AGAINST THE DRUG WAR

"An Analytic Assessment Of U.S. Drug Policy"
David Boyum and Peter Reuter AEI Press, $20, 133 pages

There has always been a certain resistance on the right to the war on drugs.
One of the most persuasive texts on that front came in 1972, when the
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse put forth a report entitled
"Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding." This document recommended
decriminalization on the grounds that marijuana and its users did not
sufficiently endanger the public safety to warrant criminal penalties.

President Nixon had no apparent use for the findings of his own
commission's study as he ran for re-election. But the report was not
without its executive influence.

President Carter, early in his term, referred to it when he argued
that "penalties against drug use should not be more damaging to the
individual than the use of the drug itself.

Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against possession of
marijuana in private for personal use."

Despite these strong words, Mr. Carter accomplished precious little on
the national level in stemming overzealous enforcement of marijuana
prohibition. His successors took a different tack than the one-term
Democrat recommended, increasing penalties on drug users and helping
the prison-industrial complex grow at nearly-exponential rates to
house those caught in the web of illicit narcotics. But despite these
efforts, America's drug problem is legendary around the world.

With that in mind, as Congress wrestles with the specter of twained
budget and trade deficits, it is fair to ask: Why does it seem like
the war on drugs is not simply a failure, but the kind of failure that
seems more egregious with each passing year?

Many conservatives have wondered the same thing, and have condemned
the inefficacy of the effort, especially regarding cannabis.

But their often emotional appeals have yet to resonate with national
policy leaders.

In that context, the utility of this slender volume becomes clear.

Using arguments rooted largely in cost-benefit analysis, the authors
neatly debunk the drug war as it is currently fought.

Decrying the lack of "strong empirical evidence of substantial
effectiveness" of the effort, the scholars suggest that the drug war's
advocates be charged with providing said evidence.

And that is not a suggestion to take lightly.

As the authors contend, the drug war has not succeeded in stemming the
availability of either soft or hard drugs on the streets.

There is little correlation, Mr. Boyum and Mr. Reuter claim, between
even the toughest law enforcement and the reduction of drug use.
Domestic drug use has yet to abate appreciably despite the staunchest
efforts of police.

Meanwhile, efforts by the United States to control the smuggling of
narcotics into the country from foreign lands bear only modest returns.

With enforcement bearing diminishing returns on all fronts, the
authors, veteran observers of the drug war, argue that resources
should be shifted from enforcement to a more "treatment-based" model.

It is striking how wide the gap is between action and perceived intent
in the drug war. During President Clinton's tenure, for example, the
decrease in viable drug markets was greeted with increased drug
incarcerations. The authors point such incongruities out at
considerable length, while making the case that initiatives like the
public-school DARE anti-drug education program, "this is your brain on
drugs" -- styled television advertisements and empty promises (like
the vow made in the 1986 crime bill that America would be drug-free by
1995) have collapsed from their own unworkability. While that point
has been noted elsewhere, the authors deserve kudos for showing, point
by point, how, where, and why the drug war has failed.

There are areas where the book could have been improved.

For example, the authors' understanding of street drug use reads
curiously dated, overemphasizing the late 1990s club staple MDMA
(ecstasy) at the expense of drugs that boomed more recently, like the
rurally popular methamphetamine. But it may be too much to expect an
up-to-the-moment understanding of the vagaries of the street drug
scene from a self-described "analytic assessment of U.S. drug policy."
For the most part, Mr. Boyum and Mr. Reuter succeed admirably here,
taking a minority position on a hot-button issue and arguing it
rigorously, honorably and unsentimentally, and recommending useful and
timely reforms.

Politicians thinking about running for president in 2008 would benefit
from reading this book and internalizing its lessons.