LET AFGHANISTAN GROW THE WORLD'S OPIUM SUPPLY

It's easy to think that eliminating opium production in Afghanistan
- -- which today accounts for 90 percent of global supply, up from 50
percent a decade ago -- would solve a lot of problems, from heroin
abuse in Europe and Asia to the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan.
I'm not so sure.

The current dilemma for the U.S., NATO and the Karzai government is
clear. The best way to reduce opium production in Afghanistan is with
an aggressive campaign of aerial fumigation -- but that would cause
massive economic dislocation and even starvation in a country where
the opium trade accounts for roughly one-third of GDP. The second
best, now under way, is manual eradication, but the result this past
year was a net increase in opium production nationwide. Either way,
these options play very much into the hands of the Taliban, who gain
politically wherever farmers fear or witness the destruction of their
livelihoods.

But imagine if the entire crop could be eliminated by a natural
disaster such as a drought or blight. The United States, NATO and the
Karzai government would be blameless -- although no doubt many
Afghans would blame the CIA -- a reasonable suspicion given support
in some U.S. circles for researching and employing biological warfare
in the form of mycoherbicides. The Taliban would suffer doubly,
losing both revenue and political advantage. And the United States
and NATO could follow up emergency assistance with investment in
alternative agriculture and economic development without having to
compete with black market opium. Outside Afghanistan, heroin would
become scarcer and more expensive; fewer people would start to use;
and more addicts would seek treatment. Seems like an ideal scenario, right?

Think again. Within Afghanistan, the principal beneficiaries would be
the warlords and other black market entrepreneurs whose stockpiles of
opium would shoot up in value. Millions of Afghan peasants would
flock to cities ill prepared for them, with all sorts of attendant
social problems. And many would eagerly return to their farms next
year to start growing opium again, utilizing guerrilla farming
methods to escape intensified eradication efforts. But now they'd be
competing with poor farmers elsewhere in the world -- in Central
Asia, Latin America or even Africa -- attracted by the temporarily
high return on opium. This is, after all, a global commodities market
like any other.

And outside Afghanistan? Higher heroin prices typically translate
into higher rates of crime by addicts working to support their
habits. They also invite more cost-effective but dangerous means of
consumption, such as switching from smoking to injecting heroin,
which translates into higher rates of HIV. And many drug users will
simply switch to pharmaceutical opioids or stimulants like cocaine
and methamphetamine. All things considered, wiping out opium in
Afghanistan would yield far fewer benefits than is commonly assumed.

So what's the solution?

Some have revived an idea first proposed during the 1970s when
southeast Asia supplied most of the world's heroin: Just buy up all
the opium in Afghanistan -- which would cost a lot less than is now
being spent trying to eradicate it. That might provide a one-year
jolt, but over time it would simply become a price support system,
inviting farmers inside Afghanistan to save a portion for the black
market and others outside Afghanistan to start growing opium. Then
there's the Senlis Council's "Poppy for Medicine" proposal, which
would license Afghan villages to grow opium and convert it into
morphine tablets for domestic and international markets. It's been
widely criticized as unworkable -- but the same can be said of
current policies.

Or, given that farmers are going to produce opium -- somehow,
somewhere -- so long as the global demand for heroin persists, maybe
the world is better off, all things considered, with 90 percent of it
coming from Afghanistan. Think of international drug control as a
global vice control challenge, and the opium growing regions of the
country as the equivalent of a "red light" zone. The United States,
NATO and the Karzai government could then focus on "regulating" the
illicit market and manipulating the participants with the objective
of advancing broader political and economic objectives. They might
even find ways to tax the illicit trade.

This is one of those proposals that sounds unworkable -- until it's
compared with all the others. It surely wouldn't be the first time
U.S. or other government officials have gotten their hands dirty
dealing with criminal entrepreneurs to advance broader political
objectives. And if this particular heresy becomes the new gospel, it
opens up all sorts of possibilities for pursuing a new policy in
Afghanistan that reconciles the interests of the United States, NATO,
the Karzai government and millions of Afghan citizens.