CZARS AND THEIR EMPIRES

American experience cautions against an antidrugs supremo

There are many important social issues that receive too little emphasis in
elections dominated by economics. Tony Blair's evident interest in attacking
drug abuse is an honourable exception. The solution that Mr Blair outlined
yesterday the appointment of an antidrugs supremo or "czar" to lead the
"war on drugs" may not, though, prove the best instrument for his intentions.

Not for the first time Mr Blair has looked to the United States for both
ideas and language. His model, in its formal title, is the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, which was established there in 1989
as a post of Cabinetlevel ranking. The Labour leader claimed that this figure
had become a "substantial success" that would be a "valuable added weapon"
were it copied in this country.

There are relatively few in Washington who would offer such a blanket
endorsement. At best, their czar has enjoyed a mixed record and at worst, many
would contend, has been a damaging distraction. The number of Americans
regularly using drugs, which had halved in the preceding decade, has risen
since its introduction. Those undertaking government treatment programmes fell
despite a more than 300 per cent increase in expenditure. That shift,
especially among the young, became an electoral embarrassment to President
Clinton. He felt obliged last year to select a fourstar General as his latest
supremo.

The reasons for this relative failure are more than relevant to Britain. In
the United States successive Presidents thought that a new office, an
impressive title, and some additional resources would in themselves
constitute a strategy. The existence of a czar became a delegation of
responsibility. For Labour ministers, already burdened with an ambitious
agenda, there would evolve, almost inevitably, a similar temptation.

In Washington, like Whitehall, the administration of drugs policy has long
been split between several departments. In theory, the czar, as chief
coordinator, was created specifically to rectify this division. In
bureaucratic practice, it has become one more agency and without the
institutional power of its competitors. That danger would be even more acute
here as Mr Blair would like an appointed expert, not in the Cabinet but of
similar status, to take charge over elected politicians.

Labour would be well advised to note that a czar is not a strategy. Mr Blair
is certainly right to argue that the fragmentation of control between the Home
Office and the Departments of Health and Education does not advance the
overall operation. That fracture reflects a political reluctance to decide
conclusively whether drug abuse is mostly a law and order question with a
public health source or mainly a public health matter with a law and order
outcome. A choice between the two approaches would eliminate much of the
superficial need for a commander.

It would also help to acknowledge the limits of central action. This problem
endures because of the demand for drugs which ensures supply not because
of the detailed organisation of departments. The causes of this craving are
best addressed through a diverse range of wellfinanced specific initiatives.
It is extremely improbable that there exists a single Statedirected solution.
Mr Blair's best hope may well rest not on a national czar but an extensive
network of local commissioners.



Shug

Legalise Cannabis Campaign Scotland http://www.thepulse.co.uk/lcc.scotland

Media Awareness Project UK http://www.eezeecope.demon.co.uk/LegaliseUK/
pages/MAPE.html

Legalize! http://www.darkwood.demon.nl/legalize/index.html

UK Cannabis Internet Activists http://www.foobar.co.uk/users/ukcia/