AMERICA'S DRUG PROBLEM DOWN SOUTH

Politicians and farmers in Peru and Bolivia have discovered an opiate for
mobilizing the masses: coca activism mixed with a potent dose of
anti-American sentiment.

The emergence of a coca-growing, yanqui-hating contingency in these
countries has had a decidedly mood- altering effect on U.S. diplomats and
Washington officials, who view with concern this political phenomenon that
threatens U.S. interests. While the growing of coca leaves has long been a
problem in Latin America's Andean ridge, widespread, sometimes violent
political activism for the right to grow coca is a new phenomenon. What
makes this activism even more disconcerting is that Peru and Bolivia were
models of U.S.-supported counter-narcotics success.

And the unholy union between drug-trafficking and terrorism in Peru makes
the emergence of coca activism a heightened concern.

In Peru this month, the government halted its U.S.-backed coca- eradication
efforts and crop-substitution program, which gives farmers subsidies to
grow crops other than coca, in the wake of violent protests by farmers
against the programs.

This is particularly worrisome in light of the State Department's Senate
testimony this February that a terrorist group, Shining Path, ravaged the
Peruvian countryside in the 1980s and mid-1990s, has made a resurgence in
coca-cultivating areas, indicating it is linked with the drug trade.

U.S. intelligence experts believe the Shining Path was probably behind
March's deadly bombing in Lima, which took place just outside the U.S.
Embassy days before President Bush's visit to Peru.

In Bolivia, Evo Morales, who has led sometimes bloody protests against
U.S.-funded coca-eradication programs, won about 21 percent of the vote in
the June 30 presidential election, second only to free- marketer Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada, who won about 22 percent.

The Bolivian congress will elect the next president on Aug. 3 in a runoff
vote. Mr. Morales' coca stand didn't really take off until it was tinged
with contempt for America. After U.S. ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha
said late last month that a Morales triumph would "place in danger" U.S.
aid to Bolivia, Mr. Morales called Mr. Rocha's comments "terrorist and
arbitrary," adding that the U.S. ambassador was his "best campaign chief."

This pro-coca contingency could reverse the remarkable counter- narcotics
gains made in Peru and Bolivia. Peru in 1992 grew 129,100 hectares of coca,
but only 34,200 hectares last year. Bolivia reduced its production from
45,500 hectares to 14,600 hectares during the same period. While much of
this coca cultivation has been shifted to Colombia, which produces about
135,000 hectares of coca, stomping out coca in these countries has
generated considerable peace and stability dividends.

Since economic growth stagnated in both Bolivia and Peru last year, it may
be tempting to turn a blind eye to coca production by poor farmers. But
both rural dwellers and the United States will sorely regret the resurgence
of narco-terrorists. America must therefore take its counter-narcotics
efforts in Latin America seriously, and launch an effective program for
countering aerial drug-running as soon as possible. It must also pull out
all the diplomatic stops to convince Peru to restore its counter-narcotics
programs.

To ease the burden, Washington should make a sincere attempt to lower
tariffs and reduce U.S. subsidies on the goods that poor countries can
competitively produce, such as agriculture and textiles.

It must also redirect its approach to giving U.S. aid, which currently buys
the support of elite influence-peddlers and largely bypasses the poor. Of
the $153 million slated to be given to Peru this fiscal year, only about
$30 million is geared to grass-roots funding targeted to the poor. In
Bolivia, just about $10 million, out of $84 million, is geared to this kind
of funding.

The war on drugs may appear to be a losing endeavor, until some of its
substantive successes are on the verge of collapse.

While U.S. demand for cocaine drives much suffering in Latin America, U.S.
counter-narcotic efforts help to ameliorate some of the damage.

Inertia often has a stuporous effect on Washington bureaucrats, but if the
White House doesn't take notice of the coca crisis soon, the problem may
quickly become too massive to contain.