DISAPPEARING ACT FAILS TO LAY CIA QUESTIONS TO REST

There are magicians within the U.S. government. Last week, they played a
dirty trick, causing two official reports on allegations of a Contracrack
cocaine connection to vanish into bureaucratic thin air.

These reports one by the Department of Justice, and one by the Central
Intelligence Agency are the result of more than a year of internal
investigation into allegations of government complicity in the crack
cocaine trade.

Yielding to public outcry sparked by the ``Dark Alliance'' series that
appeared in the Mercury News in August 1996, the government agreed to
conduct a fullfledged inquiry into what U.S. officials know, when they
knew it, and what they did about drug smuggling during the CIAsponsored
Contra war in Nicaragua.

Both reports were scheduled to be released last Thursday. But one day
before the press conference, Attorney General Janet Reno's office abruptly
canceled distribution of the 400page Justice Department report on the
vague grounds that it would compromise an ongoing lawenforcement
operation. The CIA then decided not to release volume one of a twovolume
study it has prepared. Neither agency would say specifically when the
stillsecret reports would be released.

In their place come the selective leaks that are an inevitable part of the
Washington spin game.

Unidentified CIA officials told reporters that the CIA found ``no
information to indicate that the CIA coordinated or condoned drug
trafficking or had dealings with crack dealers.'' Justice Department
sources asserted that there is no evidence that two prominent Nicaraguan
drug dealers in California had been protected from prosecution by their
alleged association with the Contras.

End of story. Scandal laid to rest.

But the scope of the issue has always been far broader than whether the CIA
knew about the drug trafficking of Danilo Blandon and Norwin Meneses, as
the ``Dark Alliance'' series implied. And public concern over what happened
during the covert war against Nicaragua will not be allayed until the CIA
and Justice Department answer a slew of questions:

How did highranking U.S. officials justify consorting with major drug
kingpins such as Manuel Noriega during the Contra operations?

Why did CIA agents authorize certain Contra groups to take funds and
equipment from known drug smugglers?

How did indicted drug runners gain U.S. government contacts to ferry
supplies to the rebels?

Why was $32,000 seized in a drug raid of two Nicaraguan smugglers readily
returned by U.S. prosecutors on the specious claims that it was Contra
funds?

What kept the Justice Department from expeditiously prosecuting Meneses and
Blandon, two of California's most notorious cocaine wholesalers?

Even though the Mercury News itself has acknowledged serious shortcomings
in the series, answers to these and other questions are required to lay the
matter to rest.

Yet there are already signs the CIA has failed to thoroughly cover all its
bases. For example, the former CIA agent in charge of the Contra war, Duane
Clarridge, shows up in declassified electronic memos and White House notes
as a participant in one effort to get a major Honduran drug smuggler a
reduced sentence, and another effort to arrange a quid pro quo deal with
Noriega. Yet Clarridge rejected the CIA inquiry as ``a bunch of bullshit.''

Such views on the part of a former official once entrusted with the
security of America are hardly likely to instill confidence in this
investigation. Indeed, the sudden delay in releasing the reports can only
add fuel to the fire of public skepticism and cynicism about the CIA's and
Justice Department's conclusions. ``It raises questions and suspicions,''
said Rep. Maxine Waters, DLos Angeles, who has been outspoken on the
issue. ``In the minds of some people, it stinks.''

Indeed, although the two reports were meant to restore integrity to the
process of the government, their publication when and if that occurs
will not be enough to overcome charges of coverup and whitewash.

Only full disclosure of the documentation upon which the reports are based
can provide the credibility and accountability demanded by the issue. The
CIA is reported to have gathered more than 200,000 pages of secret cables,
reports and memos; the Justice Department compiled some 40,000 classified
documents during its inquiry. It is imperative that both agencies release
these documents to allow for informed public evaluation of their
conclusions.

Already three freedom of information organizations the National Security
Archive, the Center for National Security Studies and the Federation of
American Scientists have jointly requested ``the most complete and
candid disclosure of evidence possible.''

In a letter to both agencies, Reps. Waters, John Conyers, DMich., and Ron
Dellums, DOakland, have warned that closure on this issue requires the
most overt display of openness on the part of the government.

``It is regrettable,'' Dellums wrote, ``that the majority of Americans
currently believe that it is routine procedure for the `government' to
obfuscate matters; not to confuse our enemies, but to prevent our citizens
from learning about possibly shameful public acts.''

There were a number of shameful acts associated with the CIA's Contra war.
And if the full reports and internal records of this history are finally
declassified, it should be considered a victory for the American public's
right to know what was done in its name. Anything less than full disclosure
on an issue this sensitive would be a mistake; not even a Houdini could
make this scandal disappear.

Peter Kornbluh is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive and
coauthor of ``The IranContra Scandal: A Declassified History.'' He wrote
this article for Perspective in the San Jose Mercury News.