McCAFFREY SEES 2007 AS A CRUCIAL YEAR

"We Are Now in a Race Against Time."

When retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey visited Afghanistan in
February for meetings with 23 senior Western and local military,
intelligence and political officials, he came away with a cautiously
optimistic view of the prospects for reform and political stability there.

McCaffrey, a respected division commander in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War and commander of U.S. military operations in Central America and
South America, now teaches at West Point. A copy of his trip report,
written for his colleagues there but widely circulated in Washington
and obtained from one of the recipients, included the following blunt
observations:

"Afghanistan is now a narco-state. The opium/heroin take is $3.1
billion -- which is 1/3 of the GNP. The British have the lead for the
[counter-drug] program and are not adequately resourced for the
effort. There is no single unifying leadership for the U.S. nor
international effort."

"If we do not get a serious and sustained effort on counter-drug
operations . . . we will fail to achieve our objectives. . . . This
should be a 10,000 man [local] program, supported by a $250 million
[U.S.] program -- with an in-country presence of 200+ DEA agents."

"We are now in a race against time. We must deal with: the Taliban
(700 percent increase in IED's [improvised explosive devices] -- 140
suicide bombers last year); the criminals who control much of the
ground-level governance of the largest narco-state operation in the
world; foreign fighters who now plot terrorism against both the
Afghan Government and the U.S. . . . and finally from the growing
disaffection of the suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police,
roads, electricity, security, jobs, and belief in their government."

"We can, without question, achieve our U.S. national objective of a
functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy --
which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is a cross-over year."

"The effort to create the Afghan police force is currently grossly
under-resourced with 700 U.S. trainers. . . . In Iraq, we have 7000
U.S. police trainers. . . . In Kosovo, we had 5000 police mentors. .
. . We have trained 60,000 Afghan police, but we have no idea where
they are. . . . Probably there are non-uniformed, untrained and
largely criminal elements in many of the district capitals. There are
no real jails -- or prosecutors -- or judges -- or squad cars.

"Without effective police, there will be no effective reconstruction.
. . . The Germans have the lead . . . [and have] done an inadequate
job. The German program consists of a few senior German police
mentors of enormous professionalism but few resources."

The Afghan National Army "is much better postured. . . . They have
pride, embedded U.S. trainers, a functioning chain-of-command, a
superb combat leader. . . . They are the first element of national
unity in 100 years." But they have "for all practical purposes no air
power . . . [and] no high speed, wheeled light armor. . . . They have
junk small arms . . . [and] lack body armor."

"If we want to be out of Afghanistan in 15 years, we need to spend 10
Billion dollars" equipping the Army and police.

"NATO presence . . . is a political and security triumph. . . .
However, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential
supporting elements, . . . have severely restrictive
rules-of-engagement, and may lack the political will to fight when required."

"The most important single factor in Afghanistan, without which
nothing else is possible, is the reality of the enormous courage,
aggressiveness, discipline, and flexibility of U.S. combat forces. .
. . U.S. Air Force and Naval air power is the monster combat
multiplier. We have employed three times the tonnage of ordnance in
Afghanistan as in Iraq."

"The central key to winning the war in Afghanistan is economic
reconstruction and employment . . . [but] the current system has been
badly organized, marked by U.S. government turf battles, badly
resourced, and has poor oversight. The allies provide inadequate help."

"Fortunately, help is on the way. If Congress acts, we should see
$10.6 billion in economic and military aid approved for the Afghans.
. . . We must lose the 'Expeditionary' mindset. Reconstruction in
this destroyed nation is going to take 25 years."