THE U.S. STRUGGLE TO BATTLE DRUGS, JUST DRUGS, IN COLOMBIA

IN the late 1980's, Washington decided to make a priority of shutting off
the pipeline of cocaine from Colombia, which provided 80 percent of the
United States' supply. But Colombia - with a history of bloody conflict
pitting a small population of rich against a huge population of poor - was
mired in a decades-old civil war.

American officials offered counternarcotics aid to the Colombian national
police, but, worried about being sucked into "another Vietnam," stipulated
that it not go to fighting guerrillas. There were always suspicions,
however, that the line between the two wars was blurring, especially as
both rebels and paramilimitary groups - created by landowners to protect
their holdings - cut deals with drug traffickers.

Now, the Bush administration is urging Congress to let Colombia openly use
the equipment and training from the United States against the rebels.
Colombia has received about $1.8 billion worth of American aid since 2000,
mostly for the police and military. And as Colombians go to the polls to
elect a new president today, the strong front-runner is Alvaro Uribe, an
ultraconservative who wants to double the size of the army's combat force
to fight the guerrillas.

Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National
Security Archive, a nongovernmental, nonprofit research center in
Washington, offer a timely look at the hidden aspects of past American
involvement.

. The United States and officials in Colombia were at cross-purposes from
the start. A July 1992 memo by the Central Intelligence Agency reveals what
the American government was unwilling to admit in public.

Andean governments are likely to continue to stress the links between local
insurgencies and the drug trade . . . [to persuade] the U.S. that funding
counterinsurgency operations with counternarcotics aid would lead to major
gains against traffickers.

However, we do not believe that the drug industry would be substantially
disrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas. Indeed, many
traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operations
against insurgents. Moreover, we believe officials in Lima and Bogota, if
given antidrug aid for counterinsurgency purposes, would turn it to pure
antiguerrilla operations with little payoff against trafficking.

The right-wing paramilitaries grew throughout the 1990's. Because some
Colombian Army units gave them intelligence and logistical help, Congress
placed human rights conditions on aid. A 1997 American intelligence report,
"Paramilitaries Gaining Strength," suggests the government of President
Ernesto Samper, weakened by charges that his presidential campaign had
accepted drug money, was not confronting paramilitaries - contrary to its
public stance.

Possible military links to these groups are of particular concern because
of the upsurge in human rights violations attributed to paramilitary groups
in recent years. Victims of paramilitary violence are most commonly unarmed
civilians who are murdered for suspected ties to guerrillas.

. . . President Samper and other top officials have said that the
government is prepared to take firm action against the paramilitaries, but
so far they have not matched their words with deeds.

Prosecutors have investigated only a fraction of the many serious incidents
that have taken place in recent years, and . . . some outstanding warrants
have not been enforced. We see scant indications that the military is
making an effort to directly confront the paramilitary groups or to devote
additional men or resources against them. . . .

The growth of paramilitary violence is likely to complicate U.S. interests
in Colombia in the areas of human rights and counternarcotics. . . . Many
military officers have been embarrassed by several high profile,
rebel-inflicted setbacks over the past year, and some . . . may see
tolerance or support for the paramilitaries as one avenue for striking
back. These officers tend to blame the military's shortcomings on the
government's failure to adequately support the armed forces.

Colombia's police have had staunch allies among the House Republicans
managing drug policy. In 1997, Representative J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois
and other House Republicans sought to lift the human rights restrictions on
aid to Colombia. The existing law barred the State Department's
counternarcotics funds from being used to buy weapons for foreign military
and police units whose personnel were credibly accused of serious human
rights violations, unless those men were prosecuted. A May 1997 cable from
the American ambassador, describing Mr. Hastert's breakfast meeting with
Colombian officials, reveals how the United States was speaking with two
voices. In fact, Mr. Hastert's office said, the reference to the people
"living outside of the U.S." refered to State Department officials in
Clinton administration.

Congressman Hastert . . . said that he and the committee would work to
remove conditions on assistance. He said he and like-minded members of
Congress are "sick and tired of people who spend most of their lives living
outside of the U.S. inhibiting the process by placing conditions on
military aid when the lives of U.S. children and youth are being destroyed
by drugs."

He decried "leftist-dominated" U.S. Congresses of years past who "used
human rights as an excuse to aid the left in other countries," and vowed
that he was committed to "correcting" that situation and expediting aid to
U.S. allies in the war on drugs. He closed by telling the military and
police that they already knew they could bypass the U.S. executive branch
and communicate directly with the Congress; he encouraged them to continue
to do so.

One way to get around Congressional restrictions was to redefine them. In
1997, the United States and Colombia signed an agreement that was intended
to guarantee that the counternarcotics aid be used only in drug-producing
areas and exclusively for fighting drugs, a zone referred to as "the box."
But three years later, the two nations expanded the definition of the box,
a change little noted at the time.

Key change . . . is the dissolution of the previously designated "box"
outside of which [U.S. government] material aid [or related training] for
counternarcotics operations could not be used. . . .The government of the
Republic of Colombia and the government of the United States hereby
designate the following areas as the "designated areas" . . . : the entire
national territory of the Republic of Colombia, including its territorial
waters recognized by the international law, and its airspace.

The Clinton administration, which approved a major increase in aid under
Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics and development strategy, struggled to
identify antidrug units that were not tainted by suspected human rights
violations. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked the American
ambassador, Curtis W. Kamman, to look into reports that an
American-supported battalion (including Bravo company) was dependent on the
Colombian Army's 24th Brigade, which was under scrutiny for suspected
atrocities. In a July 2000 memo, Mr. Kamman acknowledged the difficulty
Washington faced in separating allies from suspects.

When not conducting operations in the field, Bravo company is bedding down
at the headquarters of the 24 Brigade's 31st battalion (which has been
tasked to provide Bravo Company with logistical support). . . . The 24th
Brigade would provide any quick reaction force needed to reinforce Bravo
company should the need arise.

Post views this deployment as wholly consistent with the purposes for which
the battalion was vetted, but, given the questioned vetting status of the
24th Brigade, wished to note this deployment for the record.