HOLLAND'S SUPERGRASS CONVICTION IS A REMARKABLE PRECEDENT

Some remarkable events have been taking place over the last 10 days at the
Special Criminal Court in Dublin, but they have gone almost unremarked in
the socalled liberal media. For the first time in the history of the
state, the evidence of a 'supergrass' has been used to procure a criminal
conviction.

This court is, of course, juryless, and was originally intended to try
offenders who pose a threat either to the existence of the state or to the
security of the state. But the charges laid against Patrick Eugene Holland
last week have nothing whatsoever to do with the security of the state. He
was charged with the now very ordinary offence of dealing in cannabis.

Throughout the trial, various prosecution witnesses were permitted by the
court to make a series of casual observations linking Holland to the murder
of journalist Veronica Guerin, yet Holland faced no charge at all connected
with this murder.

Such observations would almost certainly be considered prejudicial in any
normal court of justice. One must presume that they were allowed to be made
in this case, and made repeatedly, because the case was being heard by
respected judges sitting alone, and because there was no risk of a jury
being affected by them. The fact remains that the prejudicial observations
made by various witnesses were entirely irrelevant to the charges actually
faced by Holland. It is legitimate to ask if such observations could have
the effect of creating an aura of guilt around the man in the dock.

It is also legitimate to ask if such observations could have a very
profound impact on public opinion of the accused, and on the whole climate
in which the justice system operates. It is fair to ask why the judges
hearing the case did not seek to prevent witnesses from making such
observations in court.

The main (possibly only substantial) evidence given against Holland came
from supergrass Charles Bowden. Bowden told the open court that he had
himself cleaned and prepared the Magnum gun used to murder Guerin, and
handled the 'dumdum' bullets used (these, incidentally, are illegal under
the Geneva Convention). Bowden is therefore directly linked by his own
evidence to the process leading to the murder of Guerin. No such evidential
link was established in the case of Holland. Yet Bowden has been given
protection under the state's witness protection programme, and with it the
liberty to make prejudicial statements concerning the likes of Holland in a
juryless court.

Bowden told the court that Holland regularly received large consignments of
cannabis from a Dublin criminal gang. It does not appear that Bowden (a
former member of the security forces) ever passed cannabis directly to
Holland. The court accepted Bowden's evidence and convicted Holland of drug
trafficking. Nor does there appear to have been any forensic evidence
linking Holland to drugs, though Garda witnesses claimed that he had made
various admissions concerning drugs while under interrogation. Holland
himself claimed he was not interrogated about drugs after he returned
voluntarily from overseas and was arrested.

Another extraordinary aspect of this case is that Holland's solicitor, the
man whose duty it is to assert Holland's legal rights in the face of the
criminal justice system, was himself arrested five hours after the
detention of his client. While Holland's solicitor was being detained by
the police, he would, quite logically, be unable to assist his client
(Holland) in coping with his interrogation.

It is also of importance to state here that before his arrest and trial
Holland was the subject of regular press coverage linking him to various
offences. Indeed, his name became a household word as a direct result of
this coverage, as did the nickname applied to him by the tabloid media (not
incidentally, the same nickname as was used in evidence against him at the
Special Criminal Court last week). Again, one must assume that such
newspaper coverage would be considered irrelevant to the deliberations of a
court that sits without a jury.

It seems to us that in a week in which our political masters proclaimed
proudly that they intended to alter a suspect's right to silence
(presumably by allowing courts with and without juries to draw inferences
from the silence of an accused in custody), the issues raised by the
Holland case merit some significant public debate. The use of supergrasses
in the Diplock courts in the North was roundly condemned over many years by
those politicians who now make up the Dublin government. The supergrass
system was used to put large numbers of people behind bars in the North
between 1980 and 1987, until finally the use of supergrass evidence was
judged to be unsafe and unacceptable. The obvious question that must be
asked about any supergrass is whether or not it is in the interests of a
supergrass to impress his or her handlers by adding to the evidence he or
she can present, or by embroidering it, or by simply inventing it.

Such questions are fair, particularly when the person chosen to act as a
supergrass is a hardened criminal, and therefore likely to act in an
improper manner and especially when that person is rewarded in a
tangible way for his or her cooperation. Many of those used as supergrasses
by the RUC were, by their own admission, guilty of the most heinous crimes.
To return to the Dublin courts, it would appear that decisions are being
taken by the politicians, by the police, and indeed by the courts, that
will greatly affect the quality and nature of the dispensation of justice
in those courts. These decisions are being taken without any significant
public debate and against a background of hypedup public concern about the
level of serious crime (which is low by European standards). We are not
suggesting that Holland, who faced justice last week, is an angel, or that
he is a pillar of society. But like any citizen he is entitled to his legal
rights under the Constitution. And any citizen could be put in the same
dock in which Holland stood last week. When we, as a society, alter the
rules that define the manner in which an accused person is treated by the
criminal justice system, we thereby alter the rules for each and every
potential accused person, and therefore for each and every citizen. These
are matters of the gravest importance.