MEXICO'S WAR ON DRUG CARTELS

Mexican President Felipe Calderon has his hands full. The fight
against powerful drug cartels has become increasingly bloody and
exposed the weaknesses of his government. A turf struggle among rival
gangs has escalated into a frontal assault on the government. In a
subtle twist, gangs are now enlisting and paying citizens to
participate in protests against the military presence in their cities.

While it is fashionable to call a struggle against any social evil -
say, poverty or crime - "a war," it is no exaggeration in this case.
More than 6,500 people were killed in Mexico last year as a result of
drug wars. It is estimated that more than 650 have died in the first
two months of 2009. At first, the victims were primarily gang members
fighting for control of profitable smuggling routes into the United
States. Then they realized that Mexico itself was a viable market;
reportedly use of cocaine in Mexico has doubled in the past four years.

Rising bloodshed forced the government to step in and target the
cartels. The drug groups have responded with intimidation and
corruption. Gunmen have attacked police stations with automatic
weapons and grenades. Police officials who dare to do their jobs are
kidnapped, tortured and killed to send a message. In some small
cities, entire police forces have resigned as a result.

It is far easier, however, for the drug gangs to use their immense
profits - estimated at $15 billion to $25 billion annually - to buy
off their enemies. Mexico's former top antidrug official was recently
arrested on charges of accepting nearly a half-million dollars a month
from drug traffickers during his two years in office. He is not alone:
Other local, regional and national officials have been arrested for
taking payoffs. The economy minister, Mr. Gerardo Ruiz Mateos, said he
is worried that the gangs' penetration of Mexican society is so deep
that "the next president of the republic would be a
narco-trafficker."

Frustrated by police force failures, Mr. Calderon called in the
military. Since taking office in December 2006, more than 45,000
troops have been sent into the field to fight the drug gangs. The army
has been used before to destroy drug crops, but this is the first time
that it has been deployed as a law enforcement tool in this manner.

There are risks with this development. One is corruption within the
military itself. Another is escalation as the drug traffickers respond
to the government's more serious crackdown. The capture of gang
arsenals containing rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, mines,
heavy machine guns and other weapons suggest that these are not gangs
anymore, but rather paramilitary groups. This war could get much more
bloody for civilians. Finally, there is the risk that fighting a war
against a civilian enemy on Mexico's own territory could alienate the
Mexican people from the military and, by extension, the government. A
protracted, bloody war would undermine the legitimacy of the
government in Mexico City.

There are signs that this process has begun. There are almost daily
protests against the military in many towns and cities. The Mexican
government says demonstrators are being paid by the drug gangs to take
to the streets - usually $15 to $35 apiece. That speaks to the
cartels' ability to provide financial assistance to people who need
it; governments are supposed to do that. Other demonstrators and human
rights groups report a rising number of complaints of military abuses.

Dealing with this problem requires much more than an active military,
whose deployments should be only a last and short-term resort. Local
police forces should be on the front lines, but they are underfunded
and understaffed.

Ultimately, the power of the drug gangs reflects failure of a
different kind: The U.S. already spends more than $20 billion on law
enforcement and on the reduction of the supply of illegal substances
at home. Some 500,000 people were incarcerated in 2007 in the U.S. for
drug offenses, a tenfold increase since 1980. The best measure of the
failure of U.S. drug policy is the price of drugs. Cocaine costs a
quarter of the 1981 price; heroin prices are tumbling too. Yet profits
are skyrocketing and being used to finance corruption.

Enlightened observers concede that the U.S. approach must be fixed.
Unfortunately for Mr. Calderon, that decision is not for him to make.
Until there is a change, he is on the front lines of a vicious fight.
He must ensure that Mexican law enforcement agencies have the tools to
fight an increasingly powerful enemy. Firepower is only part of the
solution; just as important is training, better salaries and federal
support. Mexico has little choice.