A WELCOME FLAME OUT:

THE LIBERALS' BILL TO DECRIMINALIZE MARIJUANA WAS BAD POLICY AND DESERVES
TO DIE ON THE ORDER PAPER.

Barring unforeseen plot twists, a federal election will soon be called and
a bill decriminalizing marijuana will go up in flames. As a supporter of
marijuana reform, I say, goodbye and good riddance. Decriminalization was
not only bad public policy, the bill's production and presentation were
deceptive, even fraudulent -- as demonstrated by documents obtained under
the Access to Information Act.

From the beginning, Martin Cauchon, the justice minister who promoted
decriminalization, promised an open discussion, a theme repeated by the
throne speech of Sept. 30, 2002, which said the government would "act on
the results of parliamentary consultations with Canadians on options for
change in our drug laws, including the possibility of the decriminalization
of marijuana possession."

These "consultations" were special committees established by both the
Senate and the House of Commons to examine marijuana and other drugs.

The first of the committees to report was the Senate's. For two years,
senators had worked diligently, commissioning 23 reports on scientific and
academic research, holding 50 days of public hearings, and meeting with
more than 100 witnesses from around the world. The final report, all 650
pages of it, deployed extensive evidence and careful analysis to argue that
marijuana possession, production and distribution should be legalized and
strictly regulated.

The Commons committee was much less rigorous. Its two reports, released in
November and December, 2002, ignored the toughest questions and produced
scant evidence. Its recommendations stuck to conventional wisdom, which by
that time was for decriminalization of possession in small amounts. One
small wrinkle was a call to further decriminalize the cultivation of a very
modest amount of marijuana for personal use.

After receiving the Commons report, the government announced it would only
decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana -- meaning
violators would not face criminal charges but would instead be hit with
substantial fines. Nothing on the supply side would change except maximum
sentences for growing marijuana would be raised, a change that eight
decades of experience and stacks of research showed would have no effect on
the trade or organized crime.

Decriminalization did, however, raise the possibility of what
criminologists call "net-widening" -- when punishments are reduced, but not
eliminated, lesser offenders who would have got only warnings from the
police are no longer let off. In effect, lighter punishment causes more
enforcement, which is precisely what happened in South Australia when
marijuana was decriminalized in 1987.

Of course, it is the government's right to look at the pros and cons of the
various models and make the wrong call. But what is not legitimate is for a
government to make an important policy decision without any consideration
of alternatives, particularly those arising from parliamentary
consultations. It appears, however, that this is precisely what the
government did.

In January 2003, under the Access to Information Act, I requested the
Department of Justice provide copies of all policy documents relating to
marijuana reform from January 2002 forward. Thirteen months later, I
received a large stack of documents that's most notable for the near-total
absence of any consideration of either committee's report.

The sole discussion of the Commons committee's idea of decriminalizing
cultivation for personal use, for example, is a single sheet with a glib
list of pros and cons. But even that looks like careful analysis next to
the treatment of the Senate report, which only appears in talking points
that advise the speaker to say such things as: "The Senate report will be a
very helpful contribution to the development of Canada's drug strategy."
There is no discussion of the report's ideas. No examination of its
voluminous evidence. No weighing of the pros and cons of its many
recommendations. Nothing.

The government wasn't under any legal obligation to respond to the report,
a department spokeswoman told me. "Legalization was not an option. Our
international obligations do not permit us to legalize. The minister was
very clear that decriminalization was what he wanted to do, not legalization."

But the Senate report addressed that issue, and if the government had
wanted a serious policy discussion, it would have examined what the report
said about it and fleshed out the issue before coming to a conclusion. It
did nothing of the kind.

Senator Pierre-Claude Nolin, the chair of the committee, was shocked to
hear the report was ignored. Mr. Nolin said he personally gave Mr. Cauchon
a full briefing. "He told me he was to ask his department to review the
report and give him an analysis."

The government's disingenuousness wasn't limited to the process that
produced the bill. It also misled Canadians about the basic character of
the scheme.

Polls show a clear majority of Canadians favour either decriminalization or
legalization, and they do so because they want less punishment or none at
all. They want liberal reform, in other words. And that's certainly how the
government pitched decriminalization, primarily by talking up the
unfairness of giving young people criminal records. The media bit hard:
Canada was praised as a hip young thing in The New Yorker and pictured on
the cover of The Economist as a moose in sunglasses.

But behind closed doors, the justice department described decriminalization
very differently. In a draft cabinet submission labelled "secret,"
Australian experience with decriminalization is cited as evidence that
decriminalization in Canada "will likely increase enforcement" -- a
conclusion listed under the heading "Advantages."

This moose wears sunglasses and carries a nightstick.

If this is the government's idea of liberal reform, I'm happy to see it go
up in flames. The status quo might be absurd, unjust and a waste of money,
but at least it's honest.