News (Media Awareness Project) - US: Report Says Afghan Drug Effort Lacks Strategy |
Title: | US: Report Says Afghan Drug Effort Lacks Strategy |
Published On: | 2009-12-24 |
Source: | New York Times (NY) |
Fetched On: | 2009-12-24 18:27:27 |
REPORT SAYS AFGHAN DRUG EFFORT LACKS STRATEGY
WASHINGTON -- The United States-led counternarcotics effort in
Afghanistan, viewed as critical to halting the flow of funds to the
Taliban and curtailing corruption, lacks a long-term strategy, clear
objectives and a plan for handing over responsibility to Afghans, the
State Department inspector general said in a report released Wednesday.
"The department has not clarified an end state for counternarcotics
efforts, engaged in long-term planning or established performance
measures," said the 63-page report, which evaluates work done by the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the
State Department.
The report said that military and civilian antidrug programs lacked
clearly delineated roles, and that civilian contracts for
counternarcotics work were poorly written and largely supervised from
thousands of miles away. It also said that cooperation between the
United States Embassies in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad,
Pakistan, was limited, adding, "This lack of cooperation is due, in
part, to Embassy Islamabad's conclusion that there is no connection
between illicit narcotics and the insurgency in Pakistan."
The success -- or failure -- of drug-control efforts is critical to
President Obama's plan for Afghanistan, where he hopes an increase in
troops will deliver a blow to the resurgent militants of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. The Taliban finance their operations partly through the
illicit drug trade, taking in up to $400 million a year.
The report called it "essential" that a force controlled by the
Afghan government take the lead in the antidrug fight. But it added
that the State Department had no clear "strategy for transitioning
and exiting from counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan."
United States officials have harshly criticized corruption, much of
it drug-related, in President Hamid Karzai's government.
Despite what it says is a consensus that eradication of poppy crops
is essential, the report noted a midyear decision by the State
Department to shift from eradication efforts to financing
interdiction of drug traffickers.
The report said that while contractors, doing work as varied as crop
eradication and educating farmers on poppy alternatives, are
generally meeting agreed-upon goals, their contracts include vague
performance measures.
While much of the report was critical, it also listed the profound
handicaps facing those involved in the drug eradication efforts,
"including a weak justice system, corruption and the lack of
political will" in the Afghan government, as well as the overpowering
economic incentives that lead impoverished farmers to grow poppies.
Among other things, the report recommended setting "a defined end
state" for counternarcotics programs; establishing benchmarks for the
shift to an Afghan takeover of those programs; and establishing
monitoring inside the country of contractors.
The report was based on meetings with embassy personnel in Kabul and
Islamabad, visits to Kabul and four Afghan provinces, and meetings
with officials of the United Nations, the United States military and
coalition members.
WASHINGTON -- The United States-led counternarcotics effort in
Afghanistan, viewed as critical to halting the flow of funds to the
Taliban and curtailing corruption, lacks a long-term strategy, clear
objectives and a plan for handing over responsibility to Afghans, the
State Department inspector general said in a report released Wednesday.
"The department has not clarified an end state for counternarcotics
efforts, engaged in long-term planning or established performance
measures," said the 63-page report, which evaluates work done by the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the
State Department.
The report said that military and civilian antidrug programs lacked
clearly delineated roles, and that civilian contracts for
counternarcotics work were poorly written and largely supervised from
thousands of miles away. It also said that cooperation between the
United States Embassies in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad,
Pakistan, was limited, adding, "This lack of cooperation is due, in
part, to Embassy Islamabad's conclusion that there is no connection
between illicit narcotics and the insurgency in Pakistan."
The success -- or failure -- of drug-control efforts is critical to
President Obama's plan for Afghanistan, where he hopes an increase in
troops will deliver a blow to the resurgent militants of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. The Taliban finance their operations partly through the
illicit drug trade, taking in up to $400 million a year.
The report called it "essential" that a force controlled by the
Afghan government take the lead in the antidrug fight. But it added
that the State Department had no clear "strategy for transitioning
and exiting from counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan."
United States officials have harshly criticized corruption, much of
it drug-related, in President Hamid Karzai's government.
Despite what it says is a consensus that eradication of poppy crops
is essential, the report noted a midyear decision by the State
Department to shift from eradication efforts to financing
interdiction of drug traffickers.
The report said that while contractors, doing work as varied as crop
eradication and educating farmers on poppy alternatives, are
generally meeting agreed-upon goals, their contracts include vague
performance measures.
While much of the report was critical, it also listed the profound
handicaps facing those involved in the drug eradication efforts,
"including a weak justice system, corruption and the lack of
political will" in the Afghan government, as well as the overpowering
economic incentives that lead impoverished farmers to grow poppies.
Among other things, the report recommended setting "a defined end
state" for counternarcotics programs; establishing benchmarks for the
shift to an Afghan takeover of those programs; and establishing
monitoring inside the country of contractors.
The report was based on meetings with embassy personnel in Kabul and
Islamabad, visits to Kabul and four Afghan provinces, and meetings
with officials of the United Nations, the United States military and
coalition members.
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