U.S. beefs up military presence in Colombia

BOGOTA, Colombia -- Responding in part to a mounting rebel threat, the
Clinton administration in recent weeks has doubled the size of the U.S.
military advisory group in Colombia and is reviewing the current level of
military aid, U.S. officials say.

A major defeat of the Colombian army this month by Marxist guerrillas has
sparked new debate in Washington about possible counterinsurgency actions
and other ways to address the rebels' growing involvement in the drug trade.

Top Colombian military officials, as well as Republican politicians on
Capitol Hill, say it is impossible to wage the war on drugs without directly
confronting Colombia's increasingly powerful 15,000-member insurgency. The
rebels constitute the primary military force protecting the airstrips,
cultivation fields and processing plants that supply most of the heroin and
cocaine sold in the United States.

Clinton administration officials acknowledge they are having difficulty
reconciling their current ``hands-off'' policy toward the insurgency with
their desire to aggressively prosecute a $215 million-a-year international
war on drugs.

``I'm positive there's some major intelligence reassessment going on out
there,'' one administration official said in reference to a brutal army
defeat two weeks ago by guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or FARC. The battle occurred in southern Caqueta province, one of
the country's chief cocaine-production areas.

Colombia, which supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine and 60 percent of
the heroin seized in the United States, currently receives more than 40
percent of the administration's $215 million international counternarcotics
budget, according to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.

As of this week, the United States had 223 military personnel stationed
around Colombia to provide training and technical assistance, including
counterinsurgency instruction, to the Colombian army and police, said Raul
Duany, spokesman of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami.

The normal U.S. military staffing level in Colombia is about 100 people and
rarely exceeds 130 personnel, said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Byron Conover, another
Southern Command official.

Duany said that the level of military personnel can fluctuate from month to
month and that up to 50 of the current military staff in Colombia could be
rotated out over the next few weeks.

The United States also is studying ways to provide increased air support for
government forces, either through a multimillion-dollar upgrade of
Colombia's fleet of U.S.-supplied Huey UH-1H helicopters or through the
purchase of up to six newer and faster Blackhawk helicopters. Congress
already has approved funding for three Blackhawks.

The gradual escalation of U.S. military involvement in Colombia is drawing
statements of concern from across the political spectrum. At least two
congressional hearings are scheduled for later this month to address the
issue.

``This muddle (in administration policy) is getting to the point where we
have to give serious consideration to how far we are willing to go,'' a
senior Republican Senate staff member said, asking not to be identified.

``Right now, we're backing into (the Colombian civil conflict) by default,''
he said. ``One way or another, you're increasing your presence there. You're
increasing the level of equipment, you're increasing the level of personnel.
We're putting our people in harm's way, and you can't do that without having
a clear idea of your policy.''

As those warnings were being voiced on Capitol Hill, the rebel commander in
southern Colombia who led this month's attack warned that the FARC would
begin targeting U.S. military advisers, claiming they are conducting covert
counterinsurgency operations.

FARC regional commander Fabian Ramrez told the Reuters news agency: ``The
claim that the United States is combating drugs in Colombia is a sophism.
All the military and economic aid it is giving to the army is to fight the
guerrillas.''

He added, ``Most (Colombian army) battalions have U.S. advisers, so it is
clear that Colombian rage will explode at any moment, and the objective will
be to defeat the Americans.''

The Washington Office on Latin America, a liberal think-tank, agrees that
the current rebel buildup poses a complex problem for the Clinton
administration.

``We are deeply concerned about the gravity of the situation,'' said Coletta
Youngers, a Colombia expert for the organization. ``You can look at case
after case over history in which the United States gets involved and then
slides down this slippery slope, from Vietnam to Central America.''

A State Department official acknowledged that the guerrilla threat is
growing, although it remains a largely rural-based insurgency that has yet
to pose a significant challenge to central government control in heavily
populated areas.

``It's something to be watched. ... There is definitely a growing link
between the guerrillas and narcotics trafficking in Colombia,'' the official
said.

He added that the army's defeat did not necessarily mean a setback in the
drug war because ``the vast bulk of counternarcotics activities in Colombia
is conducted by anti-narcotics units of the Colombian National Police.''

The army still is conducting a body count from the Caqueta fighting but
acknowledges that more than 80 soldiers are dead or remain missing -- the
highest single toll suffered by the military in more than three decades of
fighting.

The defeat for the 120,000-strong army ``signals the military situation for
the fate of Latin America's oldest democracy may be lost,'' Rep. Ben Gilman,
R-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, said in a
report last Thursday. ``The narco-guerrillas now have only one institution
standing between them and a full-blown `narco-state' -- the Colombian
National Police.''

The Colombian armed forces commander, Gen. Manuel Jos Bonett, and other army
leaders did not respond to requests for an interview. Last week, President
Ernesto Samper ordered 5,000 troops to the region in response to the
guerrilla rout.

In an interview last December, Gen. Bonett criticized the Clinton
administration's restrictions on military aid, saying he does not see a
distinction between guerrillas fighting out of ideological conviction and
those fighting on behalf of drug traffickers.

``For me, all of those in the FARC are narco-guerrillas because they live
off the drug trade,'' he said. ``We are split between the concept I have of
the guerrillas and the (restrictions) we have on where we can use the aid.''

Even White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey, a retired general, suggested
during a visit to Colombia last October that a significant gray area exists
in the U.S. aid policy.

He recited for reporters the administration's policy that U.S. military aid
can be used against insurgents only if they are deemed to be aiding drug
traffickers. Then he stated that there are ``15,000 narco-guerrillas'' in
Colombia, indicating that all of the rebels might legally be targeted with
U.S.-supplied military aid.

U.S. officials say the current policy of non-engagement is designed to avoid
another costly counterinsurgency adventure such as the one the United States
waged in El Salvador throughout the 1980s.

``Everyone knows the dangers involved. Everyone is aware of the linkages,''
said Bob Weiner, spokesman for McCaffrey. He reiterated the administration's
policy, however, that ``our funding is for fighting drugs. We are certainly
not going to intervene in the way the Colombian military handles their
affairs'' regarding the counterinsurgency effort.

This approach is proving increasingly problematic, according to various
analysts, because the guerrillas are undeniably tied to the drug trade and
are growing in strength because of the income they derive from it.

The drug war and Colombia's insurgency ``are inextricably linked,'' although
not all rebels are directly involved in the drug trade, said Riordan Roett,
director of Latin American studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies in Washington.

He added, ``It's doubletalk to make this very Jesuitical statement that
you're fighting the good fight against the evil drug lords but at the same
time saying you won't become involved in a counterinsurgency campaign.''

Lt. Col. Conover said the income the guerrillas derive from the drug trade
has gone to finance the most well-equipped, well-paid leftist insurgency in
Latin American history, which is one reason why it is drawing so much U.S.
attention.

In some cases, according to rebel ledgers captured by the army and police, a
guerrilla fighter can make twice the monthly salary that his army
counterpart earns.

``Where else in the world does that kind of financing exist?'' Lt. Col.
Conover said, adding that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the
rebels to justify their struggle on ideological grounds.

``You can't accept that kind of dirty money'' and still claim to be fighting
a Marxist struggle, he said. ``Their ideological purity is going to be
tainted.''