COLOMBIA'S NEW LEADER WILL FACE A WAR ON TWO FRONTS

The municipality of Bojaya is carved out of rain-drenched jungle in
Colombia's poorest state, Choco. The sky is often sealed off with
low-hanging clouds and the Atrato River floods frequently, as does the
nearby airport in Vigia del Fuerte.

Poor and remote as it is though, the control of Bojaya has immense value.
It lies in a main corridor for narcotics and arms trafficking. This is why,
on May 1, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia attacked its
archenemy, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. As bullets flew,
locals ran for cover. Hundreds sought refuge in a church. On May 2, a FARC
rocket bomb hit the sanctuary, killing 119 peasants and some 40 children.

One might expect such an atrocity to provoke outrage against the FARC
guerrillas. And perhaps even produce a pledge of solidarity from the
civilized world in support of the beleaguered Colombian government. This is
terrorism, after all, fueled in part by the voracious U.S.-European
appetite for illicit cocaine.

But 22 U.S. congressmen -- including John Conyers, Maxine Waters, Donald
Payne and Carrie Meek -- seem to see the incident as a chance to continue
prosecuting the Clinton State Department's war against the Colombian
military, the only protection Colombians have against FARC depredations.
During the Clinton years, U.S. policy not only refused to help Colombia
make its military more effective, but it pressured the government to remove
the institution's best leaders whenever FARC sympathizers made charges
against them.

Now Mr. Conyers et al have sent a letter to Colombian president Andres
Pastrana asking for "explanations" for the military's "lamentable inaction"
in the massacre. They also complain that when the military did arrive, it
engaged in "indiscriminately bombing" even though only one death was
reported. The letter "focuses on the regrettable inaction and reported
actions of the Colombian Armed Forces." So the Colombian army catches hell
when it acts, and when it doesn't. That's what you call a no-win situation.

The United Nations -- which recently gave an agricultural award to Haiti's
Marxist president Jean Bertrand Aristide -- is making similar noises.

There is either ignorance here about the realities of rural Colombia and
guerrilla warfare -- which wouldn't be surprising -- or the army's critics
are again carrying water for the FARC. In either case, Colombia is not
being well served by international efforts to micromanage its war. If
Colombia doesn't bring out some heavy artillery in the public relations
battle against the FARC, the left in the U.S. and Europe will continue to
nibble it to death.

On Sunday Alvaro Uribe will probably be elected president of Colombia. If
he wins, it will be because he takes a tough stance against the guerrillas.
Should he keep his campaign promises, Colombia is in for a rough, but
necessary, fight that is likely to include more guerrilla violence in urban
areas.

In running the war, Mr. Uribe will also have to defend against the FARC's
propaganda campaign. The military will be under constant international
assault from the likes of California Congresswoman Waters -- a fan of Fidel
Castro and a defender of Lori Berenson, convicted in a Peruvian court of
helping "Shining Path" terrorists. The question remains as to whether Mr.
Uribe is smart enough and tough enough to outfight and outpropagandize the
left and keep Colombians unified behind the struggle. The Bojaya incident
is a good example of the challenges he'll face.

The congressional complaints about Bojaya are gratuitous. Apparently the
Colombian minister of defense had been warned of an impending battle. But
the undermanned and ill-equipped army constantly gets "alerts" from all
over. Some originate with the guerrillas themselves to set up ambushes.
Others are real. But it's tough to tell which is which. A mere 55,000
troops cannot answer all calls.

There is also the problem of defending rugged terrain. Police in remote
outposts are often sitting ducks. In March 2000, the FARC assaulted the
police station at Vigia del Fuerte, killing or kidnapping all the officers.
The post was never re-manned. Moreover, under U.S. law, if the U.S. has
intelligence that would assist the army in fighting the guerrillas, it
cannot share it.

In the case of Bojaya, FARC gunners controlled the only dry areas that
could be used for landing aircraft. Once there was a decision to answer the
call, the army had to approach by river. A ship in Cartagena had to be
brought to the river and troops had to be moved in. A navy flotilla sailed
from the town of Riosucio but because of sandbars could only navigate the
river by daylight. It finally arrived on May 7, days after the massacre.

FARC propaganda, abetted by either sloppy or tendentious reporting in some
news organizations, is also targeting Mr. Uribe, attempting, among other
things, to link him to drugs . Most notable are repeated references to his
former aide, Pedro Juan Moreno, whose company GMP once had a chemical
shipment impounded by the Drug Enforcement Agency. After an investigation,
a DEA judge ruled, in 1999, that the evidence showed "that the suspended
chemicals will not likely be used for illicit purposes. Specifically, GMP
is a reputable company in business in Colombia for over 60 years. Further,
the company's president is knowledgeable of the country's drug producing
and trafficking problems from his past government service. He credibly
testified about the anti-drug effort taken by his governmental office and
his commitment to these actions." Yet despite the two-year old DEA ruling
the New York Times on May 18 repeated the allegation without noting the
outcome of the case.

The Uribe campaign has been inept at dealing with the foreign press. It
doesn't return phone calls and has bungled responses to unsubstantiated
accusations. If Mr. Uribe is elected he'll have to do better. Otherwise,
the FARC, with the complicity of the U.S. and Europe, will run the war
outside Colombia, and may well defeat him.