News (Media Awareness Project) - Court Attacks Practice of Acquittals as Social Protest |
| Title: | Court Attacks Practice of Acquittals as Social Protest |
| Published On: | 1997-05-23 |
| Fetched On: | 2008-09-08 15:51:07 |
Court Attacks Practice of Acquittals as Social Protest
By BENJAMIN WEISER
NEW YORK Stepping into a legal debate with racial and political
overtones, a federal appeals court in Manhattan declared Tuesday that
judges have a duty to make sure jurors do not ignore the evidence or law
in a case and instead impose their own values to acquit or convict a
defendant.
The ruling by the court of appeals for the second circuit offered the
strongest denunciation yet by the federal courts of the practice known
as "jury nullification," in which a juror might vote, for example, to
acquit a defendant for racial reasons, rather than considering the
strength of the case against him.
Calling such an action "a violation of a juror's sworn duty to follow
the law as instructed by the court," Judge Jose Cabranes wrote for a
unanimous threejudge panel that "trial courts have a duty to forestall
or prevent such conduct," by admonishing or even dismissing jurors from
a case.
The decision stemmed from a drug case tried in Albany in which jurors
complained to the judge that one juror, the only black member of the
panel, appeared opposed to applying the drug laws in the case, believing
that the defendants had "a right to deal drugs," the opinion said.
After interviewing the jurors, the trial judge concluded that the black
juror felt that the defendants "were in a disadvantaged situation" and
would not vote to convict "no matter what the evidence was." The judge
removed the juror and the 11 remaining jurors voted to convict.
In its ruling Tuesday, the appellate court actually overturned the
convictions, saying that the juror in this case may truly have been
unpersuaded of the defendants' guilt and that the judge was wrong to
conclude that he was disregarding the law. But the appeals court said
the judge was right to investigate the juror's motivation, and used the
case to take a strong stand against nullification.
"We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the
rule of law, jury nullification is desirable, or that courts may permit
it to occur when it is within their power to prevent," Cabranes wrote.
The decision comes as the legal community is embroiled in a debate over
race and the justice system, and whether it is ever appropriate for
jurors to intentionally disregard the law, in acquitting or convicting,
as a form of protest.
The appellate court noted that jury nullification has deep roots in
American jurisprudence. It protected fugitive slaves from being sent
back to the South in the period before the Civil War, as northern juries
refused to convict. But the court noted that there were also "shameful
examples of how nullification has been used to sanction murder and
lynching." Among the cases cited were the hung juries in the 1964 trials
of Byron De La Beckwith in Mississippi for the murder of Medgar Evers.
"It's a twoedged sword," said Burt Neuborne, professor at New York
University School of Law. "It's become, we can't live with it and we
can't live without it. We acknowledge that jury nullification can be the
ultimate defense against government oppression, but we also fear it
because it's corrosive of the rule of law."
The debate intensified recently when a George Washington University law
professor, Paul Butler, who is black, wrote that in certain nonviolent
cases, black jurors would be justified in acquitting black defendants to
protest racism in the criminal justice system.
Randall Kennedy, who teaches race and the law at Harvard University Law
School and is also black, recently attacked Butler's position. He argued
that jury nullification, even as a form of protest, is immoral and
selfdestructive for black people.
Kennedy said he had not yet seen the court's decision but "it sounds to
me like the second circuit acquitted itself well."
"It seems that it wanted to set forth a marker," he said, "given all the
loose talk going on. One simply cannot allow ideas to be in the air
unopposed."
The appeals court said that even after secret deliberations had begun in
a case, a judge could dismiss a juror for failing to adhere to the
evidence and the law.
But it placed a heavy burden on judges to make a solid case that a juror
intended to disregard the law, because even beginning to question jurors
about their intentions would mean invading the historic secrecy of the
deliberative process. Judges will have to walk a narrow line, as they
inquire about a juror's intentions at the same time as they endeavor to
safeguard jury secrecy, the opinion suggested.
If the decision stands, it will apply to all federal criminal cases
within the circuit, which includes New York, Connecticut and Vermont.
But given the high visibility of the second circuit and the prominence
of Cabranes, who has been mentioned in the past as a Supreme Court
contender, legal experts said the decision, while not binding elsewhere,
was likely to be widely influential.
Federal prosecutors in New York praised the decision. Mary Jo White, the
U.S. attorney in Manhattan, said the ruling was important "not only for
law enforcement but for just verdicts based on the law."
Thomas Maroney, the U.S. attorney whose Albany office handled the cases
that were overturned, said no decision had been reached on whether to
seek a review by either the appeals court or the Supreme Court, or to
retry the case.
The decision, written by Cabranes and joined by Judges Edward Lumbard
and Joseph McLaughlin, remanded the drug cases for new trials.
Defense lawyers also praised the decision for imposing a high threshold
on judges considering whether to remove a juror accused of disregarding
the law.
Cabranes wrote that a judge must be sure that the juror is not merely
unpersuaded by the government's evidence, a hurdle the court said the
judge in the Albany drug case failed to clear.
"A presiding judge faced with anything but unambiguous evidence that a
juror refuses to apply the law as instructed need go no further in his
investigation of alleged nullification," Cabranes wrote. Such a juror
could not be dismissed.
"It's a strong statement that just because a juror is voting not guilty,
doesn't mean it is nullification," said Barry Leiwant, a lawyer with the
federal defender division of the Legal Aid Society, who represented one
of the drug defendants in the Albany case.
###
New York Times
229 W. 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
Phone: (212) 5561234
Fax: (212) 5563690
Email: letters@nytimes.com
Web: http://www.nytimes.com
By BENJAMIN WEISER
NEW YORK Stepping into a legal debate with racial and political
overtones, a federal appeals court in Manhattan declared Tuesday that
judges have a duty to make sure jurors do not ignore the evidence or law
in a case and instead impose their own values to acquit or convict a
defendant.
The ruling by the court of appeals for the second circuit offered the
strongest denunciation yet by the federal courts of the practice known
as "jury nullification," in which a juror might vote, for example, to
acquit a defendant for racial reasons, rather than considering the
strength of the case against him.
Calling such an action "a violation of a juror's sworn duty to follow
the law as instructed by the court," Judge Jose Cabranes wrote for a
unanimous threejudge panel that "trial courts have a duty to forestall
or prevent such conduct," by admonishing or even dismissing jurors from
a case.
The decision stemmed from a drug case tried in Albany in which jurors
complained to the judge that one juror, the only black member of the
panel, appeared opposed to applying the drug laws in the case, believing
that the defendants had "a right to deal drugs," the opinion said.
After interviewing the jurors, the trial judge concluded that the black
juror felt that the defendants "were in a disadvantaged situation" and
would not vote to convict "no matter what the evidence was." The judge
removed the juror and the 11 remaining jurors voted to convict.
In its ruling Tuesday, the appellate court actually overturned the
convictions, saying that the juror in this case may truly have been
unpersuaded of the defendants' guilt and that the judge was wrong to
conclude that he was disregarding the law. But the appeals court said
the judge was right to investigate the juror's motivation, and used the
case to take a strong stand against nullification.
"We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the
rule of law, jury nullification is desirable, or that courts may permit
it to occur when it is within their power to prevent," Cabranes wrote.
The decision comes as the legal community is embroiled in a debate over
race and the justice system, and whether it is ever appropriate for
jurors to intentionally disregard the law, in acquitting or convicting,
as a form of protest.
The appellate court noted that jury nullification has deep roots in
American jurisprudence. It protected fugitive slaves from being sent
back to the South in the period before the Civil War, as northern juries
refused to convict. But the court noted that there were also "shameful
examples of how nullification has been used to sanction murder and
lynching." Among the cases cited were the hung juries in the 1964 trials
of Byron De La Beckwith in Mississippi for the murder of Medgar Evers.
"It's a twoedged sword," said Burt Neuborne, professor at New York
University School of Law. "It's become, we can't live with it and we
can't live without it. We acknowledge that jury nullification can be the
ultimate defense against government oppression, but we also fear it
because it's corrosive of the rule of law."
The debate intensified recently when a George Washington University law
professor, Paul Butler, who is black, wrote that in certain nonviolent
cases, black jurors would be justified in acquitting black defendants to
protest racism in the criminal justice system.
Randall Kennedy, who teaches race and the law at Harvard University Law
School and is also black, recently attacked Butler's position. He argued
that jury nullification, even as a form of protest, is immoral and
selfdestructive for black people.
Kennedy said he had not yet seen the court's decision but "it sounds to
me like the second circuit acquitted itself well."
"It seems that it wanted to set forth a marker," he said, "given all the
loose talk going on. One simply cannot allow ideas to be in the air
unopposed."
The appeals court said that even after secret deliberations had begun in
a case, a judge could dismiss a juror for failing to adhere to the
evidence and the law.
But it placed a heavy burden on judges to make a solid case that a juror
intended to disregard the law, because even beginning to question jurors
about their intentions would mean invading the historic secrecy of the
deliberative process. Judges will have to walk a narrow line, as they
inquire about a juror's intentions at the same time as they endeavor to
safeguard jury secrecy, the opinion suggested.
If the decision stands, it will apply to all federal criminal cases
within the circuit, which includes New York, Connecticut and Vermont.
But given the high visibility of the second circuit and the prominence
of Cabranes, who has been mentioned in the past as a Supreme Court
contender, legal experts said the decision, while not binding elsewhere,
was likely to be widely influential.
Federal prosecutors in New York praised the decision. Mary Jo White, the
U.S. attorney in Manhattan, said the ruling was important "not only for
law enforcement but for just verdicts based on the law."
Thomas Maroney, the U.S. attorney whose Albany office handled the cases
that were overturned, said no decision had been reached on whether to
seek a review by either the appeals court or the Supreme Court, or to
retry the case.
The decision, written by Cabranes and joined by Judges Edward Lumbard
and Joseph McLaughlin, remanded the drug cases for new trials.
Defense lawyers also praised the decision for imposing a high threshold
on judges considering whether to remove a juror accused of disregarding
the law.
Cabranes wrote that a judge must be sure that the juror is not merely
unpersuaded by the government's evidence, a hurdle the court said the
judge in the Albany drug case failed to clear.
"A presiding judge faced with anything but unambiguous evidence that a
juror refuses to apply the law as instructed need go no further in his
investigation of alleged nullification," Cabranes wrote. Such a juror
could not be dismissed.
"It's a strong statement that just because a juror is voting not guilty,
doesn't mean it is nullification," said Barry Leiwant, a lawyer with the
federal defender division of the Legal Aid Society, who represented one
of the drug defendants in the Albany case.
###
New York Times
229 W. 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
Phone: (212) 5561234
Fax: (212) 5563690
Email: letters@nytimes.com
Web: http://www.nytimes.com
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