TARGETING DEALERS POPPYCOCK; LET'S BUY POPPY CROP

The world out last week was that Canadian troops may soon expand their
combat operations in Kandahar to target drug dealers in addition to
Taliban insurgents. This widened mandate was first proposed by U.S.
General John Craddock, NATO's top commander, when he issued a
"guidance" that would authorize NATO troops "to attack directly drug
producers and facilities throughout Afghanistan."

According to Craddock's directive, the alliance could employ deadly
force against drug traffickers, even if there is no evidence that the
proceeds of their illegal trade are being used to support the insurgency.

Several NATO commanders immediately objected to the proposed new rules
of engagement and proclaimed Craddock's direction to be "illegitimate"
and in "violation of international law." These strong objections
resulted in NATO ordering a review of Craddock's instruction, and a
subsequent clarification has yet to be approved.

Canada's top general, Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk,
indicated in his comments to the media that he supports the widened
mandate. "Most times that we have operations, our soldiers, sailors
and airmen have found drugs right there with the Taliban, so the nexus
between drugs and terror is very, very strong," Natynczyk was quoted
as saying.

Canada will still wait for official sanction from NATO before
authorizing any attacks against drug dealers. International law
clearly forbids the use of military force against civilian targets -
even if they are involved in criminal activities. Those drug
traffickers with clearly identified links to the insurgency could
possibly be considered legitimate targets.

However, under Craddock's new doctrine, all Afghans involved in the
drug trade would become fair game. Those familiar with the complex
tribal mosaic of Afghanistan and the equally fractious composition of
the insurgency, will understand that Craddock is, in fact, proposing
to throw more fuel on an already raging fire.

The Afghan drug trade has exploded since the U.S. toppled the Taliban
in 2001, and this black market is estimated to represent somewhere
between 33 and 50 per cent of the Afghan economy. Not all Afghan drug
dealers support the Taliban, but by declaring war on them collectively
NATO will only guarantee that, if only for self-preservation, the
traffickers will be forced to throw in their lot with the insurgents.

Also lost in the Craddock proposal is any mention of the fate of the
poppy farmers. By targeting the drug lords and actively eradicating
the farmers' crops, NATO will leave tens of thousands of Afghans with
no viable livelihood. Without a commodity to sell and/or no trafficker
to purchase their poppies, these destitute farmers would become a
fertile recruit base for insurgents.

In fact, this particular situation among Afghan villagers has already
been labelled the "accidental guerrilla." Described by Australian
counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen as having no grand
transnational agenda and no dreams of a global jihad, the "accidental
guerrilla" is simply someone defending their local ways and customs
from outside encroachment.

The Afghan people are not drug users, and the vast majority of the
farmers involved in the opium trade are guilty of nothing more than
growing and harvesting poppies. Their concern is not how that product
is processed into narcotics, nor do they care about the street value
of those drugs in western cities. Their goal is instead to simply sell
their crop for enough money to feed their family.

Many proposals have been put forward for the international community
to purchase the Afghan poppies at the current market value and to
convert them into legitimate pharmaceuticals to supply the Third
World. These initiatives have thus far all been vetoed by the U.S.
authorities in Kabul. Now an American general in the top NATO post
wants the international alliance to add their muscle to what is
essentially an extension of the U.S. war on drugs in conjunction with
their war on terror.

Would it not make infinitely more sense for us to purchase the poppy
crop at a competitive price, even if we simply destroy it afterwards?
This would keep both the farmers employed and out of the ranks of the
Taliban, and the low-level drug lords (let's call them pharmaceutical
executives instead) content and unthreatened by NATO forces.

The only losers in this equation would be high-level international
drug traffickers, junkies in western cities, and Taliban recruiters.

Sure it would cost billions of dollars, but I suggest that would be an
inexpensive sum compared to the fortune in blood and gold which will
be required to enforce Craddock's new strategy.

Scott Taylor is the publisher of Esprit de Corps military magazine and
the author of several books.