WHY SECRETLY FUNDED DEA SURVEILLANCE PLANES AREN'T FLYING

Why Secretly Funded DEA Surveillance Planes Aren't Flying

WASHINGTON -- The first sign of trouble with the Drug Enforcement
Administration's new surveillance planes surfaced almost immediately.
On the way from the manufacturer to the agency's aviation
headquarters, one of them veered off a runway during a fuel stop.

The malfunction last spring was only the beginning. A month later,
the windshield unlatched in mid-flight and smashed into the engine.
Then, in a third incident on the same plane, a connection between the
propeller and the engine came loose and forced an emergency landing.

In January, after less than 10 months of operation, the cascade of
mechanical problems forced the DEA to ground the planes.

The planes recently were scheduled to be "cannibalized" so the DEA
could sell the parts and recover as much of its money as possible.

The story behind why the DEA sought out the three planes, only to
become the second federal agency to give them up, illustrates the
pitfalls of "black," or classified, budgeting in which Congress
approves tens of billions of dollars for intelligence agencies
outside the public's view.

The twin-engine planes, manufactured by Schweizer Aircraft, likely
came out of an even more shadowy funding provision known as "black
earmarks," according to government officials with knowledge of the
contract. The officials asked to remain anonymous because the planes,
known as "Shadowhawks," received funding secretly.

Lawmakers often earmark projects to score sought-after contracts for
companies back home.

The idea is to encourage cutting-edge research and development that
wouldn't otherwise get approval during the ordinary budgeting
process. During the regular and more transparent budgeting process,
earmarks can sometimes pay for worthwhile projects, experts said.

Black earmarks, however, receive almost no scrutiny. Even worse,
there's little accountability when the technology doesn't work.

The lack of transparency has led to some staggering boondoggles. In
1991, then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney canceled the troubled A-12
Avenger II after the secret aircraft program consumed nearly $3
billion of taxpayers' money.

In one of the most notorious cases, former California Republican Rep.
Randy "Duke" Cunningham is serving just over eight years in prison
for taking bribes in exchange for secretly steering classified
contracts to favored companies. A congressional report concluded that
the contracts totaled $70 million.

Despite calls to end it, lawmakers have continued the practice.

In this case, Schweizer received $13.5 million from Congress for the
now-defunct planes and could be paid an additional $1.75 million by
the DEA for retrofitting them.

Where the DEA got the planes is unclear. William Brown, the special
agent in charge of the aviation division in Fort Worth, Texas, said
he was under the impression that the funding for the planes was
earmarked for the State Department, but officials with knowledge of
the transaction said the planes had been intended for another agency
for intelligence purposes. The officials couldn't be named because
they weren't authorized to speak publicly.

Sikorsky Aircraft, a unit of defense conglomerate United
Technologies, bought Schweizer in 2004.

Schweizer officials said they didn't know where the original funding
came from because Schweizer got the contract before Sikorsky bought
the family-owned company. Schweizer, founded in 1937 and based in
Elmira, N.Y., specializes in light helicopters, reconnaissance
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Critics say the DEA's decision to acquire the planes not only raises
questions about the secrecy of intelligence budgets, but also about
the leadership of the DEA's aviation division.

Last month, McClatchy reported on a separate controversy sparked by
Brown's decision to spend more than $123,000 to charter a private jet
to fly Acting DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart to Bogota, Colombia,
in October.

Government watchdogs called the charter excessive, considering the
DEA could've rescheduled the flight on one of the agency's 106 planes.

Brown also sought out the Schweizer planes. He said he first heard
about them during a sales pitch by then-President Paul Schweizer, who
couldn't be reached for comment.

"I thought it was good fortune for us because we were thinking of
buying similar planes anyway," Brown said, "Paul told us that it
looked like this other agency doesn't want them anymore, but they
might work out well for you. That sounded like a good deal to us."

There was one problem: The planes were untested. They represented the
first three of the model, which was handcrafted instead of mass
produced. As a result, they were listed with the Federal Aviation
Administration as "experimental."

DEA officials with knowledge of the malfunctioning planes said that
pilots feared flying them, especially in high-elevation areas.
"Anybody who flew the aircraft was a test pilot," said one of the
officials. The officials didn't want to be identified because they
disagreed with the DEA's official stance on the aircraft.

Brown, however, said he didn't cancel the program because of safety
problems, but decided the planes were simply too difficult to repair
because the manufacturer didn't have spare parts on hand.

He said the problems were not surprising considering the planes were
new. "When you have a first of anything -- whether it's a Chevy or a
Ford or a plane you expect they will need to be tweaked."

Officials with Schweizer also said the planes were safe.

"From a safety standpoint, our record is perfect," said David Horton,
the president and general manager of Schweizer Aircraft Corporation.
"We have not had anybody hurt."

Horton said the DEA "loved the planes," which were designed to fly
long distances quietly. "There's really no any other airplane in the
world that can do what these airplanes can do."

While Brown said he thought the DEA wouldn't have to pay Schweizer
the remainder of the contract, company officials said those details
were still being worked out. Schweizer already received more than
$583,000 for retrofitting work on the planes, which the DEA is
unlikely to recover.

"We've agreed between the two parties that we're not going to operate
the (Shadowhawk) planes anymore," Horton said. "Anything beyond that
has not been decided."

Jim Henderson, a retired DEA agent and pilot who hasn't flown the
planes, but was given details about them by McClatchy, said the
agency should've realized the planes hadn't been adequately tested.

To insure the quality of its planes, Henderson said the DEA usually
puts out a request for bids or proposals in a much more formalized
process. Even when the DEA acquires planes after seizing them from
drug traffickers, the planes undergo rigorous tests before they're
scheduled for flyovers.

Henderson, who worked for the aviation division for 26 years, said if
one of the two engines had failed, the Schweizer plane might not be
left with enough power to fly out of a high elevation area such as
Guatemala City. Initially, one plane was flown into Guatemala, but
pilots complained, and Brown decided to fly it in the Caribbean.

DEA flyovers can be risky. Since the aviation division's inception in
the early 1970s, 16 pilots on DEA missions have died in plane or
helicopter crashes, including four DEA agents during a reconnaissance
mission in Peru, according to the agency's Web site.

"The DEA should have known better," said Henderson, who's a former
member of the DEA's safety council. "It was irresponsible and unsafe
to put pilots in these planes. I wouldn't have flown them."

Schweizer has no plans to give up on the planes anytime soon.
Congress, led by Kentucky Republican Rep. Hal Rogers, appropriated
$48 million for the company to manufacture the next generation of the
planes for the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection. Company
officials said the new version would have a more powerful engine than
the planes the DEA rejected. "We've learned a lot," Horton said.

Coast Guard officials said they planned extensive testing before they
fly the planes on missions.

The Coast Guard has had its own bad experience with earmark projects,
including a $4.65 million patrol boat. The Coast Guard couldn't use
the 85-foot craft, manufactured by Guardian Marine of Edmonds, Wash.,
for several reasons, including the vessel's fiberglass hull. Usually,
Coast Guard boats are made of sturdier aluminum or steel, but the
agency hadn't requested the funding for the fiberglass boat.

At a loss over what to do with it, the Coast Guard allowed other
law-enforcement agencies to bid on it. The Alameda County Sheriff's
Department in California bought it for $1.

Meanwhile, the Schweizer planes, originally scheduled to be completed
this year, have been delayed until 2012. Asked whether such delays
were common with such projects, Capt. Michael Emerson, the chief of
the Coast Guard's office of Aviation Forces, responded, "It seems to be."

"Unfortunately, with developmental projects like this, it's not
unusual for them to 'slip to the right' as they say," he said. "It's
not desirable but there is an acknowledgement that you don't want
them to turn out badly."

(Halimah Abdullah and Tish Wells contributed to this article.)