OBAMA'S MEN IN AFGHANISTAN

Misconceptions In The New Administration Could Set Back Progress In
The Fight Against The Opium Economy

Earlier this month, the United Nations released a report predicting a
decline in opium cultivation in Afghanistan for the second year in a
row. Because Afghan heroin funds the insurgency, corrupts the
government and interferes with legitimate agricultural programs, this
was good news for everyone. Four years ago, farmers grew poppies in
all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces. Three years ago there were six
poppy-free provinces; two years ago, there were 13; last year, there
were 18; and experts predict that 22 of the 34 will likely be
poppy-free this year. Nationwide, poppy cultivation was down 19 per
cent last year, and it will likely fall even more this year, prompting
the top UN diplomat in Afghanistan to say a few days ago, "This year
could be a turning point" in the war against Afghan heroin.

As one of the U.S officials who developed and co-ordinated the
counternarcotics strategy currently in effect, I felt heartened, but
only a little. We - the international community and the Afghans -
should have done a lot better. We have not delivered an effective
counternarcotics campaign in two insurgency-ridden southern provinces
- - Helmand and Kandahar - the source of more than three-quarters of the
heroin produced on Earth. The principal culprits are the Taliban, who
protect their fields aggressively (killing dozens of Afghan narcotics
police each year), and corrupt Afghan officials, many of whom come
from these two provinces, and need the support of powerful drug lords
in upcoming elections.

Outside Afghanistan, there are, regrettably, two other reasons we could not
make inroads
in Helmand and Kandahar: Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Lieutenant-General
Karl
Eikenberry. U.S. President Barack Obama has just chosen Mr. Holbrooke, a
former Clinton
administration official, as his special representative in the region, and
Lt.-Gen.
Eikenberry as his ambassador to Afghanistan. We all wish them well, but, if
they are to
succeed, they need to get their facts straight, establish clearer lines of
authority,
and avoid the increasing militarization of civilian projects.

CARROTS AND STICKS

In early 2008, Mr. Holbrooke wrote in the Washington Post that the U.S
counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is "the single most
ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy." Almost
every salient fact in his piece was wrong. He claimed that the U.S.
had a policy that focused on destroying poppy fields; in fact the
policy - published on the State Department website - balances
incentives such as development assistance and alternative crops with
disincentives such as eradication and arrest. The U.S. developed the
policy in close co-ordination with its allies, principally Britain and
Canada.

Mr. Holbrooke also said that the poppies are grown in "rocky, remote"
areas by destitute farmers with no alternatives, when two UN reports
have demonstrated that relatively wealthy farmers grow most of the
poppies in Helmand, which is the epicentre of world poppy cultivation.
Many of them are government officials. Most of them only recently
switched from growing wheat or other badly needed food crops to
growing poppy. And they grow it on a well-irrigated, flat fertile
plain near the major city of Lashkar Gah. These farmers are not poor,
they do not live in remote areas, and they have alternatives. Mr.
Holbrooke played into the hands of the Taliban and corrupt war lords,
who also perpetuate the destitute-farmer myth in order to prevent any
serious law enforcement action in that part of the country.

He has claimed that it was "an absolute scandal" that the Afghans and their
allies have
never arrested a single Afghan drug lord. In fact, four Afghan drug lords
are in jail in
the United States: Haji Bashir Noorzai, Mohammed Essa, Khan Mohammed and,
most recently,
Haji Juma Khan, aka HJK, probably the biggest drug lord in Afghan history.
Afghan and
international agents arranged for his arrest in October, and have since
transported him
to the U.S., where he will soon stand trial in open court.

I met Karl Eikenberry at the end of 2005, during his tour as commander
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, when he briefed the drug-enforcement
bureau at the U.S. State Department. He told us point-blank that the
military would not get seriously involved in the drug trade in
Afghanistan; it was not their mission. Drug experts warned him that
the Taliban were likely to re-enter the trade to raise money, but
Lt.-Gen. Eikenberry ignored the warning.

As a result, we did not get serious U.S. or NATO military support for
counternarcotics development and enforcement activity in Helmand and
Kandahar. Because those provinces are volatile the program cannot
succeed without some sort of force protection for both humanitarian
and law-enforcement efforts there. We never asked the military to
destroy poppy fields or even arrest traffickers, but rather to enable
Afghan counternarcotics authorities, and their international mentors,
to execute a balanced plan of incentives and disincentives, including,
but not limited to, eradication of the fields of wealthy farmers.
Lt.-Gen. Eikenberry did nothing to help. Now, by UN estimates, the
Taliban raise up to $300-million a year from the drug trade, and use
it to kill Americans and Canadians.

Lt.-Gen. Eikenberry was also the architect of what another American
general told me was the "flimsy and under-resourced" initial plan to
train the Afghan police. So we could not count on the Afghan National
Police for force protection either.

The misinformed statements of Mr. Holbrooke and Lt.-Gen. Eikenberry
have greatly hindered our efforts to build a consensus in the
international community on the drug issue. Yet even so, we have had
two relatively successful years.

MILITARIZATION

Equally disturbing is the continued militarization of the civilian
effort in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has already taken over police
training in Afghanistan. Their latest plan is to arm Afghan militias,
a scheme that U.S. allies, including Canada, have roundly and rightly
criticized. And now Mr. Obama - in an unprecedented move - intends to
appoint Lt.-Gen. Eikenberry - a three-star general - to be the U.S.
ambassador there. So the U.S. National Security Adviser, the Director
of National Intelligence and the ambassador to Afghanistan will have
11 stars among them. Civilians, mainly seasoned foreign service
officers, once held all those posts. This is a dangerous trend if we
want to build confidence among Afghans, who are weary of civilian
casualties.

In the drug arena, some NATO officials have been looking into the
often discussed "silver bullet" of legalizing the opium trade. This is
another example of what happens when military personnel get into areas
outside of their expertise, advocating simplistic schemes that would
have no chance of success.

First, the price for legal opium is much lower than the price of
illegal opium, so farmers would have no incentive to switch to legal
opium and would continue to sell to the illegal market under the
convenient cover of legality.

Second, only about 15 per cent of the Afghan people grow heroin, so if
you subsidize a legal opium program, everyone will grow it. Finally,
Afghanistan is facing a serious food shortage; the last thing it needs
is more opium. Maybe if the starving Afghans are all high on heroin,
they won't notice ... We have had two years of successful cultivation
reduction; we need to build on that, not reverse course.

It is unclear who is running Afghan policy in the Obama
administration. In recent weeks, we have seen Vice-President Joe
Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defence Secretary Robert
Gates, and General James Jones, the National Security Adviser travel
to the region and to Europe, or testify to Congress about the need for
change in Afghanistan. Now we have Mr. Holbrooke, a sometimes
difficult personality, with the title "special representative," an
unclear term, usually used in the context of the United Nations, not
the United States.

According to press reports, Mr. Holbrooke does not report to Secretary
Clinton. It is not clear if he has authority over the Pentagon, or if
the Pentagon would recognize his authority. And his relationship to
Gen. Jones - whose job is to co-ordinate among the relevant U.S.
agencies - is equally ill-defined.

A couple of weeks ago, someone in this convoluted hierarchy
anonymously leaked word that Mr. Obama might withdraw support for
President Hamid Karzai. Though I am one of Mr. Karzai's harshest
critics, I was astounded that a government official would make such an
irresponsible statement to a media organization, instead of discussing
these concerns directly with Mr. Karzai. In the past, when making huge
policy shifts, we spoke on the record. And we never advocated regime
change in Afghanistan, just regime reform. Afghanistan is a democracy
and a sovereign state. The U.S. can ask for change, but we have no
right to announce, anonymously or on the record, that it needs a new
president.

This statement had everyone reeling both in Washington and inside the
Karzai government. No one knew where it came from. This is what you
get with an unclear chain of command.

President Obama promised the U.S. and the world a renewed focus on
Afghanistan, and that is needed. But he will not improve things unless
the he shows the international community that he has a clear leader
for that effort: someone who knows the facts, accepts a larger
civilian role and can bring discipline to the process.

Thomas Schweich is a visiting professor at Washington University in
St. Louis. He has been U.S. ambassador for counternarcotics in
Afghanistan, deputy assistant secretary of state for international law
enforcement, and chief of staff of the U.S. mission to the United Nations.