COLOMBIANS ILL-PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR ON REBELS

SAN VICENTE DEL CAGUAN, Colombia -- Returning to a base abandoned three
years earlier to guerrilla forces, soldiers of the Colombian army's Hunters
Battalion took a few moments to make it their own again. About 50 men,
dressed in camouflage battle fatigues despite breathtaking heat, carefully
trimmed the lawn with hedge clippers and painted the stones along pathways
a gleaming white.

The housekeeping duties may have seemed an odd priority only hours after
the army swept into San Vicente del Caguan, a rebel haven during
now-abandoned peace negotiations. But the business-as-usual attitude was a
fair representation of Colombia's national mood at the outset of what
officials say could be the decisive phase of the 38-year-old civil war.

Many Colombians have yet to register that, while the end of peace talks was
painless, the broader war ahead is likely to demand sharp sacrifices,
according to political analysts, government officials and military
officers. They agree that the conflict will deepen for years to come before
peace talks are likely to resume.

"I have no worries about the military forces of Colombia being defeated
militarily by terrorist groups," Gen. Fernando Tapias, head of Colombia's
armed forces, said in an interview. "My concern is that the Colombian
society and state do not have enough strength and preparation to face
terrorism. This war is going to take a long time, and in a war on terrorism
no one can be a spectator."

By ending negotiations last month with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or FARC, President Andres Pastrana launched a military campaign
that is popular so far, particularly among the urban well-to- do who have
been least affected by the conflict, but that is likely to last longer and
cost more than many Colombians expect.

The government's foes have grown more powerful during the three years of
peace talks. There are three irregular armies here: the FARC; a smaller
Marxist-oriented rebel group, the National Liberation Army; and the United
Self Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, a right-wing paramilitary group
that opposes the guerrillas, often in concert with the army. In all,
roughly 35,000 guerrilla and militia troops are at war with the state or
with each other, twice as many as when peace talks began.

The Colombian army's 70,000 troops face nearly impossible odds against the
FARC's 18,000 seasoned guerrillas. The group, which emerged in 1964 as a
rural-based Marxist insurgency, buys its arms with profits derived from
taxing drug production and from kidnapping and extortion. Senior guerrilla
commanders have talked about "thousands of dead" as the war intensifies.

U.S. officials agree with military analysts here who say the army must
double in size just to begin slowing the FARC's growth, let alone roll back
its presence in every Colombian province and major city. Where those
resources would come from is unclear. The Bush administration has decided
against taking a larger step into the conflict, as Pastrana has sought, by
allowing U.S. military aid earmarked for anti- drug operations to be used
in the fight against insurgents.

A new intelligence-sharing arrangement is taking shape, however. Foreign
intelligence sources say the United States is now helping to identify
potential urban terrorist targets and to prevent kidnappings. But analysts
question how much good that will do.

"Intelligence is only as good as your ability to act on it," said Luis
Guillermo Velez, a former senior Defense Ministry official. "What the
Americans will do is not the key to success here. There are many other
things that need to be done first. It's going to cost a lot of money and
it's going to cost a lot of lives. And people are going to be demanding
results very fast."

Tapias, who complained he "would need four armies of this size to do the
work I need to," said his objective in the former rebel haven is to
"restore the area to normalcy." He defined that as bringing security forces
into all its major towns, controlling roads and uprooting about 50,000
acres of coca that helped finance the FARC.

But the work has gone slowly since the army moved into the former rebel
safe haven on Feb. 21. The army has been unable to keep a major road from
this town to the provincial capital of Florencia free of guerrilla
roadblocks. The general responsible for the region was fired last week for
failing to do so.

The FARC, meanwhile, has cut power and phone service to more than 60 urban
centers around the country, including at least two provincial capitals.
FARC guerrillas have closed roads, burned trucks and killed villagers
inside the former haven for allegedly aiding the growing AUC paramilitary
force, now numbering 15,000 members.

Military officials estimate that the army's mission in the former haven
could last six months and involve 13,000 troops. That is about 20 percent
of the army's total troop deployment at a time when the FARC has dispersed
thousands of fighters to other regions.

"What is the most important aspect of this operation is what could happen
to the protection of the rest of the country, its infrastructure and all
the Colombians," said German Vargas, an opposition senator. "Up to now, the
army has left some holes and has failed to prevent terrorist acts all over
the country."

When it comes to the war, Tapias said, Colombia "knows what must be done
but doesn't want to really understand it." Pastrana waited a week to invoke
special war powers because, political analysts said, he felt pressure from
business leaders not to frighten off investors. He finally declared martial
law Thursday in parts of six provinces, but he has not called up reserves,
as his senior commanders have requested.

Some military analysts believe Pastrana must double military spending to
effectively challenge the FARC. Colombia has received $1.3 billion as part
of a U.S. anti-narcotics aid package that includes $650 million for
military equipment. The military component, which includes some 80
transport helicopters, was four times the amount of Colombia's annual
budget for military equipment.

Tapias has increased the proportion of professional, rather than
conscripted, soldiers in ranks of combat troops and has created elite
mobile units styled after the U.S. Army Rangers. With its own fleet of
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, the Colombian military has become swift
enough to react to large guerrilla troop movements.

President Bush has included a $98 million request in his fiscal 2003 budget
to train a new battalion to protect Colombia's 480-mile Cano Limon oil
pipeline.

The scarcity of resources already has affected operations in the former
rebel haven. An aerial bombing campaign to begin the offensive struck 85
guerrilla targets in more than 200 sorties. But the effort used a large
part of the air force's $85 million operational budget and its supply of
500-pound bombs.