CZARS AND THEIR EMPIRES

There are many important social issues that receive too
little emphasis in elections dominated by economics. Tony
Blair's evident interest in attacking drug abuse is an
honourable exception. The solution that Mr Blair outlined
yesterday the appointment of an antidrugs supremo or
"czar" to lead the " war on drugs" may not, though,
prove the best instrument for his intentions.

Not for the first time Mr Blair has looked to the
United States for both ideas and language. His model, in
its formal title, is the Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, which was established there in 1989 as
a post of Cabinetlevel ranking. The Labour leader claimed
that this figure had become a "substantial success" that
would be a "valuable added weapon" were it copied in this
country.

There are relatively few in Washington who would offer
such a blanket endorsement. At best, their czar has enjoyed
a mixed record and at worst, many would contend, has been a
damaging distraction. The number of Americans regularly
using drugs, which had halved in the preceding decade, has
risen since its introduction. Those undertaking government
treatment programmes fell despite a more than 300 per cent
increase in expenditure. That shift, especially among the
young, became an electoral embarrassment to President
Clinton. He felt obliged last year to select a fourstar
General as his latest supremo.

The reasons for this relative failure are more than
relevant to Britain. In the United States successive
Presidents thought that a new office, an impressive title,
and some additional resources would in themselves
constitute a strategy. The existence of a czar became a
delegation of responsibility. For Labour ministers, already
burdened with an ambitious agenda, there would evolve,
almost inevitably, a similar temptation.

In Washington, like Whitehall, the administration of
drugs policy has long been split between several
departments. In theory, the czar, as chief coordinator,
was created specifically to rectify this division. In
bureaucratic practice, it has become one more agency and
without the institutional power of its competitors. That
danger would be even more acute here as Mr Blair would like
an appointed expert, not in the Cabinet but of similar
status, to take charge over elected politicians.

Labour would be well advised to note that a czar is not
a strategy. Mr Blair is certainly right to argue that the
fragmentation of control between the Home Office and the
Departments of Health and Education does not advance the
overall operation. That fracture reflects a political
reluctance to decide conclusively whether drug abuse is
mostly a law and order question with a public health source
or mainly a public health matter with a law and order
outcome. A choice between the two approaches would
eliminate much of the superficial need for a commander.

It would also help to acknowledge the limits of central
action. This problem endures because of the demand for
drugs which ensures supply not because of the detailed
organisation of departments. The causes of this craving are
best addressed through a diverse range of wellfinanced
specific initiatives. It is extremely improbable that there
exists a single Statedirected solution. Mr Blair's best
hope may well rest not on a national czar but an extensive
network of local commissioners.