SOWING AFGHAN SECURITY

THERE IS A STRIKING ANTIDOTE to worsening security in Afghanistan,
where suicide bombing and convoy ambushes now occur every day.
Increasingly, these Taliban- and Al Qaeda-sponsored attacks are
linked to opium and heroin trafficking. Afghanistan supplies 80
percent of Europe's heroin and is the largest grower of poppies in the world.

Instead of legalizing poppy growing or attempting to eradicate the
stubborn plants and destroy the livelihoods of impoverished farmers,
why not pay the farmers to grow something else? Afghans already grow
wheat as their staple grain.

Simply exhorting farmers to turn away from poppies to wheat, saffron,
and pomegranates will not work. But providing serious, guaranteed,
long-term incentives that will encourage farmers to grow wheat in
preference to poppies could well produce addictions to wheat instead
of heroin.

Senior Afghans, meeting in December at Harvard University with
American and British researchers, believe that wheat is the answer.
Americans spend about $3 billion a year attempting and failing to
expunge the Afghan poppy crop. The conclusions of a Kennedy School of
Government project on Afghanistan estimate that providing annual
guarantees for purchases of wheat at triple the world price would
cost less than eradication. To be credible for farmers, the
guarantees would have to be established for five- and 10-year
periods, not just annually.

A marketing board could do the buying, and the problems of supply
that would have to be watched carefully would concern smuggling wheat
into the country rather than smuggling opium out. The results could
also be eaten by hungry Afghans, or exported to neighboring Pakistan
or Tajikistan. And Europe would benefit immensely from reduced
supplies of heroin. By thus ending the major battles to eradicate
what is now the main peasant commodity, and the source of great
profits for warlords and middlemen, subsidizing wheat would also
contribute to peace.

It might also help to undercut some of the appeal of the Taliban.
Terrorism now connected with narco-trafficking would also cease, thus
improving overall national security. If the scourge of poppy growing
can be reduced and then eliminated, Afghanistan might stand a chance
to prosper and develop well. Otherwise, the landlocked nation's
future will be precarious, and the new government will continue to
be a collection of its sections, with little unity. Making headway on
poppies and drugs would provide the central government of Afghanistan
with a sense of common purpose that could draw the proto-nation
together. Today the central government has only limited visibility
and legitimacy beyond Kabul, the capital.

A handle on the poppy problem would also give Kabul an edge over
regional power brokers.

Washington and Brussels should use their collective financial muscle
to assist President Hamid Karzai's government and the new national
parliament in this way, and not by attacking farmers trying to be
productive by any means that they know how. To accomplish these and
other worthy objectives, Afghanistan needs to be well governed.

The key governance deliverable is security.

Second is a much enhanced rule of law. A climate of impunity for
powerful people now prevails, and must be altered.

The state must not continue to be complicit in the abuse of ordinary civilians.

Washington and Brussels must do more to help the Karzai government to
develop its legal apparatuses and codes.

Even when the police make arrests, their investigations are weak,
and the legal system plays favorites. There are few assurances of
predictability or integrity, with many local warlords imposing their
own dictates on civil and criminal disputes.

The country also requires an ability to recognize and protect
individual rights. Battling harder against corruption is critical,
also, although this is a task largely for the Karzai government and
not for outsiders. These obstacles impede Afghanistan's emergence
from conflict and chaos.

With skillful internal leadership and outside assistance, however,
these barriers can be overcome.

But the time horizon is five years, not months or single years. The
role of foreign donors will remain critical for that period, and
beyond. More coordination among those donors will be essential, but
Afghanistan must provide the priorities more than it now does.

State building in Afghanistan is not an enduring effort.

But if drug-related and judicial reforms happen, and if Afghan and
NATO forces can reduce insecurity, then -- and only then --
Afghanistan will emerge as a strong ally and an effective developing nation.

Robert I. Rotberg is director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict
at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and
president of the World Peace Foundation.