NO EXIT FOR MEXICAN LEADER FROM ILL-CONCEIVED WAR ON DRUGS

Three years of violence and thousands of deaths have seen the volume
of drugs actually increase

Three years ago this month, Mexican President Felipe Calderon donned
military fatigues and declared a full-scale war on drugs, ordering
the army into Mexico's streets, highways and villages.

Back then, Calderon received broad support, both domestically and
from abroad, for what was viewed as a brave, overdue and necessary
decision. Tangible results were predicted to come soon.

Moreover, George W. Bush's administration quickly promised American
support - the so-called Merida Initiative, signed in February 2007 -
and public opinion polls showed that Calderon had, in one fell swoop,
left behind the travails of his close and questioned electoral
victory, gaining the trust of the Mexican people. But today, things
look very different.

At a recent debate with, among others, Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek and
Asa Hutchison, the former head of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, the main question was whether the U.S. was to blame for
Mexico's drug war.

I pointed out that neither the U.S. nor Mexico was to blame; only
Calderon was. Just like Bush's invasion of Iraq, Mexico's drug war
was a war of choice. It was a war that Calderon should not have
declared, that cannot be won, and that is doing enormous damage to Mexico.

Today, a growing number of Mexicans share this view. As the war drags
on, positive results are nowhere to be seen, while violence in the
country is escalating. On Dec. 9, for example, according to the daily
newspaper Reforma, 40 people died in firefights between police and
army forces and the drug cartels. More than 6,500 fatalities will
have occurred this year alone, topping last year's total, which was
double that in 2007.

I believe that Calderon declared this war because he felt the need to
legitimize himself before Mexico's people, given the doubts
surrounding his victory in the 2006 presidential election - doubts
that his supporters, like me, never shared.

And I believe that it is unwinnable because it fails to comply with
the tenets of the Powell Doctrine, elaborated 18 years ago by Colin
Powell, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in relation
to the first Gulf War.

Powell enumerated four conditions that must be satisfied in order to
succeed in a military operation. One was deployment of overwhelming
force, which the Mexican military lacks. Another was definable
victory, which one never has in a war on drugs (a term first used by
Richard Nixon in the late 1960s). The third condition was an exit
strategy at the outset, which Calderon lacks, because he can neither
withdraw in defeat in his own country, nor withdraw and declare
victory. Calderon still does enjoy the support of the public -
Powell's fourth condition - but he is beginning to lose it.

Over the past three years, more than 15,000 Mexicans have died in the
drug war. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United
Nations Human Rights Council Universal Peer Review have all
documented, with more or less evidence and precision, a proliferation
of abuses and an absence of accountability for them.

Of the more than 220,000 people arrested on drug charges since
Calderon took office, three-quarters have been released. Only 5 per
cent of the remaining 60,000 or so have been tried and sentenced.

Meanwhile, acreage used for poppy and marijuana production has risen,
according to the U.S. government, to 6,900 and 8,900 hectares,
respectively. Restrictions on the trans-shipment of cocaine from
South America to the U.S. have made only a dent in street prices,
which spiked in 2008 but have stabilized in 2009 at levels well below
their historical highs in the 1990s.

According to the U.S. government's International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, opium, heroin and marijuana seizures have decreased
since Calderon began his drug war, and drug production in Mexico is
on the rise.

In 2008, according to the U.S. State Department, potential heroin
production reached 18 tonnes, up from 13 tonnes in 2006, as
production of opium gum rose to 149 tonnes, from 110 tonnes. Cannabis
production grew by 300 tonnes over this period, to 15,800 tonnes. In
other words, since Calderon began his war on drugs, more Mexican
drugs are on the market, not less.

There is no easy way out of this quagmire. The National Police Force
that Mexico's last three presidents - Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox
and Calderon - have tried to build is still far from ready to replace
the army in drug-enforcement tasks. American assistance, as a U.S.
General Accounting Office report made clear in early December, is
barely trickling in. Indeed, by some accounts, only 2 per cent of the
projected $1.3 billion in aid has been disbursed.

Perhaps the least bad solution would be to proceed by default:
gradually allow the drug war to vanish from television screens and
newspapers, and have its place taken by other wars: on poverty, on
petty crime and for economic growth. This may not be ideal, but it is
better than prolonging a fight that cannot be won.