News (Media Awareness Project) - US NY: PUB LTE: Drug Money |
Title: | US NY: PUB LTE: Drug Money |
Published On: | 2002-03-31 |
Source: | Ogdensburg Journal/Advance News (NY) |
Fetched On: | 2008-01-24 14:04:11 |
DRUG MONEY
To the Editor;
Why can't the $652,000 of drug seizure money go to our local youth
programs? (WILSON QUESTIONS YOUTH FUNDING CUTS March 5 2002).
The financial incentives created by civil asset forfeiture laws create a
very dangerous precedent. When protectors of the peace become predators,
society is put at risk. Both violent drug dealers and unscrupulous
prosecutors share a common bond: They are both financially dependent on a
never-ending drug war without victory.
"The ability of law enforcement agencies to financially benefit from
forfeited assets, and the provision of large block grants from Congress to
fight the drug trade have distorted governmental policy making and law
enforcement. The law enforcement agenda that targets assets rather than
crime, the plea bargains that favor drug kingpins and penalize the 'mules'
without assets to trade, the reverse stings that target drug buyers rather
than drug sellers, the overkill in agencies involved in even minor arrests,
the massive shift in resources towards federal jurisdiction over local law
enforcement - is largely the unplanned by-product of this economic
incentive structure." ("Policing for Profit The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda," University of Chicago Law Review,(1998).
Larry Seguin, Lisbon, New York
To the Editor;
Why can't the $652,000 of drug seizure money go to our local youth
programs? (WILSON QUESTIONS YOUTH FUNDING CUTS March 5 2002).
The financial incentives created by civil asset forfeiture laws create a
very dangerous precedent. When protectors of the peace become predators,
society is put at risk. Both violent drug dealers and unscrupulous
prosecutors share a common bond: They are both financially dependent on a
never-ending drug war without victory.
"The ability of law enforcement agencies to financially benefit from
forfeited assets, and the provision of large block grants from Congress to
fight the drug trade have distorted governmental policy making and law
enforcement. The law enforcement agenda that targets assets rather than
crime, the plea bargains that favor drug kingpins and penalize the 'mules'
without assets to trade, the reverse stings that target drug buyers rather
than drug sellers, the overkill in agencies involved in even minor arrests,
the massive shift in resources towards federal jurisdiction over local law
enforcement - is largely the unplanned by-product of this economic
incentive structure." ("Policing for Profit The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda," University of Chicago Law Review,(1998).
Larry Seguin, Lisbon, New York
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