SENLIS COUNCIL'S REPORT MAKES SENSE

Last week, even before the Senlis Council released their latest survey
on the situation in southern Afghanistan, the Canadian defence
establishment was already circling the wagons.

A flurry of e-mails was dispatched to the mailing list of the
Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), alerting its members to the
fact that previous Senlis Council findings "have been less than
positive about this mission."

Presumably, in the eyes of the CDA, the publishing of negative
assessments automatically damages the credibility of the independent
Senlis Council.

That's right old chaps, the army says we're winning the war, so thump
those tubs and drown out any and all naysayers!

Unfortunately for those who wish it were otherwise, the Senlis Council
is the real deal. I had the opportunity to travel with them in
Kandahar in January and to observe their data-collection methods first-hand.

As one of the few remaining non-governmental agencies still operating
outside the wire in the Taliban heartland, Senlis members compile
their research at great personal risk.

All staff members travel armed and dress as local Pashtuns.

For example, the founder of the organization, Saskatchewan-born Norine
MacDonald, disguises her gender by dressing as an Afghan boy.
Additional security is provided by a couple of dozen Afghan guards and
a pair of South African security consultants.

Nevertheless, the Senlis Council members realize their ability to
operate unhindered in the Kandahar area comes as a result of the trust
they've established with the local warlords and tribal leaders.

While their primary purpose is not to provide humanitarian aid, Senlis
will use the distribution of food and medicine to refugee camps in
order to conduct their fact-finding surveys.

Last fall, as a result of having personally canvassed a large number
of Afghan farmers, Senlis tabled a recommendation for the
international community to purchase the illegal poppy crops rather
than using military resources to enforce their eradication.

According to Senlis, subsequent conversion of these opiates into legal
pharmaceutical products would eliminate the problem of street drugs
and it would not deprive the poppy farmers of their basic livelihood.

Despite the common-sense logic of this proposal, when it was tabled
the Colonel Blimps immediately took to the airwaves to denounce the
Senlis Council.

To purchase poppies from druglords would be insane, they
harrumphed.

As a chorus they denounced such measures by saying they would simply
empower the enemy and undermine the war effort.

What they didn't realize was that the Senlis solution to the illegal
drug production was a carbon-copy of what NATO commanders had
concluded two years ago.

Unfortunately, the major pharmaceutical companies felt that such a
sudden glut of cheap opiates would flood the world market and
adversely affect their corporate profits.

But I digress.

In their most recent report, Senlis concludes that persistent poverty
and a growing disillusionment with NATO troops is pushing Afghans into
supporting the Taliban.

After polling some 17,000 Afghan males in the southern provinces it
was estimated that 27 per cent of respondents openly support the
insurgency, and just 48 per cent believe that NATO can win the war.

The rare feedback Senlis has provided should not be glibly
dismissed.

In fact, if the CDA tub-thumpers would pause their clamouring for a
minute to consider the results, they would have to admit the Senlis
findings mirror the situation on the ground.

The Taliban have certainly been resurgent in southern Afghanistan over
the past 12 months as evidenced by the dramatic increase in suicide
bombings.

As the fighting drags on between NATO forces and the insurgents, it is
only logical that the local inhabitants would grow resentful of the
coalition's apparent inability to provide a secure
environment.

The Taliban may not seem like a very attractive option, but if they
are offering to feed the families of their new recruits, they become a
desperate means of survival.

Rather than dismiss Senlis reports before they're even published, NATO
should consider the intelligence value they provide and use it to
better understand the local sentiment.

Former Canadian soldier Scott Taylor is the editor of Esprit de Corps
military magazine and a veteran war correspondent. He is the author
of Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War against Iran, and
Among the Others: Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq. In
September 2005, he was held hostage for five days in northern Iraq by
Ansar al-Islam Mujahadin.