WITH SANCTIONS, WE LOSE

Other than oil, the one area of reason and cooperation in
U.S.-Venezuelan relations has been in fighting illicit drugs. Since
2002 Venezuelan officials have seized record amounts of cocaine, at
levels comparable only to those of Mexico. Just last year Washington
praised the "excellent" Venezuelan cooperation in disrupting drug
trafficking organizations that take advantage of that country's
porous 1,300-mile border with Colombia.

Last week, however, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ended
cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; he accused
its agents of spying and later suspended their diplomatic immunity.
Washington in turn revoked the U.S. visas of three Venezuelan
military officers, including a top anti-drug commander, and reminded
Caracas that under U.S. law, President Bush will have to decide next
month whether Venezuela can be certified as "fully cooperating" in
the fight against drugs.

Unless the meaning of full cooperation has changed, Bush is likely to
decertify Venezuela in accordance with the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1992. This means that Washington will deem Venezuela
uncooperative and, save for some argument to waive sanctions, will
suspend all but anti-drug and humanitarian aid and end support for
loans to Venezuela from multilateral lending institutions. But while
U.S. law and Venezuelan deeds would justify decertification, such a
move would be largely counterproductive.

For starters, it would do nothing to further the objective of
improving anti-drug efforts. Chavez could not care less about any
opprobrium attached to decertification -- he knows full well that
Washington already considers Venezuela more or less a rogue state.
Venezuela also is riding high on oil revenue and is hardly dependent
on U.S. aid. The world's fifth-largest oil producer, Venezuela
claimed $31 billion in foreign reserves last week, a record. Of the
$3.5 million of U.S. aid earmarked for the country this year, only
$500,000 would be suspended under decertification.

More significantly, as Rand Beers, assistant secretary of state for
international narcotics under Presidents Bill Clinton and then Bush,
warns, the measure is a blunt instrument that tends to have broader
effects than anticipated. In Colombia, drug decertification that was
intended to punish the government of Ernesto Samper in the 1990s
ended up hurting the entire country. Since 1999 it has cost
Washington about $4 billion just to help Colombia recover.

While the unintended consequences in Venezuela might not be economic,
decertification would certainly strengthen Chavez's hand. The Andean
leader relishes any U.S. action that appears imperialistic or
heavy-handed, and he deftly uses it to keep his revolution alive.
Decertification coming from the world's largest consumer of drugs
would appear hypocritical and would only increase sympathy for Chavez
among those who are suspicious of Washington.

Decertification would also deal a death blow to some of the most
significant advances in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in years. Since he
arrived in Caracas a year ago, U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield has
been making frequent visits to some of the city's poorest barrios,
actions that at least suggest a tacit appreciation for Chavez's
source of power.

In February the U.S. Embassy sponsored a baseball clinic for young
players in Caracas by New York Yankees center fielder Bernie
Williams. The embassy also arranged and paid for training sessions
for Venezuelan baseball coaches in the United States. Senior members
of the House International Relations Committee are working on
legislation to increase funding for such goodwill initiatives.

But the fact is that drug decertification would narrow these avenues
of engagement by discontinuing U.S. funds for all but the most urgent
aid, such as in the case of natural disaster. This is a mistake,
because these gestures represent the beginnings of a more
constructive U.S. policy in Venezuela that takes the plight of its
poor more seriously -- and also because Chavez's standing with the
poor may be eroding.

After seven years in office, most of them during an oil boom,
Chavez's welfare programs, or misiones, have not, for the most part,
panned out. According to government data, Venezuela's unemployment
rate last year was higher (13.7 percent) than in 1998 (11 percent).
More than 53 percent of households lived in poverty last year, as
opposed to 49 percent seven years ago. The percentage of households
without basic public services remains exactly the same.

If decertification ends up doing nothing to improve anti-drug
efforts, if it undermines a more constructive U.S. approach and if it
actually helps prop up Chavez, the United States needs to decertify
Venezuela as much as its population needs to continue buying illegal
drugs. Despite the obvious idiocy of doing both, you can expect both to happen.