DON'T DESTROY AFGHAN POPPIES -- USE THEM TO CULTIVATE PEACE

On 12 December, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, stood up before a
packed House of Commons to outline his government's new approach to
Afghanistan. This eagerly anticipated statement would, it was
believed, herald a fresh approach to the country's opium problem.

Unfortunately, the reality failed to match the pre-speech optimism.
In fact, of an eight-page speech, counter-narcotics warranted a mere
two paragraphs on page seven -- apparently the issue came as an
unwelcome afterthought that deserved little more than an obligatory mention.

The government's abject failure to outline any fresh strategy on this
critical issue is staggering. After all, the endemic drugs crisis
lies at the nexus of development and security in the country.

As counter-narcotics challenges facing Afghan and international
forces in southern provinces intensify, so security and overall
reconstruction efforts become irreconcilable. The remarkable job
being undertaken by the British military in southern Afghanistan is
severely undermined by a paucity of creative policy in the area of
counter-narcotics. Ongoing failure to address the illicit drugs trade
is fuelling insurgent activities throughout the country.

The apparent paralysis that affects the government on this issue is
not entirely of its own construction. A small coterie of
functionaries within the US state department continues to exercise a
disproportionate level of influence over counter-narcotics policy in
Afghanistan.

This sub department, called the bureau of international narcotics and
law enforcement affairs (INL), is tasked to "to reduce the entry of
illegal drugs into the United States". And the best way to do this?
Blanket, indiscriminate destruction. Because, let's not forget that
drugs are inherently evil, and anyone that thinks otherwise should
head to the west coast and spark up a joint.

The INL, and hence the US government, advocate aerial chemical
spraying of poppy crops throughout Afghanistan. It is to the eternal
credit of the Karzai government that they have not allowed this to
happen in Afghanistan, but can their resolve withstand record
increases in opium production?

Washington's evidence for the "success" of aggressive eradication
comes from Colombia where, since the 1990s, coca has been chemically
sprayed at increasing rates. This policy facilitated a 20-year-high
coca harvest in 2006, has destroyed rural livelihoods, prompted mass
displacement and laid the groundwork for chronic instability.

The detrimental impact of widespread poppy eradication would be even
more pronounced in Afghanistan. In the absence of immediate
alternative livelihoods and large-scale employment programmes,
aggressive eradication operations reinforce farmers' economic
vulnerability and exacerbate poverty. Even more concerning for the
international community, such policies create a space within which
the Taleban can capitalise upon public disillusionment.

The US and UK have also indicated a desire to "decapitate" the drug
industry, capturing key drug barons and holding high-profile show
trials. In the absence of any clear definition of success in
Afghanistan, Washington calculates that hauling a big boy in front of
the world's media would represent further evidence of their progress
in the country. This neat solution fails to account for the fact that
corruption is endemic throughout all levels of the Afghan government.
A number of high-profile national and regional politicians have
become fabulously wealthy off the back of the country's opium. This
is a hydra that cannot be defeated by traditional law-enforcement
measures alone.

Indeed, law enforcement is a core part of the problem, as the Afghan
National Police are ill-- disciplined, poorly-trained and eminently
corruptible. A lack of clarity regarding their core purpose has
enabled them to continue with corrupt activity with minimal scrutiny.

It is clear that a fresh policy approach is desperately needed. Most
notably, a development-based approach that recognises the opium poppy
as a potential economic resource for Afghanistan must be adopted. A
village-based Poppy for Medicine campaign, advocating licensed poppy
cultivation for medicinal purposes, maximises Afghanistan's tradition
of strong local control systems and provides the necessary leverage
for economic diversification. Crucially, Poppy for Medicine would
allow the central government and the international community to
engage positively with rural communities and help break the ties and
dependency on the illegal drugs market and the Taleban.

The UK should truly take the leadership on counter-narcotics efforts
and endorse the implementation of Poppy for Medicine pilot projects
in Helmand province in order to test the controllabilit

y and economic effectiveness of this counter-narcotics initiative.

Successful counter-narcotics interventions require not only the
necessary economic infrastructure but, more importantly, institutions
of formal governance and mechanisms of social protection.

In the absence of immediate viable economic alternatives and with the
authority of the central government seen to be shrinking visibly in
favour of anti-government forces and narco-traffickers, forced
eradication proves a disastrous policy in the fragile Afghanistan.

Aggressive chemical spraying eradication will not only poison the
land but, more importantly, poison the relationship with the Afghan
people. Keeping to the same aggressive counter-narcotics policies
will prove catastrophic for both the Afghan government and the UK's
mission in Afghanistan.

* Paul Burton is head of policy analysis for the Senlis Council.