A Special Editorial Page Report

HALTING A DEADLY TRADE: AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS

For excellent reasons, no one praises the nation's war against drugs as a
model of efficiency. Instead, despite current close cooperation among law
enforcement agencies, America's long struggle to shed its dangerous drug
habit has been marked by fragmented efforts from thousands of worried,
deeply committed people.

To say it's chaotic would be too strong. It's more like a disjointed
crusade to cut narcotics abuse to an irreducible minimum. Envision a map of
North and South America, and think of a path shaped like a crescent drawn
northward from Colombia through the Caribbean Sea and into Florida. For
this region, the crusade is waged along that crescent of supply and demand;
elsewhere, the battle is fought, literally, worldwide.

Put another way, antidrug campaigners are wielding a scalpel, sometimes
awkwardly, trying to remove a cancer that sickens the United States and
saps its strength. Unless this malignant addiction is mostly excised from
national life, America will continue to lose hundreds of thousands of its
sons and daughters every year to the destructive lure of cocaine, heroin,
marijuana and other drugs.

In a series of editorials starting today, the SunSentinel examines the war
against drugs in its major aspects and offers forceful recommendations to
make the battle more successful. The inseparable two sides of the antidrug
coin, supply and demand, are the framework within which the editorials are
written.

Toss the coin in the air, and if it lands showing the supply side, that
means this nation's unrelenting actions to block the growing, processing
and transporting of illegal drugs into the United States. If the coin
reveals the demand side, it signifies the gritty, largely unsung push to
prevent children and teenagers from experimenting with narcotics their
first stumble toward personal hell and to treat and rehabilitate those
who have fallen into dependency on drugs.

Both sides of the antidrug coin must be seen, and acted on with great
vigor, or the narcotics cancer will spread and engulf more and more of
America's youngsters. The urgency of intensifying the war against drugs
right now, and of embarking on new tactics while stepping up existing ones
that are successful, is caused by the frightening rise in children's drug
use for five consecutive years.

This image illustrates the unforgiving reality of America's heartbreak over
drugs: Actor Carroll O'Connor, anguish lining his face and cracking his
voice, asks parents to ``get between your kids and drugs, any way you
can.'' In this television spot, the grieving O'Connor reminds parents that
his son committed suicide after a painful and losing fight against drug
addiction. Hugh O'Connor died at 32, but his slide to disaster began many
years earlier, as a teenager.

COLOMBIA'S CORRUPT SAMPER WON'T LAST, BUT U.S. POLICY SHOULD

When Colombia's excuses about drug lords and corruption grate intolerably
on U.S. sensibilities, and anger intensifies, drastic ideas pop out from
otherwise rational Americans:

The United States should invade Colombia. Or bomb it into rubble. Or try to
strangle the economic life out of it by imposing an embargo like the one on
Cuba.

Any of those hotheaded options would inevitably harm millions of honest
Colombians, many of whom risk their lives to fight against immensely rich
and powerful drug interests. After they cool down, frustrated Americans
realize the unfairness of their own ideas, and also understand every other
nation in the hemisphere would oppose them vigorously.

It's better to be practical and realistic. No matter how many times
Colombian President Ernesto Samper breaks his promises on antidrug moves,
it's encouraging to remember that he too shall pass. Soon.

By next August, the corrupt Samper will be gone from the presidential
palace, and a successor will take over. The new president will be chosen by
Colombia's voters in what is hoped to be a free and open election.

Before October's municipal elections in Colombia, rebels with drug ties
intimidated voters and candidates in some sections of the country, forcing
them to stay away from the polls or withdraw from races. To prevent a
recurrence will require firm action by the Colombian government which
may or may not happen.

Right now, as Samper fades from political view, U.S. policymakers have an
excellent opening to plan for his successor's fouryear term and for the
decade following. Both short and longrange policies should be debated
thoroughly within the U.S. government, and a creative mindset will help.

The oneonone relationship between the U.S. and Colombia demands intensive
scrutiny, but so does the growing interest in multinational efforts to
combat drugs throughout the hemisphere. In a sense drug cartels operate
like multinational corporations, frequently crossing national borders to
buy and sell their goods, and those who fight against them must do
likewise. The scourge of narcotics extends to every nation in the Western
Hemisphere.

First, though, there's the extradition issue and ``Samper's promise,'' a
laughable oxymoron. Samper promised to push through a new law allowing
Colombian drug criminals to be extradited to the U.S. or elsewhere, so they
can be tried before stern judges who will send them to bleak prisons.

A new law was approved by Colombia's Congress in late November, with a huge
loophole to protect Cali drug kingpins already in Colombian jails. Samper
was notable for his weakness in the process, watching passively.

The U.S. wanted to stop the infuriating farce in which Colombian courts
impose shamefully light sentences on convicted drug kingpins. To make it
worse, cartel leaders live in luxurious surroundings in socalled jails,
while continuing to run drug empires.

Nothing is more demoralizing to law enforcement agents. And nothing sets a
worse example for young Colombians, who may choose a life of drug crime
because ``punishment'' is so ridiculously soft.

The new law, outrageous as it is in shielding the sorry hides of Cali
cartel bosses Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, is still much better
than nothing. The U.S. should continue to criticize the escape hatch and
press Samper's successor to change it, but meanwhile move to extradite
major drug criminals arrested from now on.

Next on the shortterm agenda is certification or continued decertification
next year of Colombia as a drugfighting ally. For the past two years,
Colombia has been decertified, meaning the U.S. decided there was too much
corruption connected to narcotics and too little action against drugs.

To abandon this weapon now would be a mistake. Better to use it as a
carrotandstick to persuade the Colombian government to take stronger
action against drug criminals, or face economic sanctions.

If certification is wielded as a bludgeon, however, it could backfire. If
Colombian political leaders conclude there's no chance for certification,
what incentive will they have to toughen their antidrug laws?

Deft diplomacy is therefore essential. The Colombians should understand the
possibility, if they actually follow through on most of their antidrug
plans, of moving one step up the certification ladder.

That wouldn't be full certification, but what is called ``vital interest
certification.'' The U.S. could declare as it now does with Belize,
Lebanon and Pakistan that while Colombia falls short of full antidrug
cooperation, its efforts were substantial enough to qualify for a form of
certification because U.S. vital interests are involved.

What interests? It hardly matters, but one could be the continuing need for
the U.S. to shore up Colombia's antidrug efforts.

None of this is to suggest the certification process is fair. One American
correctly called it odious, arrogant and unilateral.

For now, though, certification should be kept intact. If and when a
broader, multinational attack on drugs can replace it, that's the time to
pack away this arrogant but useful weapon.

COLOMBIA'S PLAN TO STAMP OUT DRUGS ISN'T WORKING

No one doubts that Colombia remains the focal point of the international
cocaine trade, nor its recent emergence as a source of potent heroin.
Whether Colombia qualifies as the worst drug offender in the Western
Hemisphere, however, is open to argument, with some law enforcement
officers contending Mexico does even less to combat drugs.

Despite President Ernesto Samper's dalliance with drug lords, and his
behindthescenes sabotage of antidrug legislation, Colombia still has
made modest progress. The 100,000member national police force, for
example, is credited with courageous confrontation of drug traffickers;
this applies mostly to an elite, 2,500person antidrug unit of gutsy
police officers.

Some segments of the Colombian military forces have distanced themselves
from corrupt colleagues, and worked to eradicate illegal crops of coca and
poppies. In Colombia's Congress, after sustained pressure from the nation's
private sector, an asset forfeiture law was passed; it will go into effect,
applying to drug criminals, unless a constitutional challenge succeeds.

Money laundering, which is woven tightly into the cocaine trade, was made a
crime in 1995. The weak law means little, however, because it's not being
enforced.

Much too often, that's the standard in Colombia. Sometimes, it's even worse
than just standing still.

As part of its official 1995 antinarcotics plan to comply, however
reluctantly, with the 1988 United Nations Convention against drugs
Colombia pledged to eradicate illicit crops within two years. Instead,
despite the destruction of some crops in the field, the total amount of
coca acreage in Colombia increased by 32 percent in a year.

Obviously, the grand plan isn't working. In some aspects Colombia is
slipping backward, setting teeth on edge in the U.S. and among honest
Colombians. If the U.S. government pushes too hard, there's a possibility
Colombia will become further destabilized, with rebel forces grabbing more
of the countryside.

For the long term, the most promising course is to shift much of the
antidrug effort to multinational mechanisms, formal or informal. That
way, Colombian resentment against American pressure will be blunted as
will the resentment's impact on elections and Colombians could say
truthfully that specific antidrug measures were agreed to by many nations
in a democratic process.

On Sept. 26, the State Department published an 18page analysis and
proposal advocating a counternarcotics alliance for the hemisphere. Except
for its inexplicable failure to give prominent emphasis to reducing demand
for drugs it was barely mentioned the proposal offers solid
suggestions that could, over time, create a more effective offensive
against narcotics.

Simple, streamlined approaches may be the most effective, as in the
existing cooperation among the U.S., Peru and Colombia to shut down the
drug ``air bridge'' between the latter two nations. The wellcoordinated
effort against drugladen airplanes heading from Peru's cocagrowing
regions to Colombia's processing laboratories succeeded so well that Peru's
cultivation of drug crops dropped sharply.

For more complex issues, though, formal agreements and organizations
probably will be needed. As long as antidrug efforts aren't bogged down by
paperwork and the creaky bureaucracy of international organizations, they
have a chance to succeed.

In the difficult tasks of sophisticated criminal investigations, moves to
halt money laundering, confiscation of chemicals used to process drugs and
plans to not only destroy coca and poppy fields but to offer farmers
reasonable alternative crops in all those areas, expert advice and
detailed training are vital. Many hermispheric nations by themselves aren't
equipped with the institutions, traditions and knowledge to cope with those
issues.

The Organization of American States, through its InterAmerican Drug Abuse
Control Commission, already is active in this field and could expand its
work to give badly needed advice and guidance to nations seeking help.
Among other daunting and delicate tasks, the OAS commission could be asked
to monitor progress of each country in meeting its own antidrug plan. Not
only would measurement devices have to be developed and accepted, the OAS
would have to mollify egos and soothe sensitivities in each nation.

A dizzying array of other international groups and task forces, both
wellestablished and new, also are involved in drug issues. A sensible
overall goal would be to settle on two or three multinational groups to
give training and carry out such admirable ideas as establishing a Latin
American Judicial Center, which would try to bring the hemisphere's
judicial systems into the modern era.

Next April at the Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, more steps
will be considered to build a counternarcotics alliance. No realist expects
the overall process to be quick or without delays and disputes.

Still, it must move forward. The current fragmented antidrug efforts are
effective only sporadically, and the multinational approach at least holds
promise.



A MAN OF INTEGRITY COULD HAVE IMPACT

BOGOTA, Colombia An 18yearold Colombian from the slums buys a $20
million building, for cash, and no one questions the deal. A government
commission that's supposed to oversee realestate transactions shuts its
eyes and fails to ask the teenager, who never before had 300 pesos (30
cents) to ride a bus, how he miraculously obtained such a giant pile of money.

Of course the commission won't ask. That would be dangerous. And what are
bribes for, if not to protect Colombia's drug criminals who provide them?

To Alfonso Valdivieso, a presidential candidate who denounces with equal
vigor drug criminals and corrupt politicians who accept their bribes, such
blatant transactions demonstrate how narcotics interests permeate this
staggering nation of 37 million beleagured citizens. If elected president,
Valdivieso says, he would halt those drugdrenched deals, among many other
steps to restore Colombia to world respectability.

Is Valdivieso to be believed? Could he or anyone else really untangle
Colombia from the lucrative drug trade, while defeating or coming to terms
with two rebel armies that control 40 percent of the countryside, wiping
out human rights abuses by paramilitaries and regaining the world's trust?

At first impression, Valdivieso hardly looks like a dragon slayer or even a
moderately attractive politician for the TV age. He's short, 5feet6 at
most, and refuses to speak in simplistic sound bites.

Yet he radiates energy and decisiveness, his thick mustache bristling with
outrage at the drugdriven disaster that grips Colombia so tightly. Never
before have I seen a mustache actually bristle, but there's no temptation
to laugh because Valdivieso is all business and obviously means precisely
what he says.

As he briskly outlines his plans, it becomes apparent why this former
attorney general of Colombia is referred to as a man of integrity. He may
be short, but he's decidedly not small nor lacking in either personal
courage or intellectual subtlety.

Valdivieso says he'll never back down from drug lords, no matter how
powerful or threatening, and my inclination is to take him at his word. The
questions then become: Could he carry out his ideas? Will he get the
chance, considering that Horacio Serpa, the handpicked candidate of
corrupt incumbent President Ernesto Samper, holds a large lead over all
other contenders in early polls?

After Valdivieso resigned as attorney general in disgust over Samper's
shameful corruption, he and his backers rigorously analyzed his chances to
win the presidency. They realize the SamperSerpa duo is more experienced
and can draw on an existing organization to bring out sympathetic or
bribed voters.

Valdivieso, though, decided to barge ahead, hoping for a strong enough
showing to finish second to Serpa in the primary voting next May 31, and
then pushing hard to win the runoff the following month. From a
wellguarded house tucked into a culdesac and transformed into a campaign
headquarters, Valdivieso and a small band of colleagues are battling for
public attention. His honesty in refusing to take popular stances won't
help at the polls. Unlike most Colombian and other Latin American
politicians, for instance, Valdivieso declines to pound the antiU.S. drum
about the demand for drugs to the north.

The U.S. must curb its appetite for cocaine and heroin, he says, but that
doesn't mean Colombia should downplay its own huge contributions to
hemispheric drug misery: growing, producing and trafficking in narcotics.
Above all, Valdivieso argues intensely, Colombia must deal with entrenched
political corruption generated by drugs. He never mentions his former boss,
President Samper, but the implication is unmistakable. Samper is accused of
accepting at least $6 million in drug bribes, and few knowledgeable
observers doubt his guilt, despite a highly suspect whitewash by Colombia's
Senate.

Not too many years ago, when Colombia was less corrupt and more respected,
the mythical Juan Valdez sort of symbolized the country in the U.S. As
you'll recall, Valdez starred in commercials, searching Colombian mountain
slopes for perfect coffee trees and beans.

Maybe that's not the symbol preferred by serious Colombians, but it's far
superior to the current one: a drug lord living in obscene luxury, even
while in ``prison.'' Under Serpa, that wouldn't change. With Valdivieso as
president, it might.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE IS CRITICAL

On Oct. 8, Eduardo A. Gamarra of Florida International University testified
in Washington before the House Committee on International Relations,
subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. A native of Bolivia, Gamarra is an
associate professor and assistant director of FIU's Latin American and
Caribbean Canter.

Here are excerpts from his remarks about South America.

Overall, the battle against drug trafficking and related crimes in South
America has a very mixed record. . . . No matter how much effort, resources
and time is dedicated to this phenomenon, it appears to grow larger and to
become increasingly more sophisticated. . . .

Transnational narcotics trafficking and related crimes have no nationality;
in 1997, every single South American country has been touched by the
industry in some way. Moreover, the presence of Nigerian, Russian, Italian
and other organized criminal organizations reveals the global nature of
this problem. . . .

Despite these odds South American countries have demonstrated an important
degree of political will to combat illegal drugs and related crimes. . . .
The fact is that most South Americans and their governments are not drug
traffickers. . . .

A striking conclusion derived from interviews with government officials in
two countries is that without a degree of international pressure,
governments appear less likely to abide by the terms of the international
agreements they have signed. . . . Without intensive international
pressure, the governments of the region may be inclined to pursue other,
less punitive avenues to combat drugs. . . .

At the core, the problem has to do with ageold questions of governability
and political stability. And this reality presents the international
community with a very serious dilemma: relentlessly pursuing the
implementation of international counterdrug accords could have serious
repercussions for the political stability of individual countries. In some
places, the very survival of countries and their governments may be
threatened. . . .

This is not an endorsement of the certification process. On the contrary,
the record reveals that while the affected governments may indeed carry out
more effective and punitive counternarcotics campaigns, the destabilizing
impact on the economy and the political system of a country like Colombia
may erode whatever gains are made in the counternarcotics area. . . .

A striking and unintended result of certification is the increasing
popularity of individuals singled out by U.S. officials for their alleged
linkages to drug traffickers. The only obvious conclusion is that there is
a serious and urgent need to establish international monitoring mechanisms
that the region can live with. . .

But the key question is how to wage an effective counternarcotics effort
that does not subvert basic democratic rights and affect governance. To
that end, the following should become important elements of the present
strategy:

Prioritize democratic and civilian control over all law enforcement and
military efforts.

Continue institutional reform efforts, especially judiciaries. . . .

Continue the trend toward multilateralization of counternarcotics
efforts by supporting the role of the OAS. . . . Involve development banks,
nongovernmental organizations, the European Union, the United Nations in
the current efforts.

Rethink current unilateral certification policy and develop multilateral
monitoring mechanisms as an alternative.

At a minimum develop clear, achievable goals in each country. . . .

Increase multilateral resources to noninterdiction strategies,
especially alternative development programs for coca farmers in Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru.

U.S. POLICY SHIFTS NOTICED OVER TIME

In the past three years, Colombian political scientist Andres Franco of
Javeriana University has noticed distinct shifts in U.S. policy toward
Colombia. A Ph.D. candidate at the University of Miami, Franco says in
1994, just after Ernesto Samper was elected president and scandals about
him began to emerge, the United States adopted a ``chorus of diplomacy''
that was directed, negatively, at the entire nation of Colombia.

By early 1996, when the evidence of Samper's personal corruption had become
overwhelming, the U.S. seemed to decide it was unwise to criticize and hurt
Colombia as a whole. Instead, says Franco, the U.S. cancelled Samper's visa
so he couldn't travel to this country and tried to isolate him, limiting
his official contacts with Americans to infrequent talks with U.S.
Ambassador Myles Frechette.

By early 1997, that approach had been modified to what Franco calls
``fragmented cooperation.'' The U.S would work with specific ``good guys''
in Colombia's government, police, military and the private sector, but not
with Samper and others linked to drug corruption.

Now the reality of Colombia as a formal democracy compels the United States
to look ahead. Samper's term ends next summer, and Colombian voters will
choose a new president to replace him.

U.S. policy toward Colombia after next year's election will be influenced,
although not dictated, by whether the new president is a ``good guy'' or
has been bought by drug interests.

Copyright © 1997, SunSentinel Company and South Florida Interactive, Inc.