A WAR ON DRUGS AND TERROR

Global terrorism and international drug trafficking are partners. If we are
to win the war against the terrorists, we must also win the war against the
drug lords.

The most recent United Nations report on drug production in Afghanistan
concluded that opium production generated $2.3 billion in 2003. This report
also acknowledged that al Qaeda and the Taliban generate revenue from
Afghan drug production. It is clear from these and other field reports that
the resurgence of terrorism in Afghanistan and, indeed, in other parts of
the world, is at least partly funded from illegal drug trafficking. If the
international community fails to adequately address this narco-terrorist
threat, democracy and stability in Afghanistan will fail and the threat of
narco-terrorism likely will spread.

When coalition forces in Afghanistan discover arms caches, they often find
indications of drug trafficking, such as opium stores, safe houses, and
information that reflects the methods by which drugs and terrorists move in
and out of Afghanistan.

A conservative assumption that the terrorists take 10 percent of the Afghan
drug profits means they generated at least $200 million in 2003 from drug
trafficking alone. Despite their defeat on the battlefield, the terrorists
continue generating revenue to fuel their worldwide operations.

The relationship between Afghan drug trafficking and terrorism is real and
growing. A tenet of the war on terror is understanding that the
international community must combat the terrorists' ability to generate
revenue to fund their operations, logistics, travel and weapons
procurement. So long as they are able to freely generate these funds, their
efforts to buy weapons, information, logistical support and, perhaps,
weapons of mass destruction will remain unhindered. Ominously, other
terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jemaah
Islamiah and state actors such as North Korea are learning drug trafficking
provides large amounts of cash for other nefarious purposes.

Terrorists generate revenue from drug trafficking with frightening ease. In
Afghanistan, for example, they generate revenue by "taxing" farmers and
local officials a percentage of the revenue from opium production.
Additional revenue comes from taxing the transportation or processing of
the opium or, alternatively, providing transportation for hire.

The routes by which the traffickers move drugs throughout Afghanistan are
similar, and sometimes, identical, to the routes by which terrorists move
and operate. Historically, Afghan-produced opium was transported to Europe
and Russia north through the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. Additionally, drugs are moved east through Iran and west
through Pakistan. Proceeds are not deposited in regulated financial
institutions, but, rather, the informal "banks" al Qaeda continues using to
move its resources.

The tools the international community uses to combat drug trafficking are
identical to those needed to combat this terrorist resurgence. For example,
11 nations work together in the Caribbean with U.S. federal law enforcement
agencies, the intelligence community and the Defense Department to collect,
analyze and disseminate information on the clandestine movement of ships,
planes and people possibly carrying drugs.

This effort, led by the United States' Joint Interagency Task Force South
in Key West, Fla., includes a unique international cooperation. Under this
headquarters, nations pool resources ships, planes and law enforcement,
intelligence and military resources to locate suspect shipments and
interdict them for prosecution.

Likewise, collaboration between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Thai
military, police and intelligence forces has been remarkably successful in
combating the flow of drugs into Thailand and the rest of the world.

A similar international effort to interdict drug, arms and other
clandestine movements in Afghanistan is possible. With training and
equipment, Afghan security forces can patrol areas of ungoverned space
within the country. These forces collect drug trafficking information and
send it to regional intelligence analysis centers, which transmit the
timely information to Afghan and/or international security forces for
interdiction.

The British government assumed leadership for the international effort to
combat Afghan drug trafficking. Not only does Great Britain suffer directly
from the use of Afghan-produced opium, but Prime Minister Tony Blair also
recognized drug trafficking is an obstacle to President Karzai's efforts to
establish security throughout Afghanistan.

British efforts include training and equipping Afghan security forces to
combat drug trafficking. Obviously, those skills are equally useful for
combatting terrorists.

The Bush administration should be commended for supporting Afghan and
British efforts to combat this narco-terrorist threat. As part of the
Iraq-Afghanistan supplemental, the administration requested and received
$243 million for the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip
selected Afghan Police and Army personnel. These personnel are to collect,
analyze and disseminate information and combat the traffickers.

Just as importantly, these forces can likewise detect, monitor and
interdict the movement of arms and terrorists. International forces in
Afghanistan, including those of the United States, must be willing to act
upon this information, however, for this investment to bear fruit.

Stability and establishment of the rule of law are prerequisites for social
development in Afghanistan. The need to establish this type of security
before the international community can begin substantive development cannot
be overstated. Alternative development, no matter how promising, cannot
work so long as the symbols of sovereignty -- police, courts, military and
the rule of law -- do not exist. Without security, people will not
cooperate with alternative development efforts. The narco-terrorists will
be free to retaliate against the nongovernmental organization personnel who
attempt to improve life in the countryside.

A prime example of security leading to development is taking place in
Colombia. U.S. and international efforts to promote alternative livelihoods
in Colombia are generating success as a result of the improved security
provided by the Colombian government. U.S. Agency for International
Development efforts to convince Colombian farmers not to grow cocoa worked
only when there was a cost to noncompliance -- the enforcement of law. As a
result, for the first time, the U.N. and the United States report Colombian
cocoa production has fallen. The decreased cocoa production and U.S.-backed
efforts to increase Colombian sovereignty have decreased the resources
available to the narco-terrorists in Colombia. The Colombian economy is
growing and professionalism, and respect for the rule of law has increased.

International efforts to assist Colombia and other countries are a useful
template for international assistance to Afghanistan. By assisting Afghan
government efforts to establish security through drug trafficking
interdiction, we help establish sovereignty and the rule of law throughout
Afghanistan and, indeed, the region. In addition, counter-narco-terrorism
efforts impede generation of significant terrorist revenues to support
their worldwide operations.