MOVING THE GOALPOSTS IN COLOMBIA

WASHINGTON -- According to the U.S. government's own statistics, the
aims of U.S. policy in Colombia are not being met.

At the same time, the State Department is withholding certification
of the Colombian military's human-rights record, owing to stalled
rights cases involving the armed forces and their ties with
paramilitary groups. In February, eight members of the San Jose de
Apartado peace community, including women and children, were killed;
the community asserts, and physical evidence points to the military's
culpability.

Unfortunately, Congress doesn't seem to find this disturbing enough;
it has approved another $742 million to maintain current U.S. policy
in Colombia, dubbed "Plan Colombia." When Congress first passed the
funding, in 2000, it established a five-year lifespan. Congressional
policymakers have now concluded that this military strategy is
effective and worthy of renewal with taxpayer dollars.

They are wrong. They were duped by the Bush administration's creative
but ultimately deceptive number games, and carried away by the
increasingly desperate drumbeat of war. Despite more than $3 billion
pumped into the Colombian military in the past five years, neither of
Plan Colombia's twin aims of reducing the amount of drugs on U.S.
streets and of increasing Colombian security has been met.

Colombia remains the No. 1 producer of cocaine. The drug problem is
set against the backdrop of a protracted conflict between guerrilla
groups and paramilitary forces with documented ties to the military.
In 2000, a few wise members of Congress warned against entering into
yet another such military quagmire.

How have these concerns played out? Human costs and long-term
possibilities for peace aside, let's look at the numbers. Even by the
U.S. government's own estimate, the aerial-spray approach of
eradicating coca (the raw material of cocaine) is ineffective.
According to a report released by the White House, despite record
levels of fumigation in 2004, the amount of coca produced in Colombia
has remained the same or even slightly increased.

My organization, Witness for Peace (WFP), has been on the ground
monitoring the effects of these U.S. policies since 2001. And now a
U.S. Embassy official has told us that the U.S. government is making
"first downs" in Colombia, and that enough first downs will
eventually lead to the "goal line."

Yet the data conclusively show that this approach is ineffective in
getting us there. Five years of in-country documentation make clear
that this policy destroys food crops and hope in the countryside.
This destroys trust in the Colombian and U.S. governments more
effectively than it destroys coca. And while the Colombian government
boasts increased security and an improvised demobilization of the
paramilitary, the silence of the State Department indicates another story.

The State Department has been unable to approve the Colombian human-
rights record this year; such "certification" is necessary to release
part of the funding passed by Congress. The State Department, through
an ambassador in Colombia who toes the party line and defends
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, has been unable to rubberstamp the
process, as in the past.

Shouldn't this give pause to our policymakers who just renewed
military support for Colombia's army and police?

The House made a mistake in granting the Bush administration's
request to renew funding. The Senate should not follow suit by
renewing a failed policy expiring this year. Time is up. The State
Department could do what is best for the people of Colombia and the
United States by remaining consistent with its rhetoric on human
rights and denying certification until true progress is made.

(Janna Bowman, who lived in Bogota in 2001-04, is a member of Witness
for Peace. This article is published in association with
MinutemanMedia.org, which originated it.)