News (Media Awareness Project) - US NY: Edu: Red Gold - The Solution To Afghanistan's Opium |
Title: | US NY: Edu: Red Gold - The Solution To Afghanistan's Opium |
Published On: | 2009-04-05 |
Source: | Columbia Daily Spectator (Columbia, NY Edu) |
Fetched On: | 2009-04-10 13:31:49 |
RED GOLD: THE SOLUTION TO AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM ADDICTION
Afghanistan produces 93 percent of the world's opiates and 90 percent
of the world's opium.
Not only does this trade exacerbate a global drug crisis, but it also
provides Taliban and insurgent groups between $100 million and $400
million per year. It is estimated that 80 percent of personnel at the
Ministry of Interior benefit from the drug trade, and Afghan
officials even believe that 100,000 members of the Afghan government
gain from the trade--whether it be from transportation fees, bribes or profits.
Even highway police are believed to be involved in facilitating and
taxing smuggling.
At times, they themselves transport the drugs in government law
enforcement vehicles.
An increasingly lawless Afghanistan, riddled with corruption at all
levels of government and police, has led the way to an explosion of
poppy cultivation.
Tackling the ongoing and growing opium trade in Afghanistan must be a
priority for American policymakers. The current U.S. strategy is to
train and aid Afghan forces to conduct a mass eradication campaign by
force, which has proved to be ineffective.
The Afghan Eradication Force was created in 2005 with the help of
United States Drug Enforcement Agency and the US State Department.
The troops consist of police drawn from Afghanistan's Ministry of
Interior. On occasion these eradicators have been ambushed by Taliban
forces and even targeted by suicide bombers.
Eradication is not working.
In fact, last month, Richard Holbrooke, U.S. envoy to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, stated that the $800 million the US spends per year on
counter-narcotics is "wasteful and ineffective."
In June of 2005, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund was established
through the United Nations Development Programme to provide
additional resources to implement the policies of the National Drug
Control Strategy of the Afghan government. The CNTF has, among other
things, been promoting a system of subsidies to encourage "poppy-free
provinces." The U.S. has been responsible for 75 percent of the funds
pledged for so called "performance incentives." According to a United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, 98 percent of farmers said
they would be ready to stop poppy cultivation "should access to
alternative livelihoods be provided," and many farmers were eager to
receive a portion of those subsidies.
In 2007, this system seemed promising: 13 out of a total of 34
provinces became poppy free. Unfortunately, in many instances,
provinces that claimed poppy-free status substituted poppies with
cannabis, another illicit crop that propagates drug trade, while
truly poppy-free provinces did not receive subsidies at all.
Eradication is difficult because it threatens the livelihoods of many
Afghan farmers who simply cultivate out of necessity.
In fact, many farmers cultivate poppies in order to pay off a
loan-in-kind from the previous year. It is common for moneylenders to
charge usurious rates or conduct other forms of intimidation such as
simply kidnapping family members of defaulters (usually daughters).
At any given point in time, farmers are reliant upon loans at
staggeringly high interest rates and have loans taken out in advance
for the next season's harvest.
If they choose to abandon poppy cultivation, they will still have to
pay for that loan they already took out, without any of next season's profits.
The welfare of these farmers must be the primary concern of the
international community if it intends to end the drug trade in
Afghanistan, which benefits insurgency and Taliban forces.
Their attraction to poppy is simply a matter of convenience--it is a
high value crop, with profits estimated at around $5,200 per hectare,
and trade routes are already established. A substitute crop, which
provides an equal or better livelihood for farmers, must be introduced.
The ideal substitutable crop is saffron.
As a result of being one of the most expensive spices in the world,
saffron has been nicknamed "red gold." It is high-profit, low-risk,
and suitable to climatic conditions. Western Afghanistan has a long
history of growing the best saffron in the world.
In fact, trials of saffron growing in the Herat province, bordering
Iran, have beaten the international record for most productive
yield--on average $5,000 per hectare annually and even up to $8,000.
The statistics make saffron a higher value crop than cannabis, with
the potential to exceed profits accrued through poppy cultivation.
In order to make this substitution of saffron feasible, donor
nations, led by the United States, must provide funding in order to
provide corms (saffron seeds) to farmers.
In addition, organizations such as International Center for
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas must be brought in to train
Afghans on proper farming techniques for saffron, so that they can
grow a successful and profitable crop. The U.S. must adopt this
policy of crop substitution in order to increase national security,
reduce drug trade, and increase stability in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan produces 93 percent of the world's opiates and 90 percent
of the world's opium.
Not only does this trade exacerbate a global drug crisis, but it also
provides Taliban and insurgent groups between $100 million and $400
million per year. It is estimated that 80 percent of personnel at the
Ministry of Interior benefit from the drug trade, and Afghan
officials even believe that 100,000 members of the Afghan government
gain from the trade--whether it be from transportation fees, bribes or profits.
Even highway police are believed to be involved in facilitating and
taxing smuggling.
At times, they themselves transport the drugs in government law
enforcement vehicles.
An increasingly lawless Afghanistan, riddled with corruption at all
levels of government and police, has led the way to an explosion of
poppy cultivation.
Tackling the ongoing and growing opium trade in Afghanistan must be a
priority for American policymakers. The current U.S. strategy is to
train and aid Afghan forces to conduct a mass eradication campaign by
force, which has proved to be ineffective.
The Afghan Eradication Force was created in 2005 with the help of
United States Drug Enforcement Agency and the US State Department.
The troops consist of police drawn from Afghanistan's Ministry of
Interior. On occasion these eradicators have been ambushed by Taliban
forces and even targeted by suicide bombers.
Eradication is not working.
In fact, last month, Richard Holbrooke, U.S. envoy to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, stated that the $800 million the US spends per year on
counter-narcotics is "wasteful and ineffective."
In June of 2005, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund was established
through the United Nations Development Programme to provide
additional resources to implement the policies of the National Drug
Control Strategy of the Afghan government. The CNTF has, among other
things, been promoting a system of subsidies to encourage "poppy-free
provinces." The U.S. has been responsible for 75 percent of the funds
pledged for so called "performance incentives." According to a United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, 98 percent of farmers said
they would be ready to stop poppy cultivation "should access to
alternative livelihoods be provided," and many farmers were eager to
receive a portion of those subsidies.
In 2007, this system seemed promising: 13 out of a total of 34
provinces became poppy free. Unfortunately, in many instances,
provinces that claimed poppy-free status substituted poppies with
cannabis, another illicit crop that propagates drug trade, while
truly poppy-free provinces did not receive subsidies at all.
Eradication is difficult because it threatens the livelihoods of many
Afghan farmers who simply cultivate out of necessity.
In fact, many farmers cultivate poppies in order to pay off a
loan-in-kind from the previous year. It is common for moneylenders to
charge usurious rates or conduct other forms of intimidation such as
simply kidnapping family members of defaulters (usually daughters).
At any given point in time, farmers are reliant upon loans at
staggeringly high interest rates and have loans taken out in advance
for the next season's harvest.
If they choose to abandon poppy cultivation, they will still have to
pay for that loan they already took out, without any of next season's profits.
The welfare of these farmers must be the primary concern of the
international community if it intends to end the drug trade in
Afghanistan, which benefits insurgency and Taliban forces.
Their attraction to poppy is simply a matter of convenience--it is a
high value crop, with profits estimated at around $5,200 per hectare,
and trade routes are already established. A substitute crop, which
provides an equal or better livelihood for farmers, must be introduced.
The ideal substitutable crop is saffron.
As a result of being one of the most expensive spices in the world,
saffron has been nicknamed "red gold." It is high-profit, low-risk,
and suitable to climatic conditions. Western Afghanistan has a long
history of growing the best saffron in the world.
In fact, trials of saffron growing in the Herat province, bordering
Iran, have beaten the international record for most productive
yield--on average $5,000 per hectare annually and even up to $8,000.
The statistics make saffron a higher value crop than cannabis, with
the potential to exceed profits accrued through poppy cultivation.
In order to make this substitution of saffron feasible, donor
nations, led by the United States, must provide funding in order to
provide corms (saffron seeds) to farmers.
In addition, organizations such as International Center for
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas must be brought in to train
Afghans on proper farming techniques for saffron, so that they can
grow a successful and profitable crop. The U.S. must adopt this
policy of crop substitution in order to increase national security,
reduce drug trade, and increase stability in Afghanistan.
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