VIEW ON THE MILITARY

Losing Hearts to Taliban

Last week, even before the Senlis Council released its latest survey
on the situation in southern Afghanistan, the Canadian defence
establishment was circling the wagons.

A flurry of e-mails alerted Conference of Defence Associations (CDA)
members to the fact that previous Senlis Council findings "have been
less than positive about this mission." Presumably, in the eyes of the
CDA, the publishing of negative assessments automatically damages the
credibility of the independent Senlis Council.

That's right old chaps, the army says we're winning the war, so thump
those tubs and drown out any naysayers!

Unfortunately for those who wish it were otherwise, the Senlis Council
is the real deal. In January, I had the opportunity to observe their
collection of data in Kandahar first-hand.

As one of the few non-governmental agencies still operating in the
Taliban heartland, Senlis members compile their research at great
personal risk. All staff members travel armed and dress as local
Pashtuns. The founder of the organization, Saskatchewan-born Norine
MacDonald, disguises her gender by dressing as an Afghan boy.
Additional security is provided by a couple of dozen Afghan guards.

Nevertheless, Senlis Council members realize their ability to operate
unhindered in the Kandahar area comes as a result of the trust they've
established with the local warlords and tribal leaders. While their
primary purpose is not to provide humanitarian aid, Senlis will
distribute food and medicine to refugee camps in order to conduct
their fact-finding surveys.

Last fall, having personally canvassed a large number of Afghan
farmers, Senlis tabled a recommendation for the international
community to purchase the illegal poppy crops rather eradicate them.
According to Senlis, conversion of these opiates into legal
pharmaceutical products would eliminate the problem of street drugs
and would not deprive the poppy farmers of their basic livelihood.

Despite the common-sense logic of this proposal, when it was tabled
the Colonel Blimps immediately took to the airwaves to denounce the
Senlis Council. To purchase poppies from druglords would be insane
they harrumphed. As a chorus they denounced such measures by saying
they would empower the enemy and undermine the war effort. What they
didn't realize was that the Senlis solution was a carbon-copy of what
NATO commanders concluded two years ago. Unfortunately, the major
pharmaceutical companies felt that a sudden glut of cheap opiates
would flood the market and adversely affect their corporate profits.
But I digress.

In their most recent report, Senlis concludes that persistent poverty
and a growing disillusionment with NATO troops is pushing Afghans into
supporting the Taliban. After polling some 17,000 Afghan males in the
southern provinces it was estimated that 27 per cent openly support
the insurgency, and just 48 per cent believe that NATO can win the
war. The rare feedback Senlis has provided should not be glibly dismissed.

In fact, if the CDA tub-thumpers would pause their clamouring for a
minute to consider the results, they would have to admit the Senlis
findings mirror the situation on the ground. The Taliban have
certainly been resurgent in southern Afghanistan over the past 12
months as evidenced by the dramatic increase in suicide bombings. As
the fighting drags on, it is only logical that the local inhabitants
would grow resentful of the coalition's apparent inability to provide
a secure environment.

The Taliban may not seem like a very attractive option, but if they
are offering to feed the families of their new recruits, they become a
desperate means of survival.

Rather than dismiss Senlis reports before they're even published, NATO
should consider the intelligence value they provide and use it to
better understand the local sentiment.