NATO HAS A LOT IT CAN LEARN FROM SENLIS'S SURVEY

Last week, even before the Senlis Council released their latest survey
on the situation in southern Afghanistan, the Canadian defence
establishment was already circling the wagons.

A flurry of e-mails was dispatched to the mailing list of the
Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), alerting its members to the
fact that previous Senlis Council findings "have been less than
positive about this mission." Presumably, in the eyes of the CDA, the
publishing of negative assessments automatically damages the
credibility of the independent Senlis Council.

That's right old chaps, the army says we're winning the war, so thump
those tubs and drown out any and all naysayers!

Unfortunately for those who wish it were otherwise, the Senlis Council
is the real deal. I had the opportunity to travel with them in
Kandahar in January and to observe their collection of data
first-hand. As one of the few remaining non-governmental agencies
still operating outside the wire in the Taliban heartland, Senlis
members compile their research at great personal risk. All staff
members travel armed and dress as local Pashtuns. For example, the
founder of the organization, Saskatchewan-born Norine MacDonald,
disguises her gender by dressing as an Afghan boy. Additional security
is provided by a couple of dozen Afghan guards and a pair of South
African security consultants.

Nevertheless, the Senlis Council realize their ability to operate
unhindered in the Kandahar area comes as a result of the trust they've
established with the local warlords and tribal leaders. While their
primary purpose is not to provide humanitarian aid, Senlis will use
the distribution of food and medicine to refugee camps in order to
conduct their fact-finding surveys.

Last fall, as a result of having personally canvassed a large number
of Afghan farmers, Senlis tabled a recommendation for the
international community to purchase the illegal poppy crops rather
than using military resources to enforce their eradication. According
to Senlis, subsequent conversion of these opiates into legal
pharmaceutical products would eliminate the problem of street drugs
and it would not deprive the poppy farmers of their basic livelihood.

Despite the common-sense logic of this proposal, when it was tabled
the Colonel Blimps immediately took to the airwaves to denounce the
Senlis Council. To purchase poppies from druglords would be insane
they harrumphed. As a chorus they denounced such measures by saying
they would simply empower the enemy and undermine the war effort. What
they didn't realize was that the Senlis solution to the illegal drug
production was a carbon-copy of what NATO commanders had concluded two
years ago. Unfortunately, the major pharmaceutical companies felt that
such a sudden glut of cheap opiates would flood the world market and
adversely affect their corporate profits. But I digress.

In their most recent report, Senlis concludes that persistent poverty
and a growing disillusionment with NATO troops is pushing Afghans into
supporting the Taliban. After polling some 17,000 Afghan males in the
southern provinces it was estimated that 27 per cent of respondents
openly support the insurgency, and just 48 per cent believe that NATO
can win the war. The rare feedback Senlis has provided should not be
glibly dismissed.

In fact, if the CDA tub-thumpers would pause their clamouring for a
minute to consider the results, they would have to admit the Senlis
findings mirror the situation on the ground. The Taliban have
certainly been resurgent in southern Afghanistan over the past 12
months as evidenced by the dramatic increase in suicide bombings. As
the fighting drags on between NATO forces and the insurgents, it is
only logical that the local inhabitants would grow resentful of the
coalition's apparent inability to provide a secure
environment.

The Taliban may not seem like a very attractive option, but if they
are offering to feed the families of their new recruits, they become a
desperate means of survival.

Rather than dismiss Senlis reports before they're even published, NATO
should consider the intelligence value they provide and use it to
better understand the local sentiment.

Former Canadian soldier Scott Taylor is the editor of Esprit de Corps
military magazine and a veteran war correspondent. He is the author
of Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War against Iran, and
Among the Others: Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq. In
September 2005, he was held hostage for five days in northern Iraq by
Ansar al-Islam Mujahadin.