MANDATORY SENTENCING

Supreme Court Decision Bolsters a Bad Practice That Constrains Justice

The Supreme Court, although deeply divided on the issue, unfortunately has
decided to uphold California's three-strikes law. That law - like the
"Rockefeller drug laws" that need reform in New York - involves an
unreasonable adherence to statutory constraints that handcuff justice.

The California three-strikes law, which mandates sentences for third-time
offenders, shows justice by formula can misfire.

Despite Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion that neither of the
challenged sentences involved in this review was so grossly
disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, in neither case did the punishment fit the
actual crime. In one, a man who stole three golf clubs from a pro shop was
sentenced to 25 years without parole; in the other, the sentence was 50
years without parole for stealing children's videotapes from a Kmart.

Of course, there are reasons for such stringent laws. In California, voters
and lawmakers approved the three-strikes law in 1994 after the kidnapping
and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas. The man who committed that heinous
act had a long criminal history. Worse still, he had been released from
prison after serving only half of his most recent sentence. Laws such as
California's were made for such dangerous monsters.

The law becomes flawed, however, when it is applied to every case without
discretion. In California, there are more than 7,000 people in prisons
serving sentences of at least 25 years under the law, including more than
300 whose third strike was a minor theft. Such numbers are disturbing.

The constraints are similar in New York's harsh and mandatory-sentence laws
for drug possession or sale, including one that requires a prison sentence
for anyone convicted of a second felony within 10 years of his first.
Sentences can vary in length, but there are stiff mandatory minimums with
no judicial discretion.

O'Connor may believe the court should defer to such legislative judgments
made by the states. The high court, after all, is most concerned with
process and the Constitution.

But political zeal sometimes prevails in legislative determinations of
sentencing. Sentencing laws should offer guidelines, not too-strict
mandates. Repeat offenders, especially the ones who commit violent crime
after violent crime, undoubtedly deserve an extra measure of punishment,
and often a harsh one. But occasionally a case clearly indicates a mistake
or a need for different intervention or correction, which offers a better
path toward true justice.

Justice is what we elect judges to administer. They should have enough
leeway to do that job.