DEALING WITH MEXICO

This week's visit by Mexico's president to Washington will refocus
attention on what is at stake for US national security and for Mexico as a
nation. No country in this hemisphere will make as much of a difference to
America's standard of living in the next century as Mexico.

Dealing with Mexico has never been easy for the United States. On almost
all issues the two countries both cooperate and disagree. Mexico is not
only the second largest US trade partner but also its main source of
illegal drugs and migrants. The United States has invaded or intervened in
Mexico more than in any other country. Eleven states used to be part of
Mexico. In most of these the largest and fastest growing minority is
Mexicans. This will lead to fierce and complex debates over US policies
toward Mexico.

There has been a gradual but critical shift in the oversight and
coordination of Mexican affairs, first from the State Department to the
Treasury Department and, more recently, to the Pentagon and national
security agencies. The bureaucracy that hosts the meetings and sets the
agenda also tends to take the leading policysetting role.

Throughout the 1980s, the State Department ran USMexico policy. The
undersecretary for Latin American affairs set the agenda. The debate
focused on diplomatic issues, Mexican nationalism, and CubaCentral
America. This started to change in 1982, when Mexico's first major
financial crisis threatened loan defaults and a potential collapse of some
of the largest banks in the United States.

Mexico's leaders downplayed nationalism and sought to keep the economy
afloat with orthodox economic measures. A closed electoral system kept
voters and unions at bay even while real wages gradually dropped to the
levels of the 1960s. Meanwhile, creditors were bailed out and paid off on
four occasions as Mexico's economy crashed during presidential transitions.
A few in Mexico opted to become guerrillas, but most angrily endured,
accumulating frustration and losing hope.

Until recently, Mexico was seen in the United States primarily as a
financial risk, not a diplomatic or security crisis. The Treasury
Department was the lead player on Mexican policy. Decisionmaking was
focused on how to overcome Mexico's economic problems, and apart from the
murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena most reports on drugs, corruption, and
political instability were put aside in the interest of stabilizing
Mexico's economy.

Over the past two years, the United States has gotten increasingly involved
in Mexico's security apparatus; the primary lens through which it looks at
Mexico is now national security. Four crises caused this shift.

First, the Chiapas guerrilla uprising (which started on the night NAFTA was
implemented) blindsided the military and intelligence authorities in both
countries. Then a Colombiastyle series of murders began, which included
the leading presidential candidate, a cardinal, and the head of the major
political party. Third, on Dec. 19, 1995, Mexico's economy melted down,
triggering a massive drop in Latin American markets and forcing President
Clinton to assemble a $50 billion package of loans and credit.

Finally, over the past two years evidence of corruption and penetration by
drug cartels have led to a militarization of Mexico's police departments,
airports, intelligence apparatus, drugfighting agencies, and the attorney
general's office.

Direct and indirect US military and police involvement in Mexico is
growing. In the past two years we have witnessed the first official
exchange of visits by the two nations' secretaries of defense. Mexican
generals are increasingly visiting the Pentagon. Mexico is suddenly the
largest recipient of international military and education training funds in
Latin America. Thousands of Mexican soldiers have been trained at Fort
Bragg and other facilities.

The number of DEA and other agents in Mexico has also increased enormously.
Along the border, US military and National Guard personnel are increasingly
used to patrol, interdict drugs, and provide intelligence. These days, it
is more common to hear drug czar Barry McCaffrey's view on Mexico than
Madeleine Albright's or Robert Rubin's. Representatives of the state and
treasury departments increasingly attend meetings on Mexico at the National
Security Council, the Pentagon, and the National Office for Drug Control.

This effort to strengthen and cooperate with Mexico's military could, if
mismanaged, have severe consequences for an emerging democracy. It might
also seriously hurt USMexico relations if there is insufficient
communication with the opposition parties in Mexico. This is particularly
true today given the weakness and levels of corruption that have permeated
the ruling party and given the severe rifts within the top levels of the
Mexican military over drug policy, politics, and military involvement in
heretofore civilian jobs.

The risk is not so much a coup. The real danger is hobbling the military
because of the massive corruption associated with the drug wars. There is
also the risk of increasingly drastic and authoritarian measures
exemplified by the statements of General Salgado, chief of Mexico City's
police, who warned that the alternative to continued summary roundups and
arrests on a large scale is a military curfew throughout the city.

There are good reasons for both countries to keep the military out of the
primary drug battle lines. The military commands on both sides of the
border, however courageous and honest, should not be in charge of the
oversight and implementation of antidrug, intelligence, airport, police,
and customs functions in Mexico. This is not in the longterm interest of
either Mexico or the United States.

For the United States, a strong and effective ambassador is the first line
of defense, along with good political communication. Mexico's Congress may
not be as easy to talk to or implement a clear policy with as a
hierarchical military organization, but in the long run it may provide far
more popular support for necessary cooperation and change. The United
States should send an unequivocal signal that its primary spokespersons and
its policymakers visavis Mexico are mainstream politicians and diplomats.

President Clinton and most Republicans have tried to create and maintain a
bipartisan policy toward Mexico. The nomination of Massachusetts Governor
William Weld was not an attempt to place US Representative Joseph Kennedy
in the Massachusetts State House or to ease the flow of drugs; it was an
effort to bridge political parties and find a highly qualified executive
for one of the world's most complex crossborder relationships. That got
lost in the hubris surrounding the nomination procedure. That does neither
country any good.

Juan Enriquez headed Mexico City's Urban Development Corporation, was a
peace negotiator in the Chiapas guerrilla uprising and is writing a book on
Mexico at Harvard's Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.

Copyright 1997 Globe Newspaper Company.