facing an army, bolstered by hundreds of millions of
dollars in American aid, that is stronger, better equipped and more
mobile. And they are also battling a surging paramilitary group, a
10,000- fighter force financed by wealthy Colombians and supported by
some army units. The militiamen are, in fact, the rebels' biggest
concern, since they have been highly successful at carving into
guerrilla-held territory through terror tactics that include mass
killings of guerrilla sympathizers, leftists and poor villagers.

A Latin American diplomat said the guerrillas are also feeling the
pressure of international public opinion, which has turned against
them in the wake of their kidnapping of foreigners, attacks on
villages and belligerent declarations.

"They absolutely committed political suicide," another diplomat here
said.

That is not to say there has been a transformation of the rebel group;
there has not. The guerrillas continue to launch attacks and, even
after signing a recent accord, have questioned whether they can carry
it out. Even the most energetic supporters of a peace process
privately express uncertainty about whether the guerrillas really want
peace, or plan to negotiate as a stalling tactic.

Those close to the peace process also warn that the possibility of
signing the first cease-fire accords by April 7 -- as stipulated in
last Sunday's agreement -- will remain difficult, if not impossible.
Such agreements usually follow, not precede, significant agreements on
substantial issues. And there have been none of those.

There are many steps toward the kind of agreements that could form the
basis of a real peace; few have actually been taken.

Those rebel commanders wary of a peace process -- and it is clear it is
a large group -- must be won over by a government that is willing to
assuage suspicions and foster confidence in guerrilla negotiators.
That will mean not only controlling the paramilitaries, but
galvanizing support for a negotiated settlement among the elite
business class and the military, both bitterly opposed to making
concessions.

The government needs to also show it is serious about carrying out
difficult reforms, among them restructuring a corrupt and closed
political system and purging rights violators from the army. Colombian
leaders have to also be prepared to take on such complicated issues as
agrarian reform, which would include parceling out land to the poor,
confiscating the huge tracts owned by drug traffickers and setting up
an equitable tax structure.

ONLY then, experts agree, would the rebels bend on demands that most
agree would be nearly impossible to realize: ending unemployment,
stopping privatizations and restructuring Colombia's increasingly open
economy.

Not easy propositions, but crucial if negotiations are to advance,
said Oscar Arias, the former president of Costa Rica, who was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for his regional peace initiatives in Central
America. "What it needs is patience, persistence and plenty of
humanity to make compromises and thus reach accords," he said.

No one is really sure, though, whether the rebels are truly willing,
or even ready, to take on such an overwhelming task. Many of the
FARC's most thoughtful political thinkers -- members of its political
wing, the Patriotic Union -- were murdered by the hundreds by
right-wing assassins in the 1980's and early 1990's.

The vacuum is clearly evident to those who have been left to
negotiate. "They're brilliant political tacticians," one diplomat
said, "but terrible negotiators."

And many rebel commanders have been soured by what they view as the
failures of other rebel groups that negotiated. To them, El Salvador's
rebels never achieved widespread reforms that closed out that
country's war a decade ago. Other Colombian groups that took the same
path failed as political parties, or were annihilated by assassins.

Still, the signs recently emanating from the camps of the 38-year-old
peasant army have been unmistakable. Many diplomats here say the group
took a quantum leap this month when it invited a United Nations envoy
and then a group of ambassadors in an effort to overcome an impasse in
peace talks. The development marked a sharp turnaround for a group
deeply suspicious of outsiders and bitter after the European Union
banned travel visas for rebel members. Then the rebels gave up on
demands that had held up talks and accepted the long-held government
demand that the two sides talk about a cease-fire.

"This is historic," said Daniel Garcia-Pena, a former government peace
negotiator. "I wake up and say, 'Did this really happen?' This
signifies big, deep changes."

Perhaps most significant, guerrilla commanders have toned down
vociferous demands that Mr. Pastrana dismantle the paramilitary
groups. The issue is still paramount, but a diplomat familiar with the
group said commanders decided to back off on public protestations
after concluding Mr. Pastrana did not have the political capital to
force the military to act more decisively.

WHAT still remains a mystery, though, is who holds the upper hand in
the top echelon of the rebel group -- those who believe in negotiations
or the hard-liners, who refer to themselves as "the army."

"There are huge arguments in the FARC right now," said a Western
diplomat. "That consultation is going to be a real debate, and we may
see a FARC coming back to the table that is more suspicious, more
cautious, less willing to give."

Or, the diplomat said, the FARC may resume talks "firmly decided as an
organization, at their top leadership levels, that this is the way to
go."