NATION SLIDING INTO COLOMBIA'S MORASS

Washington must rethink pouring more money, troops into mission
American presence in Colombia is becoming a classic case of ''mission
creep'' -- getting involved in a foreign venture whose scope and cost
keep growing, each escalation justified by the failure of the previous
one.

The only way to break this spiral is to re-examine the rationale for
the intervention, the results and -- most importantly -- determine an
end point. When is it time for the U.S. to pull out, either because
the mission has succeeded, or the cost has outstripped any possible
benefit?

Last weekend, Congress quietly doubled to 800 the number of American
troops allowed to operate in Colombia, and it also increased the
number of U.S. civilian contractors allowed to work there to 600 from
400. Many of the civilian contractors are involved in quasi-military
activities such as surveillance and intelligence analysis.

U.S. involvement in Colombia's war against narcotraffickers jumped
sharply in 2000 with the launch of Plan Colombia. So far the U.S. has
invested $3.3 billion, mostly for military aid.

Originally, the plan was targeted exclusively at the drug cartels in
an attempt to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the U.S.

But in Colombia's civil war it's impossible to neatly isolate
narcotraffickers. There are drug growers and producers, but also two
guerrilla groups fighting the government and a paramilitary army
fighting the guerrillas.

They all profit from the production and shipment of narcotics to the
U.S.

In 2002, distinctions between the fight against the drug traffickers
and the anti-government guerrillas began to blur as the Bush
administration lifted restrictions on the role of American troops. So
the anti-drug campaign evolved into a counterinsurgency effort against
guerrillas fighting the government. The scope of the U.S. mission grew
further when, in 2003, the Bush administration officially designated
the guerrillas and paramilitary groups as terrorist organizations, on
par with al-Qaida or the Taliban -- an analogy that rings false.

So far these policy acrobatics have not made a dent on the original
problem --- stanching the flow of illegal narcotics to the U.S. After
a recent visit to Colombia, John Walters, head of the White House's
Office of National Drug Control Policy, admitted these efforts have
not reduced the availability of drugs on American streets. Inside
Colombia, the cultivation of coca has just moved from one place to
another.

It is deeply troubling to see Congress reflexively increase the U.S.
military involvement in Colombia, as it did last weekend.

American policy in Colombia is not working. This nation needs to
rethink its involvement in Colombia's civil war, rather than pouring
more money and personnel into a failing enterprise.

- -This editorial appeared in the Chicago Tribune on Tuesday. This
commentary should be considered another point of view and not
necessarily the opinion or editorial policy of The Dominion Post.