NORTH KOREA'S DRUG HABIT

WASHINGTON - Reaction to last month's meeting between Junichiro Koizumi, the
Japanese prime minister, and Kim Jong II, the North Korean leader, was
nothing short of underwhelming. Critics said Mr. Koizumi gave up too much -
millions in medical aid and thousands of tons of rice - to secure the return
of five children of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea more than two
decades ago. He also failed to obtain a definitive commitment from Mr. Kim
to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

The critics notwithstanding, Mr. Koizumi's diplomacy should be judged
a success. The lesson the United States and Japan should learn from it
is that moderate pressure on the North Korean regime works - and can
be used to limit the North's ambitions not only in weapons development
but also in the drug trade.

After all, Japan has been pressing for the release of its citizens and
their relatives since the day two years ago when Kim Jong Il admitted
North Korea had kidnapped them. Yet it was not until Japan made clear
it was prepared to curtail trade with the North - cutting off
financial remittances to the North, imposing an import ban on North
Korean goods, banning Japanese ships from making North Korean ports of
call - that North Korea made any concessions.

International commerce is clearly important to North Korea, and
threats of trade sanctions obviously get the regime's attention. Yet
there is an even better reason for the United States and Japan to
employ this strategy: there is increasing evidence that in recent
years North Korea has expanded its role as producer, shipper and
trafficker of narcotics throughout East Asia and Southeast Asia.

According to the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Pyongyang has directed North Korean farmers to
produce opium poppies since the late 1970's, with cultivation areas
expanding exponentially in recent years. These farms are thought to
produce as much as 40 tons of opium annually. Government-subsidized
factories process the opium into heroin, which is then distributed
through companies and diplomatic conduits. According to some sources,
North Korea now ranks among the world's largest opium and heroin suppliers.

Because the North Korean state is so secretive, it is difficult to
prove any direct links between the regime and drug trafficking. But
there is some evidence that the government may be taking over and
enlarging the trade, as it has done in other areas of the North Korean
economy. A 2003 report from the Congressional Research Service cited
nearly 50 arrests or drug seizures involving North Koreans in more
than 20 countries since the early 1990's, with at least 11 documented
cases involving North Korean diplomats or intelligence agents. In the
last five years, both Russian and German police have detained North
Korean diplomats on counterfeiting or heroin smuggling charges. And
between 1999 and 2001, more than one-third of all drug seizures by
Japan and China were methamphetamines en route from North Korea.

This problem is likely to get worse. In part, this may be the
unintended consequence of other diplomatic policies. The American-led
Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, which began almost two
years ago and aims to block trade in nuclear and other weapons, may
have caused Kim Jong Il to rely on drug trafficking and counterfeiting
to try to compensate for lost revenues. North Korea's foray into
illicit activities has been further spurred by United States efforts
at taking customers like Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen and Libya off North
Korea's missile sales roster, which has cut the North's revenues in
this area to one-tenth of their usual volume.

As they continue their on-again, off-again diplomacy, the United
States and Japan may find that North Korea's drug trade is a more
visible component of the regime's threat. The good news, for the
United States and its allies, is that the North's growing drug threat
means that diplomacy aimed at eliminating its missile exports is
working. The bad news, for North Korea, is that continued drug
trafficking is not likely to be tolerated by the region.

If it continues to increase its trade in drugs, North Korea is likely
to become the eventual target of a regional initiative to restrict the
drug trade - which, in conjunction with the American-led curbs on its
weapons trade, will put moderate yet deliberate pressure on North
Korea. And if Japan's recent experience with abductees is any
indication, such patient but comprehensive diplomacy may be the key to
attaining Mr. Kim's flexibility on nuclear disarmament.

Victor Cha is a professor of government and Asian studies at
Georgetown. Chris Hoffmeister is a recent graduate of Georgetown.