DRUG CZAR OVERLOOKS METH CRISIS, CRITICS CHARGE

WASHINGTON -- When officials at the White House drug czar's office
downplayed a recent survey showing that methamphetamine had exploded
into a national epidemic, the reaction in Congress was swift and harsh.

"I think this administration is fundamentally out of touch," said Rep. Brian Baird, D-Wash, a leader on the meth issue.

"The whole country is screaming," about meth, added Rep. Mark Souder,
R-Ind., a critic of the drug czar's office.

But the drug czar's response didn't surprise Washington insiders, some
of whom view the office as structurally incapable of dealing with the
nation's meth crisis. And they say its current leadership seems
unwilling to try.

A congressional panel today will spotlight the drug czar's office,
asking top officials how they intend to halt meth's devastation.
Among those expected to testify is Scott Burns, the deputy drug czar,
who told national and international prosecutors in Portland this month
that meth is "the most destructive, dangerous, terrible drug that's
come along in a long time."

Aides to Souder, who chairs a subcommittee of Government Reform, said
the hearing will not be a forum to hurl blame and accusations at the
White House. Rather, the goal is to examine what federal resources
are available to combat meth.

But it's clear that Congress is frustrated with the drug czar's office
and its leader, John Walters, according to drug-policy experts.
Walters has proposed cutting aid to local law enforcement, saying it
has not produced results. And he is not fulfilling his role in
coordinating drug policy across the federal bureaucracy, they say.

"The whole interagency process that that office is charged with
leading has broken down," said John Carnevale, who led the office's
transition team before President Bush took office in 2001. "I'm
personally very disappointed in the performance of that office."

Walters declined requests last week to be interviewed. But
spokeswoman Jennifer de Vallance said Walters and his staff are
committed to a balanced approach of addressing drug addiction in all
its forms.

"We need to be focused not only on marijuana and methamphetamine, but
also cocaine and heroin, prescription drugs, which is the
second-largest source of drug abuse in this country," she said. "You
cannot focus on one single drug to the exclusion of others." Epidemic
defined

Earlier this month, the National Association of Counties revealed that
58 percent of sheriffs polled identified meth as their top drug problem.

And the survey showed that meth's reach had extended steadily eastward
from its West Coast roots.

Local government leaders and members of Congress reacted with alarm.
But two of Walters' top deputies -- Dave Murray and former Multnomah
County prosecutor John Horton -- declared that meth still did not
qualify as an epidemic.

"We can't turn our back on other threats," Murray told the Associated
Press.

The House Meth Caucus, a bipartisan group with more than 100 members,
responded with a letter to Bush firmly declaring that meth "is our
nation's No. 1 drug threat."

Baird was among the signers, but he said he was so irked that he sent
a separate letter to Bush reciting the definition of "epidemic" and
inviting the president to meet with victims of meth-related crime in
his district.

"When you've had exponential growth, when you know that it kills
people as surely as any disease kills people, well, it is an
epidemic," Baird said in an interview. "When someone implies it's
not, it's as if they don't take it seriously."

Baird attributed the tepid response of the drug czar's office to a
combination of factors, including Walters' management style and an
"East Coast bias" that still regards meth as a problem endemic to the
West.

But other critics said that indifference to the meth problem is rooted
partly in the history of the drug czar's office and its longstanding
strategy to reduce rates of drug use, not necessarily costs to society.

The drug czar's office was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, signed
in 1988 by President Ronald Reagan. At a ceremony, Reagan dedicated
the law to first lady Nancy Reagan, who had popularized the anti-drug
slogan, "Just Say No."

The law, Reagan said, would help "banish any lingering tolerance of
the false image that drugs are somehow 'cool' or 'hip.' " Its biggest
weapon in the war on drugs: a multi-million-dollar budget to promote
anti-drug advertisements.

The law reflected the concerns of the day: Congress wanted to reverse
perception that drugs such as marijuana and cocaine were becoming
acceptable. A drug such as meth, with its high human toll and
potential for collateral damage, was little more than a blip on the
public consciousness.

Accordingly, the drug czar adopted a strategy to reduce overall rates
of drug use. In the 1980s, under drug czar Bill Bennett, that meant
attacking cocaine. Today, under Walters, Bennett's protg, that means
going after marijuana, which is used by 15 million people in the
United States.

De Vallance, the drug czar's spokeswoman, said the strategy does not
mean that the office pursues marijuana to the exclusion of other
drugs. But under orders from President Bush in his National Drug
Control Strategy, the office continues to measure its success by
reductions in use of all illicit drugs. And pot, she acknowledged,
remains No. 1.

Baird said that though he applauds progress in reducing rates of drug
use, the strategy naturally de-emphasizes a drug such as meth. It is
used by about 1 million people but has an outsized impact on families,
police and health care providers, he said.

"You could say that the common cold is more frequent than breast
cancer; therefore, the most dangerous ailment in America is the common
cold," Baird said. "But if some family member came to you and said,
'I've got cancer,' instead of, 'I've got a cold,' what would your
reaction be? It's the very same kind of thing with meth."

Over the years, Congress has developed a pattern of using the drug
czar's office as a scapegoat when public pressure mounts to deal with
a particular drug problem, policy experts said.

"Creation of a central office coordinating drug policy was an
opportunity for Congress to place the blame for not quickly winning
the drug war," said David Musto, a medical historian at Yale
University. "Congress wanted a single target."

But if Congress wants a greater focus on meth, it also bears
responsibility for managing the drug czar's mission -- a fact that
Souder acknowledged in June as his committee began work on a bill to
reauthorize the drug czar's office.

"Neither this nor any administration is ever going to be entirely
happy with how Congress shapes the office, since what members think of
as oversight is seen as interference by an administration," Souder
said during the hearing.

In managing the reauthorization bill, Souder has added $25 million
dedicated to running anti-meth awareness ads. He also has resisted
administration efforts to cut money to the drug czar's High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area program, which often is used by local police to
combat meth.

Baird said bigger changes to the drug czar's office still are possible
this year but the administration is unlikely to acknowledge that it
has made mistakes or that a new approach is needed.

"The feeling I have is that Congress woke up to this fully this year
for the first time," Baird said. "The administration has yet to wake
up."