FIGHTING COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLAS - AMERICAN AID TO COLOMBIA

Colombia and the United States America should offer its weapons, but not
its soldiers, to shore up democracy in Colombia

IT IS a world away from Afghanistan. But this week American officials were
preparing to step up action against three other groups on their list of
"international terrorist organisations" - in Colombia. Done the right way,
this could help eventually to bring peace and to strengthen democracy in
Latin America's third most populous country.

But there are many dangers, not least that of conflating Latin American
guerrillas, however nasty, with Islamic terrorists.

Originally Marxist, the struggle of Colombia's two guerrilla groups, the
FARC and the ELN, has become one of plunder.

Financed by kidnapping, extortion and taxes on the drug trade, the FARC, in
particular, has grown into a powerful army even as its political support
has all but evaporated. Guerrilla violence has called forth its mirror
image, in the bloody paramilitary vigilantes of the United Self-Defence
Forces of Colombia (AUC), who enjoy the collusion of some army officers.

The Clinton administration gave a dollop of military aid to Colombia, to
train a new army brigade and equip it with helicopters. But this aid has
been subject to a restriction: it is supposed to be used to fight illegal
drugs, not guerrillas. Now, George Bush wants Congress to lift that
restriction, and to approve fresh aid, to protect an important oil pipeline
and the electricity grid from guerrilla sabotage.

Two things have prompted this proposed widening of American help. One is
that Colombia's president, Andres Pastrana, has lost patience after talking
to the FARC for three years, during which the guerrillas showed no signs of
wanting peace.

Last month Mr Pastrana called off the talks, a move that has been met by a
wave of guerrilla sabotage attacks.

He was prompted in part by polls suggesting that in next May's presidential
election war-weary Colombians will choose Alvaro Uribe, who wants tougher
military action against the FARC. The second change is that many people in
the United States have begun to view Colombia's conflicts through the prism
of September 11th. This has revived America's appetite for fighting against
insurgencies in foreign countries.

The Americans should be wary of making this link. Unlike al-Qaeda, the FARC
poses no direct threat to the security of the United States. And if there
is one thing that inflames Latin Americans more than the perceived neglect
of their region by their mighty neighbour (see page 45), it is
over-heavy-handed American "intervention". That is why Mr Bush would be
wise to rule out sending combat troops to Colombia. With that proviso, the
case for further American (and, for that matter, European) aid to Colombia
is a strong one. It stems from the failure of the rich countries' attempts
to prohibit cocaine and heroin.

Each year, drug consumers unwittingly stuff $500m-800m or so into the
pockets of the FARC and the AUC. It is only fair to help Colombia's
democracy to defend itself - and right that aid should no longer be
restricted to a counter-productive and doomed effort to wipe out drug
supplies. But, if aid is to be directed openly against the guerrillas, it
should have a clear purpose, and come with the right message.

This is something George Bush could deliver on his trip this weekend to
Latin America. The aim of American policy should be to strengthen Colombian
democracy and its associated institutions. Military training, more
helicopters and more intelligence are all needed.

But so are more and better policemen and prosecutors, to establish the rule
of law.

Nor is the FARC democracy's only enemy.

The AUC kills at least as many civilians (see page 56), and is more deeply
implicated in the drug trade than is the FARC. That makes a first-ever
drug-trafficking indictment against three FARC commanders issued by the
Justice Department this week look politically contrived.

And it means that America should press Colombia much harder to take on the
AUC, and to punish army officers found to have helped it. However much
foreigners help, the main effort has to come from Colombia itself.

Its people now appear to realise that they can no longer live side-by-side
with violence. It is wrecking their economy and their society, as well as
taking a terrible toll of lives.

It may be an illusion to imagine, as Mr Uribe and some American officials
seem to, that the FARC can be eliminated. A more realistic aim is to weaken
it so that it is more serious about peace when talks resume, as they will
eventually have to. But even that limited aim is a worthy one.