FORAY INTO COLOMBIA HAS PRODUCED FEW RESULTS

BEFORE we rush to bring the war against international terrorism to the
jungles of Colombia -- as the Bush administration and some in Congress now
urge -- we would do well to understand that country's feudal history. We
should also review what has been done with the nearly $2 billion we have
appropriated for Colombia in the past two years.

``Plan Colombia,'' devised by the Clinton administration and the Colombian
government to drastically curtail cocaine production in Colombia, called
for $7.5 billion. At the time, we were told that Colombia would contribute
$4 billion and the U.S. share was to be $1.6 billion. Donations by other
countries, mostly European, have not materialized. The Colombian
government's support also has fallen short. Now the Bush administration
seeks an additional $537 million for fiscal year 2003.

So far, U.S. tax dollars have paid for a fleet of aircraft to spray
chemical herbicide over large areas of the country planted in coca, for
combat helicopters to protect the planes from groundfire and for training
and equipment for counter-drug battalions. Funds also went to economic
programs to give coca farmers alternative sources of income and to reform
Colombia's justice system.

Because of the Colombian military's poor human rights record, Congress
conditioned aid on the prosecution of military officers implicated in
serious abuses and on the severing of the military's links with illegal
paramilitary groups.

By any objective measure, Plan Colombia's results have been disappointing.

Initially, the State Department predicted a 30 percent reduction in coca
cultivation by the end of this year. Although nearly 85,000 hectares were
sprayed last year, coca cultivation in Colombia actually rose, by at least
21,100 hectares. Other than raising questions about possible adverse health
and environmental effects, the spraying seems to have produced few results.
There has not been any significant reduction in the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States.

Moreover, U.S.-funded economic programs have produced little in the way of
viable alternatives for farmers. It is dangerous and difficult to implement
successful programs in the conflict zones where coca is grown, particularly
without stronger support from the Colombian government.

Last week, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell certified that, while
additional improvement is important, Colombia has met the human rights
conditions on which further U.S. aid is contingent. But the certification
had more to do with the fact that U.S. aid was running out than with
Colombia's actually making sufficient progress on human rights. Senior
military officers who have been implicated in the murders of civilians or
who have abetted paramilitary violence and drug trafficking have not been
jailed. Many remain on active duty and some have been promoted.

F OR a time, it seemed that President Andres Pastrana's brave efforts to
negotiate peace might pay off. Now, though, the talks have collapsed.
Violence has intensified, and the guerrillas, especially the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have sharply escalated kidnappings,
assassinations and other terrorist acts.

Americans need to understand that Colombia is really two ``countries,'' a
condition that is at the heart of its problems. The thinly populated,
impoverished eastern half, which the government has ignored for
generations, is mired in the 19th century, while the sophisticated, urban
west is edging toward the 21st. There are deeply rooted social, economic
and political reasons why Latin America's oldest conflict is no closer to
resolution, and why drug money, corruption and lawlessness permeate
Colombian society. These problems, which ultimately only Colombians can
solve, will not be fixed by simply attacking the symptoms.

Before taking this path, we should consider alternatives. We want to help
Colombia, particularly as the FARC has evolved from a rebel movement with a
political ideology to a drug-financed terrorist syndicate. But we and the
Colombians need to be clear about our goals and what it would take to
achieve them. Continued U.S. aid to the Colombian military must be tied to
accountability for abuses. Goal-setting should also be coordinated, after
the elections in May, with Colombia's new president, who may favor an
entirely different approach.

Just as Colombians need to take far more responsibility for their own
problems, we need to understand that Colombia cannot solve America's drug
problem. Our meager attempts to reduce demand for drugs have failed, and
unless we devote far more effort to what we know works -- education and
treatment -- the drugs will keep coming and Americans will keep dying.

- -- Patrick Leahy is a Democratic U.S. senator from Vermont. He wrote this
for the Los Angeles Times.