JUDGE: OFFICERS MAY LIE ABOUT TRAFFIC-STOP REASONS

In the cloak-and-dagger world of undercover drug investigation, just
how far can officers go to conceal their secretive work?

U.S. District Court Magistrate Judge Bruce Guyton wades into this
thorny area of the law with an opinion involving the seizure of a
kilogram, or a little more than two pounds, of cocaine found stashed
in a diaper bag inside Adrian Brown's car.

The cocaine, authorities allege, was a drop in the bucket for a
conspiracy that funneled hundreds of pounds of the illegal powder from
Atlanta to Athens to Knoxville. Brown, they contend, was part of a
ring of drug traffickers led by Nathaniel Brinson Jr.

A task force of agents headed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration knew the odds were high that Brown had cocaine in his
car in August 2003. But they had a problem.

Brown and his alleged co-conspirators had no clue the DEA was on their
trail. They were clueless of phone taps and surveillance teams and
unaware of the government's efforts to build a conspiracy case.

The DEA-led task force wanted to snatch Brinson's cocaine and,
perhaps, turn him into an informant in the process, but they were not
ready to take down the entire alleged trafficking organization.

So, they concocted a ruse, testimony has shown. That ruse would
ultimately lead into a Knox County courtroom, where a Tennessee
Highway Patrol trooper would - on the witness stand - continue to
cloak the real reason he stopped Brown. If the trooper, at best,
blurred the truth or, at worst, lied, could Assistant U.S. Attorney
Mike Winck still be allowed to use that kilogram of cocaine against
Brown?

In an opinion released last week, Guyton said he could.

According to Guyton, federal appellate judges have given undercover
officers quite a bit of leeway when it comes to concealing their work.
They can stall a traffic stop to keep up a ruse, and they can even lie
about their real reasons for stopping a suspect, Guyton wrote.

What matters, Guyton wrote, is not what the officers say they know but
what they really know that counts.

"The legality of a stop must be judged by the objective facts known to
the seizing officers rather than by the justifications articulated by
them," Guy wrote, citing a 6th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruling.

Using wiretaps and surveillance, the DEA-led team of agents tracked
Brown to a West Knox County hotel, where they believed Brinson
delivered to Brown the kilogram of cocaine.

DEA Agent Todd Lee asked THP Sgt. Johnny McDonald to follow Brown's
car and try to find a legal basis to stop it. Lee had briefed McDonald
on the details of their probe, so the trooper knew Brown was a
suspected cocaine trafficker with drugs in his car, Guyton wrote.

McDonald used a temporary tag affixed to the back of Brown's car as
reason for a stop. He later testified in Knox County General Sessions
Court that the tag - and his perceived authority to check its validity
- - was the sole reason he stopped Brown.

At that hearing, McDonald never divulged details of the conspiracy
probe, a move to continue to cloak for the DEA its ongoing
investigation. A sessions court judge ruled McDonald had no right to
stop a car to check a temporary tag and tossed out the cocaine as evidence.

When Winck unveiled the government's conspiracy case against Brinson,
Brown and a crew of others a few months later, defense attorney
Russell Greene asked Guyton to follow the sessions court judge's
ruling. McDonald, Greene charged, had lied on the witness stand and
should be stuck with the tale he told.

In his opinion, Guyton refused to label McDonald a liar and instead
wrote that he found the trooper's testimony "credible." But even if he
didn't, Guyton said that would not change the fact that McDonald had
probable cause to believe Brown had cocaine in his car, regardless of
whether McDonald revealed that to either Brown or the sessions judge.

Brinson and several others in the conspiracy indictment have pleaded
guilty. Brown contends he is innocent and is set to stand trial early
next year.