POPPY PATHOLOGY

How U.S. Drug War Boosts the Taliban

ACCORDING to a recent report from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
19,047 hectares of poppies were eradicated in Afghanistan this year,
24 percent more than in 2006. Meanwhile, the number of opium-free
provinces more than doubled, from six to 13.

Those victories were somewhat overshadowed by the news that the total
amount of land devoted to opium poppies in Afghanistan rose from
165,000 to 193,000 hectares, an increase of 17 percent. Due to
"favorable weather conditions," estimated opium production rose even
more, hitting an all-time high of 8,200 metric tons, 34 percent more
than the previous record, set last year.

Since their efforts have had precisely the opposite of the result
they intended, U.S. drug warriors, predictably enough, plan to try
harder, calling for more eradication, possibly including aerial
herbicide spraying, and more interdiction. Over the long term, if
history is any guide, these supply-reduction measures will have
little or no impact on heroin consumption. Over the short term, they
will continue to strengthen the Taliban insurgency.

The U.N. report emphasizes that poppy growing is becoming
increasingly concentrated in the southern provinces where the Taliban
are strongest. Having forgotten whatever religious scruples they may
once have had about the opium trade, the Taliban make money by
charging poppy farmers for protection and taxing traffickers at
checkpoints, a fundraising opportunity created by U.S. demands that
the Afghan government wipe out a crop the U.N. says accounts for
one-third of the Afghan economy.

"Afghanistan's drug money corrupts the government, weakens
institutions and strengthens the Taliban," says a new report from the
State Department. It would be more accurate to say that America's
drug policy, which it insists on exporting to every other country in
the world, corrupts the Afghan government, weakens institutions and
strengthens the Taliban.

The State Department draws exactly the wrong conclusion from this
situation, saying, "The increasing linkage between the region's major
drug-trafficking organizations and insurgencies prompts the need to
elevate the drug-enforcement mission and integrate it appropriately
into the comprehensive security strategy." In fact, the "drug
enforcement mission" - which alienates Afghans from their government,
helps fund the insurgency and distracts NATO and Afghan forces from
the central goal of reducing violence and establishing order - is
fundamentally at odds with the "security strategy."

The United Nations says this year's opium output, which represents 93
percent of the illicit world supply, "exceeds global demand by a
large margin," indicating a stockpile of thousands of tons. Despite
their concerns that opium profits are helping to fund terrorism, U.S.
and U.N. drug warriors seem intent on raising the value of that
stockpile by curtailing production.

Even if they're successful, they cannot reasonably hope to have a
lasting impact on heroin availability. If cracking down on opium
production in some Afghan provinces simply shifts it to others,
cracking down on opium production throughout Afghanistan will simply
shift it to other countries. That has been the general pattern during
the last century of opium "eradication," which might more accurately
be called opium relocation.

A decade ago, Pino Arlacchi, then the head of the U.N.'s anti-drug
program, declared that "global coca-leaf and opium-poppy acreage
totals an area less than half the size of Puerto Rico," so "there is
no reason it cannot be eliminated." For a less optimistic man, the
fact that such a tiny percentage of the earth's surface is needed to
supply the world with heroin and cocaine would be cause to doubt the
effectiveness of eradication.

Speaking of cocaine, in recent years, the U.S. government has spent
billions of dollars on anti-drug aid to Colombia, with no discernible
effect on prices or purity. Colombia, which still supplies about 90
percent of America's illicit cocaine, has been helping to train
Afghan police in anti-drug tactics, and Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says it provides "a good model" for Afghanistan.