News (Media Awareness Project) - US GA: OPED: Daugherty: U.S. Intervention in Colombia Raises a |
Title: | US GA: OPED: Daugherty: U.S. Intervention in Colombia Raises a |
Published On: | 2003-02-23 |
Source: | Savannah Morning News (GA) |
Fetched On: | 2008-01-20 23:59:08 |
DAUGHERTY: U.S. INTERVENTION IN COLOMBIA RAISES A WHOLE NEW HOST OF PROBLEMS
American policy toward Colombia in the last two decades has been to assist
its government only in the arena of counternarcotics programs. U.S. aid was
mostly limited to interdicting drug shipments, training Colombia's military
and police forces in counternarcotics tactics and supporting their
operations against the cartels. As such, we were also supporting the
Colombian government's commitment to democracy.
But the cartels are not Colombia's only problem. For 40 years it has been
besieged by rebel groups from the left and right seeking to overthrow the
elected government.
Predominant is the leftist group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), distinguished by uncountable heinous acts of terrorism over the
years, running the gamut from murder and kidnapping to huge car bombs with
corresponding losses of life and injury. More than 3,000 Colombians have
been killed annually in the last decade, the great majority civilians.
Beginning in August of 2002, U.S. policy shifts, taken in accordance with
doctrine articulated in the president's current National Security Strategy
Statement, have combined with events in Colombia to alter the nature of
America's relationship with that government and escalate the American role
there. The president's strategy statement, required each year by Congress,
differs significantly from those of his predecessors.
First, earlier presidents gave short shrift to this document, often allowing
mid-level officials to draft bland, generic statements for Capitol Hill.
Importantly, this president chose to make it a serious, thoughtful
postulation of newly emerging American policy interests and directions, even
serving as the principal drafter.
A second difference is that it moves the United States beyond deterring
terrorist attacks or arresting individual terrorists; instead America now
seeks to destroy terrorist groups and capture leaders as well as operatives.
Third, the strategy statement commits the United States to building and
sustaining democracies around the world. This differs from America's Cold
War policy, which was limited to containing Soviet expansionism, undermining
pro-Soviet regimes and supporting regimes, democratic or not, that were
under threat of communist subversion. Policies to increase democracies
globally were not part of the Cold War calculus.
Now, the president has directed our government to "work actively to extend
the benefits of freedom across the globe -- and to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the
world."
Thus, in August of 2002 President Bush amended U.S. policy toward Colombia
by adding counterterrorism programs. This may be seen as the first
escalation and one filled with potentially serious consequences. While it is
manifestly a worthy goal to aid an ally in defeating terrorism, the problem
was and is that FARC and other terrorist groups are also insurgents seeking
to destroy the national government. Hence the second escalation, a
counterterrorism effort that quietly but officially began evolving into a
counterinsurgency program in the fall of 2002.
America has only the best intentions in aiding Colombia, but the fact
remains that the United States has deliberately put itself in the midst of
someone else's civil war. It is worth remembering that the last three times
the United States became embroiled in civil wars were Vietnam, Lebanon in
the early-mid 1980s and Somalia in 1991-93. And while the reasons and
circumstances in each were different, the results were the same: American
humiliation and defeat, too many American casualties, and failure to achieve
policy goals. Colombia is different yet, so our efforts there may prove to
be the exception.
But good intentions are not a substitute for a solid policy that is clearly
articulated and implemented only after all options and possible consequences
have been objectively evaluated. Risks and costs must be balanced against
potential gain, and policymakers must ensure that they listen to experts, in
and out of government.
The president, already overburdened with Iraq, North Korea, a fractured
Europe, and a sagging economy at home, must nonetheless give Colombian
policy the attention it deserves. Otherwise, he may wake up one morning
surprised by yet another foreign policy crisis.
William J. Daugherty, Ph.D., is a professor of American government and
foreign policy at Armstrong Atlantic State University.
American policy toward Colombia in the last two decades has been to assist
its government only in the arena of counternarcotics programs. U.S. aid was
mostly limited to interdicting drug shipments, training Colombia's military
and police forces in counternarcotics tactics and supporting their
operations against the cartels. As such, we were also supporting the
Colombian government's commitment to democracy.
But the cartels are not Colombia's only problem. For 40 years it has been
besieged by rebel groups from the left and right seeking to overthrow the
elected government.
Predominant is the leftist group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), distinguished by uncountable heinous acts of terrorism over the
years, running the gamut from murder and kidnapping to huge car bombs with
corresponding losses of life and injury. More than 3,000 Colombians have
been killed annually in the last decade, the great majority civilians.
Beginning in August of 2002, U.S. policy shifts, taken in accordance with
doctrine articulated in the president's current National Security Strategy
Statement, have combined with events in Colombia to alter the nature of
America's relationship with that government and escalate the American role
there. The president's strategy statement, required each year by Congress,
differs significantly from those of his predecessors.
First, earlier presidents gave short shrift to this document, often allowing
mid-level officials to draft bland, generic statements for Capitol Hill.
Importantly, this president chose to make it a serious, thoughtful
postulation of newly emerging American policy interests and directions, even
serving as the principal drafter.
A second difference is that it moves the United States beyond deterring
terrorist attacks or arresting individual terrorists; instead America now
seeks to destroy terrorist groups and capture leaders as well as operatives.
Third, the strategy statement commits the United States to building and
sustaining democracies around the world. This differs from America's Cold
War policy, which was limited to containing Soviet expansionism, undermining
pro-Soviet regimes and supporting regimes, democratic or not, that were
under threat of communist subversion. Policies to increase democracies
globally were not part of the Cold War calculus.
Now, the president has directed our government to "work actively to extend
the benefits of freedom across the globe -- and to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the
world."
Thus, in August of 2002 President Bush amended U.S. policy toward Colombia
by adding counterterrorism programs. This may be seen as the first
escalation and one filled with potentially serious consequences. While it is
manifestly a worthy goal to aid an ally in defeating terrorism, the problem
was and is that FARC and other terrorist groups are also insurgents seeking
to destroy the national government. Hence the second escalation, a
counterterrorism effort that quietly but officially began evolving into a
counterinsurgency program in the fall of 2002.
America has only the best intentions in aiding Colombia, but the fact
remains that the United States has deliberately put itself in the midst of
someone else's civil war. It is worth remembering that the last three times
the United States became embroiled in civil wars were Vietnam, Lebanon in
the early-mid 1980s and Somalia in 1991-93. And while the reasons and
circumstances in each were different, the results were the same: American
humiliation and defeat, too many American casualties, and failure to achieve
policy goals. Colombia is different yet, so our efforts there may prove to
be the exception.
But good intentions are not a substitute for a solid policy that is clearly
articulated and implemented only after all options and possible consequences
have been objectively evaluated. Risks and costs must be balanced against
potential gain, and policymakers must ensure that they listen to experts, in
and out of government.
The president, already overburdened with Iraq, North Korea, a fractured
Europe, and a sagging economy at home, must nonetheless give Colombian
policy the attention it deserves. Otherwise, he may wake up one morning
surprised by yet another foreign policy crisis.
William J. Daugherty, Ph.D., is a professor of American government and
foreign policy at Armstrong Atlantic State University.
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