PORTUGAL'S EXPERIENCE SHOWS DECRIMINALIZATION CAN WORK

Both Drug-Related Pathologies And Overall Drug Use Have Decreased
There Since Its Drug Law Was Moderated

With Mexico being increasingly rapidly and increasing visibly crushed
by its war on drugs, some politicians in Mexico and the United States
have dared to suggest that decriminalization is the answer.

According to these politicians, decriminalization would allow
governments to switch their focus from supply reduction to demand
reduction, and to redirect funds away from law enforcement and toward
treatment. The end result, they argue, would be a reduction in the
harms caused by substance use.

Advocates of criminalization suggest the opposite would occur.
Decriminalization would send the message that drug use is acceptable,
they argue, thereby leading to an increase in use and drug-related harms.

The trouble with these arguments, which we've heard a million times,
is that they take place in an empirical vacuum. Given the lack of
empirical evidence, we're left to speculate about the effects of
decriminalization and, since it might lead to greater harm, many
people are persuaded that it's best to leave bad enough alone.

The trouble with this is that empirical evidence does exist. Although
it seems to be the world's best-kept secret, Portugal formally
decriminalized possession of all illicit drugs in 2001. And its
experiment has provided us with a wealth of empirical evidence about
the positive effects of decriminalization.

According to American constitutional lawyer Glenn Greenwald, who
produced a report on Portugal's drug policy for the Washington-based
Cato Institute, decriminalization has led to a reduction in
drug-related pathologies -- precisely what advocates predicted -- and
a reduction in drug use -- precisely the opposite of what opponents feared.

While experiencing severe drug problems in the 1990s, Portugal formed
the Commission for a National Drug Strategy, which issued in 1998 a
report stressing that criminalization drove resources away from
treatment and deterred people from seeking help for addiction.
Consequently, the commission recommended decriminalization to reduce
both the use and abuse of illicit drugs.

In 2000, the federal government's council of ministers issued a
policy consistent with the report, and on July 1, 2001, a new law
came into effect decriminalizing personal use possession of all
narcotic and psychotropic drugs, including heroin and cocaine.
Trafficking remains a criminal offence.

Possession is now considered an "administrative" offence, meaning
that police can issue citations to, but not arrest, those caught with
drugs. Individuals issued a citation appear before three-person
commissions that can order a variety of sanctions, including fines or
treatments orders, though in the vast majority of cases -- 83 per
cent -- the commissions have suspended proceedings.

To see the effect of this policy, Greenwald first compares statistics
from pre- and post-decriminalization Portugal, and concludes that "in
almost every category of drug, and for drug usage overall, the
lifetime prevalence rates in the pre-decriminalization era of the
1990s were higher than the post-decriminalization rates."

This reduction in lifetime prevalence rates -- a measure of the
percentage of people who have used a drug at least once in their
lives -- was observed across many age categories, including the
critical 15-19 age group, the years during which most people first try drugs.

Fears that decriminalization leads to increased drug use therefore
appear to be unfounded, at least in Portugal. But University of
Maryland criminologist Peter Reuter, while admitting that "drug
decriminalization did reach its primary goal in Portugal" suggested
that Portuguese decriminalization occurred during a time of global
reduction in marijuana use.

So it's important to compare not just usage rates in Portugal over
time, but to compare the Portuguese experience with that of other
states. Greenwald did just that, and post-decriminalization Portugal
appears to be a model for the European Union.

Between 2001 and 2005, Portugal enjoyed the lowest lifetime
prevalence rate for marijuana, the most popular illicit drug in the
EU, with many states' rates double or triple that of Portugal.
Similarly, for cocaine, the second most popular drug: Portugal's
lifetime prevalence rate was lower than all but five EU states, and
many states' rates were again double, triple, or quadruple that of Portugal's.

In the critical high school student age group, Portugal's lifetime
prevalence rate for cocaine is just 1.6 per cent, compared to four
per cent across Europe, which suggests that Portugal will continue to
experience fewer problems far into the future. Similar results were
also observed for other problematic drugs, including heroin and amphetamines.

Drug use rates in Portugal are now also far lower than those of most
non-EU states, including Canada and especially the U.S., whose
cocaine and cannabis rates are so high -- the highest in the world,
despite its raging drug war -- that it is considered a statistical outlier.

So much for the primary argument against decriminalization -- that it
will lead to increased use. But what of the primary argument in
favour of decriminalization -- that it will reduce drug-related pathologies?

Greenwald notes that decriminalization resulted in increased funding
for treatment programs, resulting in increased detoxification beds,
therapeutic communities and halfway houses. Substance users also
showed a renewed willingness to avail themselves of such programs,
with the number of people in drug substitution programs increasing
147 per cent, from 6,040 to 14,877, between 1999 and 2003.

One would expect this to have a noticeable effect on morbidity and
mortality, and so it has. While Portugal had the highest rate of HIV
among injecting drug users in the EU in 1999, the number of new cases
has declined substantially every year since 2001. A modest decrease
in hepatitis B and C infections has also been observed.

As for mortality, Portugal experienced an increase in acute
drug-related deaths every year between 1989 and 1999, with nearly 400
people dying that year. Since decriminalization, that trend has been
reversed, with 290 dying from such causes in 2006. Policy-makers are
united in their belief that these trends are the result of earlier
intervention and better treatment made possible by decriminalization.

Similarly, now that the bogeyman of decriminalization has been slain,
Portuguese politicians of all political persuasions are almost
unanimous in their support of it. Unfortunately, the same can't be
said for politicians of other countries, particularly those countries
that most need to listen to Lisbon.

Greenwald notes that the U.S. Office of National Drug Policy -- the
drug czar -- has been uncharacteristically silent about the
Portuguese experience, which isn't really surprising since drug
warriors need a drug war to justify their existence.

But it is a hopeful sign that some courageous American politicians
have suggested the U.S. needs to thoroughly rethink its approach
toward illicit drugs.

The same can't be said for Canada, which is about the only remaining
western country in favour of increasing criminalization.

Now that the evidence in favour of decriminalization is in,
politicians should no longer be permitted to corral support for
criminalization by stirring up public fear of a bogeyman that doesn't exist.