TURN ON COLOMBIA NO GREAT DANGER

During the late years of the Clinton administration, Washington decided to
help the government of Colombia in the war against drug cartels/Marxist
rebels. But that war had been going on for decades, and many pictured the
United States being drawn into an endless, unwinnable fight, as in--of
course--Vietnam. So American aid was limited. It was concentrated around
the sending of helicopters, which could be used only against drugs, not
against revolution.

That pretty much didn't work. Now the Bush administration wants to end the
distinction between fighting drugs and fighting rebels, on the grounds that
the distinction is murky, that the enemy is the enemy. Others respond that
this change is precisely the sort of "mission creep" critics of the Clinton
initiative warned of, that Washington is on a slippery slope and that,
well, "Vietnam."

In fact, though, nobody has to warn anybody these days about the dangers of
getting enmeshed in somebody else's war. And the Bush administration is not
talking about sending troops.

The reality is that there's no real political rebellion in Colombia. By
now, it's all about drugs.

Allowing more leeway in the use of American help is the most uncostly,
danger-less way of maximizing Washington's impact. It's also very limited.

Ohio Sen. Mike DeWine worked with the Clinton administration on Colombia
and will be leading the fight, on the GOP side, for the Bush plan. He says
that among the legitimate reasons for U.S. concern about Colombia is Sept.
11, that anti-American terrorists may be looking for new breeding grounds.
Whether that's true or not, it's better for Washington to link Latin
America to Sept. 11 than to ignore Latin America because of an obsession
with Sept. 11.

Washington does not have a solution to the problems of Colombia. But
Washington must, at least, try to complicate life for the drug cartels.
Given that the United States is where much of their profits come from, so
should the United States be where some of their trouble comes from.