PLAN COLOMBIA FAILS TO CUT SUPPLY OF DRUGS

Just over a year ago, the people of Putumayo province watched the launch of
'Plan Colombia', the US-supported anti-drug programme. For weeks,
helicopters patrolled and crop-spraying aircraft deposited a fine mist of
herbicide over Putumayo's huge fields of coca, the raw material for cocaine.

In El Tigre, at the heart of the drug-growing area, there has been one big
change since then: the village, which used to live under leftwing guerrilla
control, is now dominated by illegal rightwing paramilitaries.

On a recent visit, lined up on the village football pitch, a squad of about
50 paramilitary troops could be seen drilling. This is something that the
Colombian army, despite its boasts to be combating paramilitary groups more
forcefully than ever, has apparently not spotted.

Enrique, the paramilitary chief in Putumayo, says his enemies - the rebels
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) - have retreated
towards the nearby border with Ecuador. "I support Plan Colombia 100 per
cent," says Enrique, who claims to command about 800 troops.

That professed support probably makes the US squeamish. After all,
paramilitaries and guerrillas alike are considered terrorist enemies of the
US. But Washington is likely to be just as concerned by what has not
happened in El Tigre and elsewhere in Putumayo: so far, there are not many
signs that Plan Colombia is succeeding in cutting the supply of illegal drugs.

Local prices for semi-processed coca paste (a useful indicator of
availability) have barely changed, and fields left brown by herbicide
spraying are now once more sprouting with coca.

Although the paramilitaries say they agree with eradication because it
helps to reduce the guerrilla presence, coca still flourishes in areas they
control: they charge less tax than the leftwing groups. Both guerrillas and
paramilitaries depend heavily on drug money.

The authorities began a new round of crop-spraying in Putumayo late last
year. But this only rekindled local anger that legitimate crops are also
being killed, before crop-substitution pacts, another key part of Plan
Colombia, have had a chance to be properly financed and implemented.

Some 35,000 families have signed crop-substitution agreements to rip up
37,000 hectares of coca. Aid is in most cases still to be handed out: tools
and agricultural supplies up to a value of 2m pesos ($870) per family. That
amount is far less than the value of a single harvest from one hectare of
coca - and coca gives at least four harvests a year.

Jamec Aguirre, whose two hectares of land was split between coca and new
food crops of beans and yucca, saw cropdusters destroy everything last
month. He says he had not planted new coca. No crop substitution aid has
arrived. He still has pigs - but nothing to feed them with. "I will have to
sell them," he says. "I have no cash."

Gonzalo de Francisco, an adviser to President Andres Pastrana with
responsibility for security issues in Putumayo, admits there have been
problems and delays that dent peasants' confidence. "All we can do is work
harder," he says.

An enthusiastic supporter of crop substitution, Mr de Francisco
nevertheless also emphasises drug eradication efforts to convince peasants
that the government is serious about ridding Putumayo of coca. If their
coca is repeatedly destroyed, he thinks, they will eventually get the message.

By Mr de Francisco's estimate, there were around 66,000 hectares of coca in
Putumayo before the spraying offensive began a year ago. That offensive
probably eradicated about 20,000 ha. But with new planting having taken
place, there may still be 50,000-60,0000 ha of coca in Putumayo.

Publicly, US officials say they always knew the drug eradication effort
would be a long haul. Crop-spraying will be stepped up next year, while
investment is continuing in Putumayo to try to make legitimate agriculture
easier. However, some officials connected with drug eradication efforts say
the US is depressed at the lack of progress so far.

Members of the US Congress have been critical of lack of progress in
spending social aid and creating alternative development. Aid approved for
Colombia falls short of the Bush administration's request.

Mr de Francisco knows patience is short. "I think we have to see results in
the next three months in the social part," he says. "We can do a very good
technical job, plan and invest the money, but if we do not stop the
planting of coca . . . that is the only thing we can be measured by."