ILLUSIONS OF A WAR AGAINST COCAINE

Panama is debating whether to let Washington keep American soldiers there
to combat drug trafficking after the 1999 pullout date set by the canal
treaties. The proposal, called the Multinational Counternarcotics Center,
is one of several efforts to broaden the role of Latin American militaries
in fighting drugs. It is dismaying to see Congress and the Clinton
Administration return to a strategy that has failed and could harm Latin
democracies.

Washington is seeking to keep more than 2,000 soldiers in Panama for 12
years to continue coordinating radar searches for suspicious aircraft, a
job that could be done from American soil. The troops would also train
Latin American military and police forces in drug-fighting. The project
needs the approval of Panama's Congress and its voters in a referendum.

Some American officials say the proposal is a way for Washington to
maintain ties and coordination with Latin militaries now that cold-war
rationales have evaporated.

Military aid and sales to Colombia have also been resumed, and this year
Congress approved a five-year project costing up to $100 million to train
and equip Colombian and Peruvian militaries to interdict drugs transported
by river.

Washington has periodically pushed the Mexican military to take on an
anti-drug role, and since 1996 has provided training, intelligence and
equipment.

Some cooperation with Latin American law enforcement is useful.

Crop substitution programs, which give coca-growing peasants economic
incentives to switch crops, deserve expansion. But no one should put too
much store in efforts to stop the production of cocaine in Latin America.

Past efforts have not reduced the flow of drugs to the United States. A
Rand Corporation study showed that source-country control was by far the
least cost-effective way of reducing cocaine use. Treatment for addicts, it
found, could have the same impact at a 20th of the price.

Even effective military operations show this strategy's limits. The
Peruvian Air Force has stopped many planes carrying coca paste to Colombia
for processing. But that success, along with a fungus that has attacked
Peru's coca plants, has simply pushed coca-growing into Colombia.

Military strategies are not only ineffective, they can be harmful. The
virus of corruption contaminates everyone who comes near the drug war, as
the wave of recent arrests of Mexican officers shows. There is evidence
from several countries that militaries have used their American equipment
and training to fight guerrillas or to abuse human rights. The
counternarcotics relationship has also led some Clinton Administration
officials to praise officers and strengthen militaries that threaten
civilian rule. These are echoes of cold-war abuses that the Administration
should heed.

Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company