GIVE THE NEW PRESIDENT A BREATHER

Without a truce, or at least a temporary reprieve from all sides,
Carlos Mesa, who was sworn in on Friday night, may go down as the one
of Bolivia's shortest-lived presidents. To achieve a lasting truce all
sides will have to at least temporarily forgo demands for any type of
action by the Bolivian government.

The likelihood of achieving this kind of respite is slim despite the
claims by the social groups that brought down the government of
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada that they will allow President
Mesa to govern. Several reasons explain why the kind of truce that
Bolivia is currently experiencing following the four-week-long bloody
confrontations between strikers and the military will not last.

The most likely source of tension will come from U.S. attempts to
ensure that Mesa does not deviate from the goals of completely
eradicating the cultivation of coca leaf, the raw material for
cocaine, in the Chapare region of central Bolivia.

In this sense, Mesa may soon face the stark reality about Bolivia's
cocalero movement and its leader, Evo Morales. Since achieving second
place in the June 2002 electoral contest that brought Sanchez de
Lozada to office with Mesa as the vice president, Morales shrewdly
spent thirteen months orchestrating a national movement aimed at
destabilizing and prematurely ending the previous government.

He achieved his objective last Friday, when Sanchez de Lozada was
forced to resign from office. While Morales appears to be more
sympathetic to Mesa than to the ousted ''millionaire gringo,'' this
honeymoon is likely to be short-lived.

Washington will likely demand compliance with counternarcotics
programs, especially the eradication of coca cultivation in the
Chapare, where Morales holds an iron-clad grip over seven labor
unions. The United States is unlikely to give Mesa a reprieve on coca-
eradication programs, and Morales is even less likely to accept a
full-scale eradication program.

This was the same dilemma faced by Sanchez de Lozada, who traveled in
vain to Washington in November of last year to request a temporary
pause in eradication programs in order to buy time to deal with
Morales' threats to paralyze the country. The beleaguered Bolivian
president also asked for $150 million to help his government overcome
an inherited fiscal deficit that topped 9 percent of GDP.

He returned to Bolivia with empty hands and an order to restart
eradication in the Chapare. By mid-January, cocalero mobilization in
the Chapare began, and the government's armed response initiated the
long series of deaths that eventually led to Sanchez de Lozada's
resignation.

If Mesa chooses to eradicate, his government will soon face
mobilization by coca-growing farmers in the Chapare followed by road
blockades and work stoppages. Any attempt to clear roadblocks with the
use of police or military forces is likely to produce casualties and,
in the short-to mid-term, is likely to lead to a full-scale
mobilization against the new Bolivian government.

This has been a recurrent pattern in Bolivia for at least a decade,
although it became particularly acute in the last six years after the
government of General Hugo Banzer and Jorge ''Tuto'' Quiroga
implemented a so-called Dignity Plan that dramatically reduced coca
cultivation in the Chapare. The Dignity Plan was so successful that
former U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha boasted that no Bolivian cocaine
reached U.S. shores.

On the other hand, if Mesa opts against eradication, the United States
is unlikely to continue funding development programs, and Bolivia
could soon end up on the list of countries decertified for
noncompliance with Washington's counterdrug programs. The list is
generally crafted at the end of each year and announced in early March.

A decertified Bolivia is not in the best interest of the United
States, as this would likely strengthen Morales and perhaps even
result in his eventual ascension to power. Moreover, a pause in
eradication may be the best chance for the Mesa government to achieve
its ambitious agenda to make Bolivian democracy more representative
and inclusive.

At the same time it could lead to a massive upsurge in coca
cultivation and cocaine production destined for the Brazilian and not
the U.S. market.

This may prove to be a moment for Washington to consider granting the
Bolivian government some sort of reprieve on the coca front. After
all, if no Bolivian cocaine reaches the United States, then maybe this
is no longer a Washington issue.

Instead, U.S. officials could focus on helping Mesa overcome the
dramatic situation in Bolivia. President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, on
the other hand, may want to speak to fellow labor leader Evo Morales
about rising crime, addiction and drug trafficking in Brazil.

Eduardo Gamarra is director of Florida International University's
Latin American and Caribbean Center.