THE U.S. FACES TOUGH DECISIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

In a gun battle this week, NATO troops killed 12 Taliban fighters in
southern Afghanistan -- and stopped a would-be suicide bomber. The
fight got little attention because, sadly, in Afghanistan this is more
or less routine.

The Afghan conflict now takes more lives each month than the war in
Iraq, and the incoming Obama administration plans to dispatch at least
20,000 additional troops to tackle the growing violence.

Sending more troops, it's patently clear, is a waste of time, money --
and lives. In fact, sending more troops to Afghanistan will be about
as effective as bailing out a boat without plugging the leak.

Three difficult problems fuel the Afghan war. The United States and
its allies have failed in their efforts to control any of them.

How can NATO troops quell an uprising when enemy fighters, suicide
bombers, weapons agents and support personnel pour over the border
from Pakistan at will, without hindrance, day and night?

How can those troops quell an insurgency when the enemy is buying
weaponry and enriching himself with drug money -- as much as $100
million a year, the United Nations says -- from the southern areas of
Afghanistan he controls.

And how can Western forces enlist cooperation from the government it
is trying to protect when government leaders are also sucking up money
from the opium farmers at such a voracious rate that Afghanistan is
now classified as the fifth most corrupt nation on Earth?

The obvious answer is that, until these problems are brought under
control, the war cannot be won.

The Bush administration's strategy for halting the flow of enemy
fighters -- paying the Pakistani government to do it -- has been an
abject failure costing more than $10 billion so far. The weakness of
this approach has been apparent for more than two years, and yet the
money still flows. Barack Obama has suggested he will stop the
program. In fact, the West has to recognize that Pakistan cannot, will
not, ever step up to the plate and take out the militants in the
tribal areas.

So, what can be done? There's only one answer: Close Afghanistan's
border with Pakistan, everywhere but in a few heavily controlled
crossing points. That's impossible, right? The 1,500-mile border is
rugged, unmarked and in dispute. Closing it would be infinitely harder
than controlling the United States border with Mexico.

All of that is true, but there's one big difference: Afghanistan is a
war zone. Declare the border closed, patrol it with helicopter
gunships and shoot anyone who tries to cross. That may not seal the
border, but it should significantly slow the flow of militants.
Dedicate some of those new American troops to this mission. Pakistan
might appreciate it, given the cross-border attack on a military base
this past week.

Now, what about the opium? For years now, Afghanistan has grown enough
opium to supply more than 90 percent of the world's market for heroin.
All of this has grown up since 2002, just after the American invasion.
The year before, paradoxically enough, it was the Taliban who managed
to shut down the opium trade by warning farmers that they would face
retribution if they did not stop growing opium. In 2001, Afghanistan
produced no opium -- none.

As the size of the crop soared a few years ago, Hamid Karzai, the
Afghan president, told visiting American officials (who then told me)
that he planned to appeal to the farmers' better nature and convince
them that growing opium was not good for the nation. Well, that didn't
work.

Two years ago, U.S. officials asked for permission to spray the opium
crop with Roundup, a non-toxic herbicide, the same one used to spray
coca plants in Colombia. Of course, the Afghan government didn't like
this idea, saying it would anger the farmers. More likely it would
anger all the government officials who sit on fat wallets, enriched by
the drug trade. Last year, Karzai formally said no, so NATO dropped
the idea.

The United States, Afghanistan's patron state, needs to tell Karzai
that the price of continued support is the immediate eradication of
the opium crops. Sure, the farmers will be angry. But what's worse:
enraging some constituents -- or standing by while these same people
hand over $100 million a year to your enemy?

The Afghan war is not lost. But turning the conflict around will
require tough decisions. Close the Pakistani border. Shut down the
opium trade. Let's not spend another seven years pursuing an enhanced
version of a strategy that has already failed.